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ABSTRACT
The concept of human flourishing currently holds a position of prominence within
Christian theology. Numerous theologies assert that a person enjoys the fullness of
humanity, not through conformity to an essential nature, but through being a living
demonstration of what human being can become. This approach to theological
anthropology has proven especially useful for advocacy on behalf of marginalized
groups. Nevertheless, because this approach identifies human being with the capacity for
purposive agency, it remains incapable of affirming the full humanity of persons with
profound cognitive disabilities. These persons lack abilities that purposive agency
presupposes, such as self-representation, language, and goal-oriented thought. The aim of
the present study is to reconstruct theological anthropology so that it includes these
persons without qualification and makes their flourishing an ethical priority.
Christian theologians do not typically regard cognitive disability as a topic
deserving consideration. I thus establish its vital importance by both engaging disability
studies and articulating a relational conceptualization of the imago Dei. Disability studies
challenges the widespread assumption that "disability" is an identity category pertaining
only to a minority of individuals whose bodies or minds are "abnormal." Deborah
Creamer's limits model of disability is especially helpful in illuminating how experiences
of disablement are common to every human life. The expectation that a "normal" body is
entirely free of impairment perpetuates modern ideals of autonomy and self-sufficiency
ii

that no concrete person is capable of embodying. Restated theologically, embodied limits
are the intrinsic, unsurprising consequence of creaturely finitude. The fact of finitude is
itself good rather than a poor alternative to divine perfection.
I further argue that creation in God's image entails living into a relational state of
radical interdependence. Human being is the embodied expression of God's own caring
embrace of vulnerable, dependent others. Purposive agency is merely one capacity
through which this is achieved. Human being remains possible where it is absent.
Through careful reflection on creation, Christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology, I
identify biblical and traditional resources that, beyond being simply compatible with my
anthropology, also provide warrants for affirming the full humanity of persons with
profound cognitive disabilities.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS OF A POPULAR
ANTHROPOLOGY

For many Christian theologians today, the central questions of theological
anthropology—What does it mean to be human? What is this creature’s proper
relationship to God and other beings? What is humankind’s destiny? —cannot be
sufficiently answered without invoking the concept of human flourishing. A strong
emphasis on human flourishing compels the theologian to move beyond purely
speculative consideration of human nature to include practical and moral considerations
in one’s theoretical work. The concern for human flourishing is, at its base, a concern
both to understand and promote the sort of well-being that is most appropriate to human
existence. The widespread adoption of such an approach has produced an academic
climate in which liberationist themes now characterize mainstream theological
discourse.1 Theological texts that do not explicitly address the plight of the marginalized
and disadvantaged are increasingly hard to find. To the extent that the concept of human
flourishing has facilitated this shift in the field, it has indeed been a valuable resource.

Sheila Greeve Davaney asserts that “the power of the liberationist critique has gained wide enough
credence that it is, in this age, a central point for determining the validity of contemporary theological
options.” See Pragmatic Historicism: A Theology for the Twenty-First Century (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2000), xii.
1
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Yet the typical manner in which Christian theologians represent human
flourishing leads to a concept of human being that has troubling implications. This
concept ties a person’s status as a human being to his or her capacity for agency. More
specifically, it valorizes the agency of self-determination or, as I will most often refer to
it, purposive agency.2 It is this preoccupation with agency that renders numerous
theological anthropologies problematic. For all its liberative applications, this portrait of
humanity actually perpetuates the marginalization of certain persons; namely, persons
with profound cognitive disabilities.3 As I discuss in further detail below, these persons
are incapable of exhibiting what is widely assumed to be a chief marker of humanity,
leaving most Christian theologies incapable of affirming them as human without
qualification.
In what follows, I explore how the concepts of human being and human
flourishing might be purged of their implicit ableism. My main argument is that the most
promising means to accomplish that end is to decenter the notion of purposive agency
2

I borrow this term from Hans S. Reinders. See Receiving in the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability,
Theological Anthropology and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008).
In referring to “cognitive disability,” I primarily have in mind the sorts of impairments medical
professionals once classified as “mental retardation” and now more often label “intellectual and
developmental disabilities.” In the present study, I use cognitive disability and intellectual disability
interchangeably. If one were to be precise, however, cognitive disability has a broader application,
including not only intellectual and developmental disabilities, but also conditions such as dementia,
Alzheimer’s, and autism. Not all instances of cognitive disability entail a form of intellectual disability. See
Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson, "Introduction: Rethinking Philosophical Presumptions in Light of
Cognitive Disability,” in Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, eds.
Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2010), 1-26, 1n1. Yet it is
precisely because cognitive disability has a more inclusive meaning that I choose to make it my primary
term. I want to allow the opportunity for the reader to bring to this discussion their own legitimate
applications of the term that I might not discuss here. In speaking of “profound cognitive disabilities,” I
have in mind a person whose impairments place their cognitive abilities below the average toddler or, more
to the point, below what current testing can even measure. For a concise discussion of the diagnoses
“mental retardation” and “intellectual disability,” including the technical distinctions between moderate,
severe, and profound cases, see Pekka Louhiala, Preventing Intellectual Disabilities: Ethical and Clinical
Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-22.
3
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and replace it with an ontology of radical interdependence. The theological anthropology
I propose continues to affirm agency as a genuine and important manifestation of human
being, even as I strive to dislodge it from its current place of primacy. This effort both
upholds the liberationist themes currently prevalent within Christian theology and asserts
that only an unflinching criticism of even the most cherished, shared assumptions about
human flourishing can expand the scope of theological anthropology to include all
persons.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to characterize the assumptions I am
critiquing in further detail and to bring its ableist elements into clearer view. I begin with
a preliminary sketch of what is common to agency-centered anthropologies, including a
brief remark on their historical origins in nineteenth-century continental philosophy. I
then examine particular ways in which several prominent theologians develop the
concept of human flourishing as part of larger theological projects. Next, I specify the
importance that issues of disability hold for theological anthropology as a discipline.
Finally, I plot the course the present study will follow as I pursue a solution to this
pressing theological problem.

Human Beings as Purposive Agents
A Preliminary Description - The Expressivist Turn
Up to this point, I have made only broad claims about the extent to which the
notion of purposive agency currently shapes the theological imagination. To be frank, I
find its presence to be so pervasive within Western thought in general that I consider it
the predominant understanding of human existence among theologians today. For that
3

reason, an investigation into the possibility that popular assumptions about human
flourishing implicitly justify a type of discrimination is a matter of high stakes. If the
majority of Christian theologians operate under these assumptions, then the majority of
them are contributing (albeit unintentionally) to the continued dehumanization of persons
with cognitive disabilities. A charge such as this cannot be made flippantly. I must be as
clear as possible about the sort of theological anthropology I have in mind here. A
general description of its content is, therefore, in order—one that identifies the common
form and shape of an agency-centered anthropology wherever it appears.4
Despite its ubiquity, the form of this anthropology is, historically speaking, quite
recent. As the historical research of Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor effectively
demonstrates, its origins trace back to the first post-Enlightenment generation of German
intellectuals who took Immanuel Kant's revolutionary turn to the subject and his account
of the freedom of the will as starting points for their own projects.5 Berlin singles out
early German Romanticism as the most noteworthy of the nineteenth-century

In Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates speaks of a form as a common characteristic that appears in all the
different actions or things human persons describe with a particular term. In “Euthyphro,” for example,
Socrates wants his interlocutor to identify the characteristic that all pious things possess and that warrants
the attribution of piety to these things. My references to the form of an agency-centered approach to
theological anthropology assume the Socratic understanding of the term. I am referring to the characteristic
themes one will find in all theologians who articulate a version of this approach. See, “Euthyphro,” in Five
Dialogues, 2nd ed., trans. G.M.A. Grube, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 2002), 1-20, 6n7.
4

In my original proposal for this study, my outline included an entire chapter devoted to examining Kant’s
concept of the will and the ways it has shaped present-day understandings of purposive agency. I intend to
revisit this topic soon, perhaps as journal article. For those interested in delving into this topic, see
Immanuel Kant, “Chapter I: Passage from Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morality to Philosophical” and
“Chapter II: Passage from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysic of Morals,” in Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (1785; New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 61-113; Critique of
Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (1788; Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996) 133-272; “Part I: Concerning the Indwelling of the Evil Principle Alongside the
Good, or, Of Radical Evil in Human Nature,” in Religion within the Boundaries of Pure Reason, trans.
George di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology, trans. and eds. Allen W. Wood and George di
Giovanni (1793; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 39-216, 69-97.
5
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philosophical and cultural movements that assume both Kantian values and appropriate
insights from Counter-Enlightenment figures of a decidedly non-Kantian stripe. Taylor's
preferred term for the understanding of human being that emerged during this period is
"expressivism." Taylor's work builds on the insights of Berlin and demonstrates how
other figures who did not expressly participate in the Romantic movement (most notably
G.W.F. Hegel) engaged in similar trends of thought and so contribute to the same
remarkable developments.6
The aggregate effect of these changes is, what Berlin declares to be, "the single
greatest shift in the consciousness of the West that has ever occurred."7 This "gigantic
and radical transformation" grasped the imagination of the first post-Enlightenment
generation so enormously that, after it, "nothing was the same."8 This transformation
generates an understanding of the human being that Taylor calls "one of the cornerstones
of modern culture," an understanding now so deeply entrenched that people find its
relative novelty hard to accept.9 Theodore Vial concurs that most Westerners presently

6

One famous figure Taylor leaves out of his account of expressivism is Friedrich Schleiermacher. Given
Schleiermacher's significant impact on Western thought as "the father of modern theology," Taylor's choice
to overlook him appears rather capricious. For an extended treatment of this topic, see Brent W. Sockness,
“Schleiermacher and the Ethics of Authenticity,” in Journal of Religious Ethics 32, no. 3 (Winter 2004):
477-517. In a future study, I hope to explore more closely the way in which Schleiermacher is directly
responsible for the current prevalence of expressivist values within Christian theology.
7

Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. by Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999), 1.
8

Ibid., 5.

9

Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1989), 376.

5

have an "expressivist anthropology," whether they justify it theoretically or simply
assume it to be true in prereflective ways.10
The most fundamental tenet of this perspective is (as Taylor's chosen term
indicates) that "human activity and human life are seen as expression."11 Although the
twenty-first century reader's first inclination will likely be to find this claim self-evident
and thus unremarkable, its brevity and subtlety also belie the innovation it contains.
Perceiving its true weight requires one to consider what long-standing convictions the
equation of humanity with expression denies, while also ruminating on the statement's
less conspicuous claim that human life is human activity. Expressivism challenges both
the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions by portraying a human life as a complete
interpenetration of form and matter.12 It rejects the notion of a wholly predetermined and
unchanging form of the human that is logically prior to the natural existence of the
human being in whom it becomes empirically evident and particularized. In other words,
a proper human life does not acquire its distinctive shape and purpose from imitating that
which is pure and eternal within the limitations of the natural world.
As an alternative, expressivism sets forth its most original feature—that the
actualization and clarification of human nature and purpose go hand-in-hand.13 Each
human life manifests a potential, perhaps unprecedented, form of humanity that only

10

Theodore Vial, Schleiermacher: A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: T & T Clark, 2013), 55.

11

Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 15.

12

Taylor, Sources of the Self, 379.

13

Sockness, “Schleiermacher and the Ethics of Authenticity,” 486.

6

becomes determinate and discernible through its very manifestation.14 In this way, the
expressivist anthropology fashions an ontology that is thoroughly dynamic, steeped in the
contingencies of history, and nurturing to individuality. Summing up this portrait of the
human being and its agency, Berlin writes, “to live is to do something, to do something is
to express your nature.”15
All the theologians I survey below adopt the values of the expressivist turn in one
fashion or another. To be fair, the appearances of expressivism across the theological
literature are various and nuanced. Two theologians may share this very same concept of
human being and yet arrive at that concept through different methodologies or justify it
within different theoretical frameworks. To illustrate the reality of this state of affairs, I
turn to the writings of five theologians—Gordon Kaufman, Sheila Greeve Davaney,
Dwight Hopkins, Kathryn Tanner, and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki. Each of them hold (or
have recently held) a prominent position at a prestigious theological institution. I have
selected texts in which these scholars explicitly present their respective understandings of
what it means to be human, each text having been published within the last twenty-five
years. My intentions in surveying these texts are both instructive and polemical. In one
respect, my aim is to provide a sense of how truly pervasive an agency-centered approach
is by describing a variety of the theological frameworks in which it operates today. My
descriptions of these viewpoints will also highlight the laudable purposes toward which
this approach is often directed, thereby shedding additional light on why this motif has
become so popular within the theological literature. In another respect, I want to identify

14

Taylor, Sources of the Self, 375; Hegel, 16.

15

Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, 105.

7

specific instances in which the commitment to purposive agency leads a Christian
theologian who is committed to the promotion of human well-being and liberation (of
one type or another) to exclude persons with profound cognitive disabilities from his or
her concept of human being. To better organize this survey, I note how each theological
anthropology treats these common themes: embodiment, embeddedness, relationality,
rationality, and agency. I begin my survey with Gordon Kaufman.16

Gordon Kaufman
Gordon Kaufman’s In Face of Mystery is an extended meditation on the proper
function and scope of Christian theology as an interpretive framework for orienting life in
the world. Kaufman identifies the concept of “the human” as the most appropriate
starting point for articulating a Christian world picture. Although he places the human
alongside the concepts of “world,” “God,” and “Christ” as the central (and dialectically
interrelated) categories of the Christian theological tradition, he thinks the intuitive clarity
of what “human” means gives that concept a natural priority over the other, more
contested terms.17 Kaufman’s anthropology, far from being just one prominent theme in
his theology, sets the parameters for the rest of his reflections.
For Kaufman, a proper understanding of human being begins with the recognition
of their embeddedness. He interprets this state of affairs through the notion of historicity.
Historicity denotes “the process of grasping and understanding, of shaping and creating,
For a chapter-length engagement of Kaufman’s anthropology from a disability perspective, as well as a
similar assessment of the work of George Lindbeck, see Molly Haslam, A Constructive Theology of
Intellectual Disability: Human Being as Mutuality and Response (New York: Fordham University Press,
2012).
16

17

Gordon D. Kaufmann, In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1993), 98.
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through which a culture gradually defines and develops itself through the course of its
own history.”18 Kaufman identifies the human capacity for prolific cultural creativity as
the feature which distinguishes the human form of life from all others. By means of this
creative power, humanity has brought an artificial world into being, a symbolic world it
then superimposes on the natural one. The emergence of this order of reality produces in
human beings new desires, interests, and needs. These exceed (and are sometimes at odds
with) strictly biological needs.
This last statement points to Kaufman’s consistent emphasis on the embodiment
of the human being. It is not simply historical—as though its nature could be sufficiently
captured by attending to its capacity for abstract thought and meaning making alone—it
is biohistorical. Consistent with current popular understandings of the human, Kaufman
emphasizes this being’s status as an animal and its place in the earth’s complex web of
life. Humanity’s unique cultural abilities have arisen as one trajectory in a process of
natural evolution. The conditions of human life and well-being are thus determined, in
large part, by their organic connections to other lifeforms and natural phenomena. Human
existence cannot be interpreted properly apart from the environmental aspect of human
relationality.
Another important aspect of this relationality is, of course, the associations
between biohistorical individuals and groups. Kaufman declares, “No individual selves
could exist without a community which gave birth to them and continued to sustain
them—not least through providing them with language, that medium of signs which…is

18

Ibid., 103.

9

an indispensable ingredient of individual selfhood and agency.”19 This quote highlights
not only the intimate connection Kaufman draws between selfhood and purposive
agency, but also the fact that he sees both as depending upon the capacity for
symbolization.
As a mode of existence that produces historical and cultural patterns, human
activity is not merely the expression of instincts. It fundamentally involves the attempt to
realize self-appointed goals and purposes which may be entirely abstract. At its highest
levels, this identification and selection of a goal is called intention. The intention of an
act serves as the agent’s own symbolic standard for bodily motion; it is a plan to direct
that motion towards one end rather than others. The capacity to perform an intentional act
is, therefore, only available to beings who possess a symbol system. In order to make a
choice, an agent must envision a number of possible, as yet unrealized actions. The types
and patterns of symbols present within one’s mind radically inform (and restrict) the
possibilities one can imagine. According to Kaufman, the mind acquires these symbols
from infancy onward as the individual human being is progressively shaped by the
culture into which he or she is born. This cultural inheritance includes language. It is
through learning to speak the personal language of “I” and “we” that human beings come
to understand themselves as agents. Human individuals are thus not essentially separate
and autonomous. They are “persons-in-community,” existing only within “a highly
complex sociocultural system.”20

19

Ibid., 151.

20

Ibid., 161.
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This account of agency presents rationality as a vital element of selfhood. An
agent’s mind must not only be capable of retaining inherited symbols but of putting them
into practice as well. The capability to act demands that one be able to carry out the
symbolizing functions of intention, decision, and attention to relevant sense data as
second nature. The individual’s performance of these functions personalizes deliberation
and introduces accountability into the process of action. Kaufman regards accountability
as essential to agency as such and its appearance in the inner life of a human being as a
defining development: “When we cross this threshold, we become responsible
participants in and bearers of humanity and thus enter into relationships truly and fully
human.”21
More significant than a human being’s responsibility for individual actions,
however, is the responsibility one has for one’s very selfhood. An important consequence
of human historicity is that human existence is never grasped directly. A concept of the
human is always crafted with reference to past experiences. The variety of historically
located experiences inexorably results in a variety of concepts of the human. The
particular concept a human individual or group adopts leads to a self-understanding
(which is also a self-relation) that is prior to and determinative of the orientation one
assumes towards other persons and groups. In other words, different human beings
internalize different concepts of who and what they are, and thereby demonstrate
different forms of biohistorical existence. Accordingly, human nature is not a fixed,
uniform reality. It is instead “diverse and pluralistic to very deep levels.”22

21

Ibid., 148.

22

Ibid., 100.

11

For this reason, Kaufman regards freedom as an empirical fact of human
existence. Humanity’s distinctive mode of creativity both presupposes and exemplifies its
concrete reality. The moral dimension of human existence thus necessarily involves a
respectful consideration of each person’s freedom. The work of the conscientious
theologian will model that respect. Rather than serving chiefly as expositors of inherited
religious doctrine, theologians ought to engage in “imaginative construction” of
interpretive frameworks.23 Furthermore, they should not hesitate to reconstruct any
traditional beliefs and practices that can contribute to dehumanization. The notion of
human flourishing, therefore, plays a crucial role in evaluating the adequacy of religious
symbols, even those of “God” and “Christ.”

Sheila Greeve Davaney
The theological anthropology Sheila Greeve Davaney advocates in her book
Pragmatic Historicism shares much in common with that of Gordon Kaufman, although
she also finds his brand of historicism lacking in key respects. In agreement with
Kaufman, Davaney asserts that twenty-first century theologies will only be viable
interpretive frameworks if they take seriously “the historicist turn” that characterizes
Western thought in the present moment.24 She maintains that “while no single
explanatory category will suffice for describing our age, the notion of historicity can be
seen to be a persuasive and illuminating theme that runs through much contemporary

23

Ibid, ix.

24

Davaney, Pragmatic Historicism, ix.
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analysis.”25 Davaney aspires to develop a theological method that takes the insights and
implications of the historicist turn with utter seriousness. Her critique of Kaufman and
other historicist theologians is that their insights have not yet been pushed to their full,
appropriate conclusions.26 She endeavors to articulate such “an expansive historicism”
and combine it with “a clear pragmatism.”27
Davaney’s expression of historicism interprets human existence chiefly in terms
of the interrelation between traditionedness and agency. This viewpoint repeats
Kaufman’s emphasis on the relativity, particularity, and plurality of human existence and
on the theologian’s responsibility to engage in imaginative construction. Davaney
nevertheless regards Kaufman as placing “disproportionate stress upon the agential
character of human historicity,” which results in “an anemic and uncreative view of
tradition.”28 On Davaney’s reading, Kaufman most often treats the past as a restriction for
human agency to transcend. In her view, this overlooks how freedom is both concretely
funded and made possible by the inherited past.
Davaney advocates a more materialist understanding of tradition. This emphasis
derives from her commitment to express the embeddedness and embodiment of human
beings more thoroughly. As biological beings, humans exist within that “network of

25

Ibid., 26.

26

Davaney identifies Sallie McFague, William Dean, and Delwin Brown as other historicist theologians.
She also critiques the revisionist theology of David Tracy and the postliberal theology of George Lindbeck
as examples of a faint-hearted historicism.
27

Ibid., x.

28

Ibid., 88.
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interdependent entities” called the cosmos.29 Human distinctiveness does not consist of
autonomy and independence from non-human creatures; rather it emerges out of
structures of relationality and dependence on other forms of life. She affirms the
identification of human distinctiveness with their status as cultural beings, yet insists that
the ideas, symbols systems, and languages that comprise culture cannot finally be
divorced from “the social and political forces, institutions, and material conditions within
which they are located and in relation to which they function.”30 Such an
acknowledgment further complexifies a historicist understanding of the web of human
existence.
The distinctive emphases of Davaney’s expansive historicism include an
unflinching rejection of essentialism, a view of human beings as multitraditioned, and an
insistence that theological norms are entirely pragmatic in nature. She decries Kaufman’s
categorical scheme (human, world, God, Christ) as attributing an abstract essence to the
Christian tradition. Despite his analytical recognition of the concrete details of
biohistorical existence, his methodology assumes a purely formal relationship between
Christians and their past that allows one to ignore “the concrete specificities of a living
tradition.”31 Davaney conceives of a tradition as lacking any essence whatsoever, be it a
canon of doctrine, a paradigmatic narrative, or a set of categories. Traditions are instead
internally pluralistic and porous for the very reason that they are made up of localized
thoughts and practices.

29

Ibid., 66.

30

Ibid., 78.

31

Ibid., 89-90.
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On these grounds, Davaney calls for “the democratization of culture.”32 Such an
approach to theology will note ways in which the meaning and value of elements in a
tradition are constructed by ordinary people (rather than solely by those in positions of
power), as well as the fact that the meaning and value of beliefs and practices are not
inherent. Implied in this observation is Davaney’s understanding that, insofar as human
beings belong to a tradition, they employ their capacities for abstract representation and
rationality to determine both the content of that tradition and the worth of that content
from within concrete contexts.
The pragmatic emphasis of Davaney’s historicism is strikingly evident in her
assertion that “we engage historical traditions for the purpose of creating visions and
practices for today.”33 The great importance of the past lies in the fact that it places
constraints on the present, while also providing resources for creative transformation.
Because the location of the constructive theologian takes shape “out of and at the juncture
of multiple, overlapping, and sometimes tension filled influences,” he or she must look
beyond even the pluralistic content of one religious tradition to consider the insights of
other interpretive frameworks.34 Discourses of nation, ideology, gender, race, class and
other faiths must be taken into account. The primary impetus behind this wide-ranging
and rigorous methodology is Davaney’s conviction that the most adequate theological
construction of reality is the one that best contributes to the enhancement of historical
identities and communities. The central task of theology, therefore, is not a search for
32
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timeless truth or the authentic form of Christianity. Davaney conceives of theology as a
form of cultural analysis; namely, “the identification, examination, assessment, and
reconstruction of historical traditions of interpretation and practice so that humans might
more fruitfully and responsibly live within our complex and interdependent universe.”35
An emphasis on human flourishing is thus clearly present in the anthropological and
cosmological assumptions of pragmatic historicism.

Dwight Hopkins
The theological anthropology of Dwight Hopkins provides an account of human
being that is developed with reference to a particular community of human beings.
Identifying as a black liberation theologian, Hopkins focuses his critical analysis
primarily on the embeddedness of African-American existence in structures of poverty
and racial inequality. In Being Human, he characterizes human persons as material beings
whose lives include the transcendent dimension of spirituality. He casts the discipline of
theological anthropology as an interrogation of those ways of being and acting for which
human beings have been created and called by God. In today’s increasingly globalized
world, novel possibilities for what human beings may be and do continually present
themselves. Yet means of dehumanization also abound within this state of affairs. The
key question for Hopkins, then, is: “How can we envision being human in a way that
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supports and enables human flourishing and provides ultimate orientation in such
times?”36
Hopkins’ answer to this question considers both the present and ultimate context
of human existence. Addressing the latter, he speaks of God as a creative force or power
that imbues the material world but may not be reduced to creation taken as a whole.
Indicating his pluralist sensibilities, Hopkins declares that this “supreme spirit . . .
manifests, for me, decisively, but not exclusively, in Jesus the anointed one.”37 The God
revealed in Jesus is a spirit of liberation. Accordingly, Hopkins identifies the image of
God in human beings with a particular type of agency: “the capacity to create healthy life
with restrictions removed from the inside and around the poor and working
communities.”38 Proper recognition of oneself as an image of God necessarily directs the
practice of freedom forward as a love that pursues a divine mission. (Though Hopkins
does not state so explicitly, a capacity for rationality must be present in agents who use
their freedom in this goal-directed fashion.) Healthy spirituality acknowledges the imago
Dei in others and shares with them the good news of liberation. Service to others is thus
the point of contact between the transcendent and personal dimensions of human
existence; it is the active means through which a material being realizes genuine spirit
and is vivified. Answering God’s call to become fully human finally amounts to a two-
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fold liberation, one that is captured in Hopkins’ definition of a human being as “a person
who fulfills individual capabilities and contributes to a community’s well-being.”39
Hopkins parallels Davaney’s insistence that abstract anthropological concepts
must remain tethered to the concrete if they are to provide life-giving explanations of a
worthwhile human existence or of humankind’s destiny. He endeavors to understand the
present context of human existence through careful reflection on the categories of self,
culture, and race. 40 As should already be clear, the notion of relationality is central to
Hopkins’ description of the self. Healthy individual relationships with God are found
within healthy, harmonious communities. This harmony extends beyond human
relationships into a balanced comportment towards animals, plants, and the natural
elements. Rejecting individualism as demonic, Hopkins understands the self as logically
subsequent to and generated by selves—social units of interdependent relationships
whose well-being depends on the practice of communal values (such as reciprocity, care,
and solidarity) towards the end of a common good. One critical task of the theologian is
to reflect intentionally on how to champion the values of friendship above economic or
nationalistic understandings of human relations as essentially competitive or even
adversarial.
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Selves and the self give rise to culture. Succinctly stated, Hopkins identifies the
elements of culture as the totality of human labor, the aesthetic, and the spirit.41 Race,
meanwhile, is “a shifting signifier” whose content varies according to cultural context
and the powers that define it.42 In the United States, Hopkins asserts, race entails
“explicitly combining biological or God-given phenotype with malleable sociological
characteristics,” thus assigning specific values to forms of embodiment.43 For AfricanAmericans, engaging in matters of culture and race means not only championing healthy
spirituality over against individualism, but also combating the white supremacist
spirituality that arbitrarily denies the full worth of non-whites. In these concrete ways, a
genuine God-human encounter frees the individual to enjoy self-love and a healthy ego.
God’s call to full humanity also draws attention to the equally arbitrary class
structures that keep persons in poverty. Part of the liberating good news of Jesus is the
revelation that the totality of the material world belongs to God and God alone. Hopkins
asserts that “all human beings are created with a spiritual purpose to share in the material
resources of the earth.”44 The practice of privatizing resources such that certain
communities are denied access to God’s gifts to all dehumanizes those who are denied.
For this reason, Hopkins posits that God commissions every human being to live in
solidarity with the poor and working class.
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In the final analysis, Hopkins’ theological anthropology asserts the prerogative of
each person to define her or his own identity (contra essentialism). The community is
obligated to provide the space, material resources, and opportunities of speech this task
requires. Conversely, the individual must acknowledge accountability to the community
throughout the process of self-definition. Nurturing and sustaining healthy people
requires above all that “we collaborate with nature to engender flourishing of the
oppressed.”45 Conditions that provide for their freedom will ultimately provide for the
freedom of all.

Kathryn Tanner
Of the five theologians surveyed here, Kathryn Tanner stands out as the most
traditional. Rather than assuming the basic incompatibility of early Christian doctrines
and twenty-first century understandings of human existence, Tanner identifies an affinity
between orthodox formulations of “God” and “Christ” and a concept of the human that
emphasizes dynamism, local context, and materiality. In her books Jesus, Humanity, and
the Trinity, and its sequel Christ the Key, Tanner aims to redeploy longstanding Christian
notions creatively towards present ends.46 In that spirit, her theological anthropology is
informed by a “traditionally articulated but significantly reconceived Chalcedonian
Christology.”47 Tanner follows the early church’s precedent of affirming both the full
humanity and full divinity of Jesus Christ, while still taking seriously “modern concerns
45
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with human agency and freedom and modern emphases on conflict and process in human
history.”48 Tanner regards Christ to be the culmination and completion of God’s
interactions with the entire created order. Christ is thus the key to understanding what
God is doing everywhere, including human lives.
Tanner remarks that explanations of the imago Dei typically focus on “human
nature in and of itself.” They identify “some set of well-defined and neatly bounded
characteristics” that establish the human’s qualitative difference from animals and
relative similarity to the divine, such as rationality, freedom from necessity, or
relationality. She thinks these approaches are misguided for two reasons: human nature
cannot be predetermined so neatly, and it cannot be properly understood without
consideration of the triune God. Following an early church trajectory, Tanner identifies
the imago Dei, not as a human trait, but as the second person of the trinity (i.e. the Word).
It is through being an image of the second person that the human being becomes an
image of the trinity as a whole.
In Tanner’s theology, God radically transcends the world. Nevertheless, the
abundant goodness of the divine life results in a “gratuitous trinitarian overflow” in
which God freely chooses to create a world of creatures who exist simply to be the
recipients of gracious gifts.49 Because the divine life is perfect fullness and ontologically
distinct from all other modes of being, God’s relationships with creatures are noncompetitive; that is, God’s power does not come at the expense of other entities. The
more God’s glory is made manifest through giving gifts to the creature, the more
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empowered and perfected the creature becomes in its own nature. It is through Christ that
God may award the goodness of the divine life to beings that do not possess it by nature,
and do so without compromising the ontological distinction that establishes the integrity
of each creature’s nature.
Tanner maintains that the second person of the trinity is the perfect image of God
because it is its nature to be so. In the incarnation, the first person sends the Word into the
world to become one with the humanity of Jesus through the power of the Holy Spirit.
The unity achieved is perfect, and Jesus manifests the image of the Word just as fully as
the latter images the first person. The unity is one of action and will—the way that Jesus’
life as a whole is a fully human manifestation of the mode of the Son. 50 The incarnation
is thus a process spanning Jesus’ entire life. As the Christ, he purifies, heals, elevates, and
perfects humanity in his achievement of perfect union between what is God and not God.
He is the “new man” in the way he lives his life entirely for his human fellows and
unfailingly orients his life toward the God he serves. Christ is the paradigm for how
human beings may image God through participation in the divine life.
Jesus is also the means by which other human beings participate in the triune
God. The Holy Spirit comes to other human beings through the glorified humanity of
Christ and makes them one with him through the bonds of faith, hope, and love. This is
the form of life for which human beings were created—a form that does not simply
unfold from the natural function of their native capacities. Human well-being, like being
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as such, is God’s gift to the creature.51 Yet the creature must use its native capacities of
rationality and agency to choose to accept what is (and shall remain) alien to its nature.
As Tanner explains, God calls human beings “to act in a process primarily of selfreformation in service of God’s ends for the whole world that the superabundant God
wants to be similarly replete with goods.”52
Interestingly, Tanner’s observations about the embeddedness of human existence
only reaffirm her Christological assertions. Tanner states that human nature boasts an
expansive openness. She finds within human nature a “positive inclination to the
universal.”53 Human reason seeks the truth that is above all knowledge, and the human
will strives to do what is unconditionally good. Because both these qualities can belong
to God alone, there is no fixed limit on the potential of human growth. Any number of
excellent ways of thinking and doing remain available for human beings to realize. They
are thus defined by a simple malleability.
Accordingly, there is a lack of human uniformity, allowing human life to assume
a variety of forms across cultural and historical circumstances. This fundamental
plasticity leaves them susceptible to radical transformation beyond the present limits of
their created nature. By virtue of their inherent relationality, human beings negotiate a
myriad of environmental and social inputs. The self-reflective ability of human beings
heightens and complexifies these other traits. They are able to organize their natures
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according to a basic moral and religious orientation. What they determine matters most to
them “decides in greater part the character of their lives, the identity they come to exhibit
in their acts—that is, just their nature.”54 The whole human person is impacted through
such processes, including his or her material embodiment. Conformation to the image of
God engages all these capacities for alteration; it is merely an extreme case of having
one’s character transformed by a relationship with what one is not.
In summary, Tanner views human nature in essentially dynamic terms—so
dynamic, in fact, that what it means to be human cannot be predetermined through
consideration of human nature in and of itself. Only the form of life that attends the new
identity one receives in Christ provides definitive shape to human life, transforming its
plasticity into a strong image of God and enabling well-being as a result.

Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki
Like Kathryn Tanner, Marjorie Suchocki develops a version of the flourishing
model that is explicitly metaphysical, although it has a less traditional flavor. Written
from the vantage point of relational theology (i.e. process theology), Suchocki’s The Fall
to Violence presents a reconstructed doctrine of original sin. Despite its controversial
history, Suchocki thinks this doctrine can bring greater clarity to the manner in which
each human being is oriented toward sin by forces set in motion long before one’s birth.
She is interested in establishing how it is that one inherits this predisposition from one’s
ancestors, as well as how this state of affairs serves as a common source of guilt for all
humanity. Yet she does not affirm the classical definition of sin as essentially pride or
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unbelief—the human being’s refusal to accept the divinely established parameters of life
coupled with the self-deception that it can define the terms of its own existence.55 In this
portrayal of sin, a creature utilizes its capacity for transcendence in an effort to outstrip its
natural limitations and exhibit a godlike power.
Suchocki regards the classical portrayal as incapable of accounting for present
understandings of human embeddedness and relationality. She observes that explanations
of sin as a proud rebellion against God often conflate the divinely established parameters
of life with the cultural, social, and political structures of a particular society. In these
instances, Christian theology fails to challenge forms of oppression and marginalization,
thereby exacerbating the suffering of victims rather than facilitating their liberation.
Suchocki alternatively characterizes sin as “participation through intent or act in
unnecessary violence that contributes to the ill-being of any aspect of earth or its
inhabitants.”56 Such an intent or act is sinful “whether conspicuously chosen or
otherwise.”57 Suchocki claims this definition of sin directs theological interpretation more
squarely towards the concrete data of human evil. It acknowledges, for example, that
marginalized groups (Suchocki discusses women specifically) repeatedly contribute to
their own dehumanization, not through proud self-assertion, but through accepting the
social status imposed upon them and thereby failing to use their agency to defy those
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limits that stifle human flourishing. Sin, in other words, is “rooted in the great challenge
of becoming oneself.”58
Suchocki advocates a “horizontal” notion of transcendence within the natural
order of creation. There is no fundamental opposition here between transcendence and
nature or between human spirit and human embodiment. Self-transcendence is achieved
through the capacities of memory, empathy, and imagination. By these means, a human
being may come to identify past patterns of being that have led to the degradation of
oneself, as well as one’s fellow creatures, and become conscious of future possibilities
for both the enrichment and the destruction of being. Once more, we find the notion of
rationality in play insofar as the symbolic representations of self, others, past events, and
potential futures play a key role in the enactment of self-transcendence.
The cosmology underpinning Suchocki’s theological anthropology depicts the
universe as continuously co-created by the interaction between God and every entity that
makes up the world. Suchocki does not portray God as radically other than the world;
God is the highest exemplification of the metaphysical processes that define every being.
God is maximally related to all other entities and, for that reason, is uniquely equipped to
influence the overall process of creation’s coming to be. God works to promote the
maximum level of harmony available to creation in the present, but the inherent freedom
each creature possesses limits God’s creative influence to persuasion. The well-being of
the entire created order thus depends on how each entity chooses to use its capacity for
self-transcendence from moment to moment. Accordingly, human sin is “not a contained
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act, but an extended event.”59 Violent acts directly cause creation to suffer and, by
extension, the human beings and the God who are inextricably connected to the creation
and constituted by it.
Within this metaphysical scheme, sin takes on a triadic structure. First, “human
personality contains a substructure of violent aggression related to survival.”60 During its
evolutionary development as a biological being, the human species relied on animal
instincts that far predate the emergence of a moral or religious consciousness. These
instincts remain, predisposing human beings to violent behavior and ensuring that a
certain base level of violence remains integral to human existence as such. Second, the
ontological solidarity humanity enjoys makes an indirect experience of violence possible.
Suchocki states, “Through this connectedness comes one’s own participation in every
evil, and with it, a share in the responsibility for all evil.”61 One human being’s sinful act
impacts every other member of the race, albeit with varying degrees of intensity. This
indirect experience, as well as any response to it, is typically subliminal; it is never
consciously registered even as the emotive effect of violence invades one’s very interior.
Third, Suchocki lifts up the intergenerational quality of sin. She notes the tendency of
cooperative institutions to exhibit a collective egotism that privileges the interests of a
particular subgroup to the ill-being of others. These institutions have their own
intersubjective consciousness that functions as an interpretive grid, establishing social
norms for future generations, including values and practices that promote unnecessary
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violence. “By definition, the inherited norms cannot be questioned prior to enactment;
one is caught in sin without virtue of consent. Original sin simply creates sinners.”62
By emphasizing the ways in which conscientious human beings might oppose or
reverse the preceding factors, Suchocki places the concept of well-being at the center of
her theological vision of how a human being ought to live. Through the recognition of the
necessary violence that its animal inheritance carries into daily life, the human being can
begin to identify the excessively violent acts one should not commit. Understanding
one’s evolutionary past also raises awareness of the instincts of bonding the human
animal has likewise come to rely on and may now intentionally choose to promote.
Similarly, the recognition of how indirect violence is communicated through human
solidarity can lead to a form of empathetic transcendence Suchocki calls compassionate
subjectivity. This form of consciousness adds to the awareness of human solidarity “the
concomitant response of human life lived through compassionate love.”63 Finally, a frank
appraisal of one’s responsibility for the continued dominance of sinful social conditions
amounts to the identification of one’s guilt; that is, the degree to which one has the
freedom to transcend structures of ill-being and fails to do so. Because freedom of selfdetermination is inherent, all three aspects of original sin may be continually resisted,
even where possibilities for well-being are difficult or few. Whenever human action
promotes the values of truth, love, and beauty, the positive effects of these achievements
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resonate just as extensively as the effects of sin.64 In the final analysis, the mode of
human existence that is the direct contrary of sin is a process-relational mode of human
flourishing.

Summary
Having now completed my survey of recent theologians, a concise statement of
how they commonly employ the themes of embeddedness, embodiment, relationality,
rationality, and agency is in order. On the other side of the expressivist turn, many
Christian concepts of human being and its flourishing eschew the idea that human nature
has a universal and unchanging essence. They contend that the process of defining
humanity is ongoing because humanity is continuously made manifest through human
activity. Accordingly, human nature is not an abstract model each person must live into
but an endeavor every individual must carry out. In this way, human beings are
fundamentally defined by freedom; most importantly, the freedom of self-determination.
Purposive agency is not one among many faculties the human being possesses. In the
most primordial way, human beings are their freedom.65
Yet human freedom is not absolute. Agency is always embedded within particular
contexts. The manifestation of humanity occurs within antecedent conditions. These
conditions establish both the parameters within which individual agency begins and the
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future possibilities a human being may choose to realize. As the conditions of freedom,
contextual factors shape much of who an individual is and what he or she might become.
Foremost among the natural conditions of human agency is an individual’s
embodiment. A distinctive contour of the current theological landscape is the attention
paid to the material dimensions of human existence. Human beings necessarily have
bodies and, consequently, their overall well-being entails bodily health and integrity.66
The body is thus an end of freedom as well as a means. Through the body, each human
being is inextricably linked to the rest of the natural world, adding an ecological
dimension to considerations of flourishing.
This approach to theological anthropology also rejects traditional descriptions of
the individual self as ultimately autonomous and self-sufficient. It names relationality as
a defining feature of human existence. The individual self is constantly shaping and being
shaped by other selves. Values of community are important to well-being because,
although other human persons are unavoidably the objects and means of one’s own free
activity, they remain agents in their own right. 67 The flourishing of human individuals is
finally inseparable from the flourishing of human communities.
As the human being acts amidst the limiting conditions of embeddedness,
embodiment, and interdependent relationships, the individual’s capacity for rationality is
vital. Human freedom only takes determinative shape if it is directed towards particular
ends in pursuit of particular purposes. That direction requires the agent to make use of
cognitive abilities for symbolization or language that a selection among possibilities
66
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requires.68 Because goal-oriented thought is integral to the freedom that leads to human
flourishing, the brand of agency which sets human being apart as a distinctive type of
existence is purposive agency.69
In short, present-day theologians often equate what it means to be human with the
free exercise of a purposive agency that is both made possible and shaped by a number of
contextual factors. The well-being of this creature depends largely on the individual
agent’s ability to demonstrate his or her freedom and thereby contribute to the
progressive and pluralistic manifestation of humanity itself. Wherever this agential
capacity is arbitrarily or maliciously denied, dehumanization takes place and human
flourishing is absent. This is the approach to theological anthropology I critique.

The Challenge of a Disability Perspective
In my critical engagement of the five theologians just discussed, I have attempted
to provide a representation of their views that is not only faithful, but also appreciative.
Each scholar champions certain values and emphases that I would rather help proliferate
than oppose. (For example, Hopkins’ call for solidarity with the working class and
Suchocki’s cry against unnecessary violence highlight pressing human problems that
Christian theology ought to take up with great sincerity.) In point of fact, the theological
anthropology I propose later in this study shares more similarities with these theologians
than points of contention.
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Nevertheless, a critique of their commonly held understanding of human
flourishing is exigent. Woven into the shared assumptions of all their anthropologies is a
thread of ableism—a normative perspective on being human that, in practice,
discriminates against persons with “abnormal” bodies and minds.70 The ableism of this
common understanding is not a product of happenstance; this disposition follows
naturally from its core formulations of freedom, self-determination, and agency. Hans
Reinders observes that, as long as “the point of our lives is what we are capable of
doing,” persons with profound cognitive disabilities will fail to qualify as human beings
or, at best, they are implicitly relegated to an anthropological “minor league.”71 Persons
with profound cognitive disabilities lack those capacities for self-awareness, selfrepresentation, and social-cultural understanding that are indispensable to the
predominant concepts of human being and human flourishing. Although these concepts
facilitate liberationist projects carried out on behalf of a diverse range of human persons,
the methodologies and theories associated with it repeatedly overlook the presence of the
cognitively disabled within living human communities. This state of affairs reveals that
the conceptual shift from self-sufficiency and autonomy to interconnectedness and
relationality does not automatically establish the basic humanity, or promote the wellbeing, of all those nominally identified as persons in daily life. As Molly Haslam
explains, “a second step beyond the move toward a relational anthropology is necessary if
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we are to construct an understanding of human being that promotes the flourishing of all
human beings, including individuals with profound intellectual disabilities.”72
Haslam’s statement serves as a caution to all theologians, including those already
working on theologies of disability. In her landmark book The Disabled God, Nancy
Eiesland casts the theology of disability as “a theology of coalition and struggle in which
we [persons with disabilities] identify our unique experiences while also struggling for
recognition, inclusion, and acceptance from one another and from the able-bodied society
and church.”73 This quote highlights the genetic ties between disability theology and
liberation theology and, by extension, between disability theology and agency-centered
understandings of human flourishing. Eiesland’s work draws attention to the fact that a
commitment to liberationist understandings of freedom and agency ought to compel
Christians (in the church as well as the academy) to take account of the ways in which
persons with disabilities exercise these capacities or are denied opportunities to do so.
However, a strict commitment to self-determination and self-advocacy within the
theology of disability reproduces an unfavorable result. As Deborah Creamer notes, when
disability scholars demand that “liberation for people with disabilities come through
actions taken by persons with disabilities,” they reinscribe a paradigm into which
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cognitive disability does not neatly fit.74 Persons with profound cognitive disabilities
remain “hard cases” for theological anthropology, even within disability studies.75
My investment in these issues is a personal one. My older brother Jarrod is a
person with profound cognitive disabilities. When he was four months old, he contracted
a case of spinal meningitis that was initially misdiagnosed and, therefore, improperly
treated. The damage to his nervous system was extensive. Jarrod was eventually
diagnosed with cerebral palsy, epilepsy, mental retardation, and deafness. Having grown
up with him in a Christian household, my own experiences of community and religious
practice have always been informed by Jarrod’s presence.76 For this reason, although I
am not a person with disabilities, many of the arguments and concerns disability scholars
raise resonate with me. Jarrod is my closest living relative. Any concept of human being
that excludes him is, in my estimation, too limited in its explanatory power.
A more expansive and representative concept of the human is in order, not only
for my scholarship, but for the entire discipline of theological anthropology. Profound
cognitive disability is an abstract category, but this abstraction manifests itself in the
persons of one’s neighbors, relatives, and friends. Its appearance transgresses the social
delineations of gender, class, race, and nationality. If the promotion of all human beings
within their lived contexts is indeed a common objective of Christian theologians today,
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how could a phenomenon as widespread as cognitive disability remain the purview of
only a subset of theologians?
What remains to be articulated is how my certainty about Jarrod’s basic humanity
is at all warranted in light of Christian theology’s common assumption that human
flourishing results from the proper exercise of purposive agency. The present study levies
the contention that anthropologies organized around that capacity do not yet arrive at
what is most fundamental to human being. The goal of this study, therefore, is to provide
theoretical support for what is, at present, a mostly intuitive conviction: a sufficiently
robust concept of the human must include persons with profound cognitive disabilities.

Outlining the Present Study
Having stated the impetus behind my resistance to agency-centered
anthropologies and their concepts of human flourishing, I must offer a few words
previewing the remainder of the present study. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to lay out an
expanded account of ableism and make a case for the fact that disability issues go to the
heart of what it means to be human. I discuss several different models for conceiving of
"disability" and "normality," including medical, moral, and social perspectives. This
survey of disability studies uncovers that even the theories and methodologies of that
discipline regularly prove incapable of establishing the full humanity of persons with
profound cognitive disabilities because they also tend to assume an agency-based
anthropology. I critically examine the moral philosophy of Martha Nussbaum as an
example of how even earnest scholarly advocacy on behalf of these persons falls short as
long as purposive agency remains fundamental to human flourishing. Chapter 2
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concludes with an exposition of Deborah Creamer's limits model, an approach to issues
of disability and embodiment that challenges the ability/disability binary and promises a
fruitful vantage point from which to envision a sufficiently inclusive theological
anthropology.
I devote the remainder of the present study to my constructive proposal for
Christian theological anthropology. Over the course of three chapters, I articulate an
ontology of radical interdependence and make the case for why it, rather than purposive
agency, ought to operate centrally within Christian representations of human being and
human flourishing. After identifying the concept of the imago Dei as the signature
concept of theological anthropology, I discuss several ways in which this concept is
amenable to an ontology of radical interdependence, treating it within the doctrinal
contexts of creation, Christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. Throughout my
constructive proposal, I challenge the traditional tendencies to either stigmatize cognitive
disability or ignore it completely through my demonstrations that the dependency,
vulnerability, and need for care that is most conspicuous in the lives of profoundly
disabled persons are, in truth, fundamental structures of human being in general.
In Chapter 3, I champion a relational approach to conceptualizing how human
creatures are made in the image of God in opposition to the more traditional substantialist
and functionalist approaches. I then contend that the most salient truth of the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo is not an assertion about the origins of the cosmos but rather the fact of
humankind's absolute dependence upon God. Turning to Christology, I note how the
person and work of Jesus Christ are determinative for understanding the imago Dei. This
proves to be an invaluable methodological insight insofar as the story of Jesus is replete
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with details of his own interdependence, as well as his commitment to promote the wellbeing of the marginalized.
The reflections on the doctrine of the church in Chapter 4 focus most intently on
the Pauline metaphor that the ecclesial community is the body of Christ. The church
becomes authentically itself both through carrying on the earthly ministry of Jesus and by
being a communal embodiment of diversity within interdependence. While discussing the
thoroughly ontological fashion in which the church is the image of God, I engage the
theological anthropologies of Hans Reinders and Molly Haslam—two theologians who
arguably provide the most sophisticated proposals for how to bring profound cognitive
disability into the center of theological reflection on human being. The result is my own
account of the relational ways in which persons with and without cognitive disabilities
are human in the same basic sense.
The fifth and final chapter takes up the question of the final end of human being.
Treating the eschatological dimension of human being in terms of how eternal life in God
already infuses the church's earthly existence, I enumerate reasons for including the
flourishing of persons with profound cognitive disabilities in the content of Christian
hope. I also adopt the long-standing confession that the human creature's ultimate end is
to know God, advocating a version of it in which knowledge of God is fundamentally
non-conceptual and thus a real possibility for Jarrod and other similarly embodied
individuals. Any adequate notion of the imago Dei must affirm this. The cumulative
result of the last three chapters is a portrait of human being in which its authenticity
includes the embrace of profound cognitive disability rather than its elimination and
where its flourishing requires living more fully into radical interdependence instead of
37

transcending it. The construction of this theological anthropology begins in the next
chapter with a discussion of disability studies.
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CHAPTER TWO: NORMALITY, DIGNITY, AND OBSTACLES TO
AFFIRMING HUMAN WORTH

Constructive theological discussions of human flourishing and human being often
begin with questions concerning human worth. A theological anthropology, therefore, is
more than simply a descriptive model in that it aims to provide theoretical grounds on
which to affirm the worth of a distinctly human mode of existence. The assertion that a
human being boasts an inherent (even superior) value is not an eventual conclusion of
such inquiry but an initial hypothesis that drives investigation, making the investigation a
clear instance of faith seeking understanding. The great challenge of positing a
hypothesis that affirms the value of persons with profound cognitive disabilities is that
the Christian theological tradition is decidedly lacking in ready-made resources.
Cognitive disability does not count among the perennial topics of Christian
thought. For that reason, it is typically life experience that inspires a theologian to reflect
on the subject, rather than the standard content of his or her theological education. The
inspiration for the present study comes primarily from my relationships with my
immediate family, especially my older brother Jarrod, who is a man with profound
cognitive disabilities.77 My experiences with Jarrod leave me convinced of both his full
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As I stated in Chapter 1, Jarrod was not born with profound disabilities. At four months, he nearly died
from a bout of spinal meningitis that was initially misdiagnosed. Afterward, he was diagnosed with cerebral
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humanity and his unqualified worth, and I devote space below to reflecting critically on
those experiences. To make a case that supports my convictions, the first step is to
consider why the mere fact of having a cognitive disability might call a person’s very
worth into question. I begin with a piece of family history—a piece that focuses chiefly
on our mother Debra.

Taking Up the Question of Human Worth
In 1992, when Jarrod and I were still children, our parents were in a car accident.
Our father Dale died instantly, while Debra suffered a traumatic brain injury. When she
awoke from a coma lasting several weeks, we discovered that she was mostly paralyzed
along the left side of her body and her cognitive functions were significantly impaired.
Debra spent most of her remaining eighteen years living in a modest nursing home under
the guardianship of her father Howard. She passed away at age fifty-seven from what
appeared to be natural causes.
Spending time with Debra after the accident was always difficult for me. In a
typical year, I would only visit her two or three times. When I reflect on what made those
visits so hard, I do not fixate on the environment in which she lived or the fact that
entering her room brought past loss to mind. The hardest part was the sheer difficulty
involved in simply being present with her. Most noticeably, the injury to her brain led her
to develop a tick of sorts: she would compulsively grind her teeth or chew something,
usually a sheet, a bib, or her shirt. Merely keeping her mouth clear for conversation could

palsy, epilepsy, deafness, and “mental retardation” (a term that has been replaced by "intellectual and
developmental disabilities").
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be a challenge. Even if Debra appeared to give someone her attention, she would often
continue to move her head around or scan the room with her eyes seemingly at random.
Yet the true challenge to engaging Debra was her broken memory. There were
certainly days her recollections were clearer but, even then, her statements never cohered
into a proper narrative and she consistently confused the chronology of events. It also
became increasingly difficult for her to identify people. The more a person’s appearance
had changed since the time of the car accident, the less likely Debra would be to
recognize who he or she was. Although Howard ate lunch daily with Debra during those
years, he never grew comfortable with the ways the car accident changed his daughter. I
visited Howard for a month in the summer of 2005. On multiple occasions, his reports
from his visits with Debra ended with the statement, “Your dad was the lucky one, David.
‘Cause what’s happened to your mom . . . . That ain’t livin’.”
The moments I found hardest to bear were the moments Debra became visibly
agitated with her own limitations of memory and concentration. In those moments of selfassessment, Debra would often launch into a cycle of rapid questions, a near rant that
always took the same basic shape: “Are we just stupid and worthless? Are we stupid and
worthless? Are we? Are we dumb? Are we just dumb? Are we just stupid and worthless?”
That refrain echoes in my thoughts regularly to this day.
As I consider these memories with an academic interest, I am struck by the way in
which the link Western society forges between human worth and cognitive function is so
blatant that even a woman with significant brain damage could both recognize it and fret
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over its implications.78 I am equally struck by the abiding power of Debra’s questions.
Her chosen pronoun alone is provocative: “Are we stupid and worthless?” This is the sort
of question that eliminates the safe distance of detached observation and places me in the
exigency of her anxiety and concerns. On this topic, Hans Reinders asserts that, when the
humanity of a person with a cognitive disability is brought into question, the humanity of
the supposedly “healthy” investigator cannot be assumed. In the investigation, “my
conception of my own humanity is at stake.”79 If there is indeed a common humanity that
binds Jarrod, Debra, and myself together as persons with identical worth, despite our
disparate mental capacities, in what does it consist?
In the preceding chapter, I interrogated a concept of human being that is currently
popular among Christian theologians. This concept portrays a fully human life as a
flourishing life—a state of well-being in which one is free to exercise and enjoy the
capacity for agency. Surveying the anthropologies of five prominent theologians (Gordon
Kaufman, Sheila Davaney, Dwight Hopkins, Kathryn Tanner, and Marjorie Suchocki), I
expressed appreciation for the fact that their shared concept of the human draws attention
to the embedded, embodied, and relational character of human existence. I also affirmed
their common choice to decenter rationality from its traditional place as the defining
78
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capacity of human being. Nevertheless, I critiqued this form of theological anthropology
on the grounds that it is not sufficiently inclusive. The overarching argument of the
present study is that this vision of a flourishing human life tacitly excludes persons with
profound cognitive disabilities, such as Jarrod, insofar as it equates basic humanity with
the personal capacity for goal-oriented action, i.e. purposive agency.80 In short, the key
task of Chapter One was to name this problem for an academic field that does not
typically acknowledge profound cognitive disability as a topic worthy of theological
reflection.81 Yet there remains much to explore regarding the complexity of this problem
and the implications it has for long-standing assumptions about the human being.
The purpose of the present chapter is to provide a more in-depth critique of the
ways in which Christian thought has represented or ignored persons with disabilities, as
well as to identify resources (ready-made or not) for constructing a theology that affirms
the great significance of profound cognitive disability for understanding human being. Its
central contention is that the failure of Christian theology to affirm the full humanity of
persons with profound cognitive disabilities renders it incapable of affirming the inherent
worth of these people’s lives. A sufficiently inclusive anthropology will validate the ways
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concisely the link between the notions of rationality and agency and the restricted sense of agency that
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in which loved ones and faith communities already engage and care for the profoundly
disabled, and it will also provide strengthened theological warrants for drawing these
individuals more intimately into the human family in theory as well as practice. In pursuit
of these objectives, I will reexamine the embodied, embedded, and relational dimensions
of human existence and posit that a proper commitment to these notions logically
necessitates reconsideration of the significance of purposive agency.
Thus far, the rhetorical strength of my argument depends on a considerable
amount of goodwill from my audience. If the reader is already convinced of the severity
of the problem at hand, it is likely because he or she already shares my conviction that
Jarrod and other persons with profound cognitive disabilities are as fundamentally human
as the most capable of purposive agents, despite the general lack of anthropologies that
justify this conviction. In light of this absence, referring to Jarrod as a person with
cognitive disabilities is a dogmatic use of that word, a label that operates more as a
promissory note for what my project strives to achieve than a statement of accomplished
fact.
The concept of personhood shares an intimate connection with the concept of
dignity. In the history of Western thought, the term dignity denotes a life possessing
inherent worth, a value that is never merely instrumental or conditional.82 The concept of
human dignity often provides the conceptual warrant for claims that human beings ought
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to be treated with the utmost respect; unconditional worth makes an unconditional
demand on those able to perceive it. As Molly Haslam explains, “the word ‘human being’
names that which is valuable to the degree that it is deserving of care and protection from
harm.”83 For anthropologies preoccupied with purposive agency, dignity is denied
wherever a potential agent has been deprived of meaningful possibilities for selfdetermination. Just and caring relations between fellow human beings entail active
opposition to the mechanisms of this deprivation, be they political, economic, or social in
nature.84 Despite the great usefulness of this anthropology for numerous theologies
constructed on behalf of the marginalized, it does not provide grounds on which to affirm
the dignity of persons with profound cognitive disabilities because they do not exhibit the
symbolic and rational abilities purposive agency requires. The effort to include persons
with profound cognitive disabilities within a Christian concept of the human is thus
geared toward a theoretical and methodological problem with serious ethical
implications: The ongoing failure to include those individuals in popular concepts of the
human leaves their very dignity in question and, as a result, allows the promotion of their
well-being to remain a matter of debate rather than a moral requirement.
The effort to construct a sufficiently inclusive theological anthropology must
begin with an informed understanding of the practices of exclusion already operative
within Christian communities and, more broadly, Western society. For this reason, a
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closer examination of the category “disability” is in order. Entering into conversation
with the field of disability studies, I discuss three common models for conceptualizing
disability—the medical, moral, and social models. My key objective here is to highlight
the ways in which the application of the category often fails to account for the
personhood of the individuals it supposedly describes. Following this examination, I
discuss work on the subject of disability by the philosopher Martha Nussbaum.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach represents perhaps the best known and most earnest
attempt to affirm the dignity of persons with cognitive disabilities within a liberative
project that valorizes agency, but even her valiant attempt cannot help but fall short.
Finally, I present Deborah Creamer's limits model of disability. Her expressly theological
approach to representing disability experiences promises a perspective from which to
affirm the full humanity of persons with profound cognitive disability with an efficacy
that other models of disability fail to provide. Through the completion of these three
tasks, I identify the most helpful resources for articulating my own theological
anthropology, as well as possible pitfalls for my project to avoid.

Disability, Ableism, and Normalcy
If Christian theologians have typically neglected profound cognitive disability as
a topic of reflection, what exactly is it that they have failed to consider? What factors
have enabled this failure to such a degree that even theologies attentive to the embedded,
embodied, and relational character of human existence do not register the presence of
cognitive disabilities in the congregation, the home, or the public square? In the pursuit of
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answers to these questions, it is important to note that reflection explicitly on disability is
a fairly new development within the academy at large. Although scholarly writing on the
subject of disability began as early as the 1950s, the first disability studies programs in
the United States did not appear until in the mid-1990s.85 This appearance paralleled the
initial emergence of disability culture at a national level, particularly in the United
Kingdom and the U.S.86 It was not until 1994, with the publication of Nancy Eiesland’s
The Disabled God, that theologies of disability began to draw any substantial attention
from the theological mainstream.87 Even with an increase of books, articles, and
conference sessions on the theology of disability over the last two decades, a theological
treatment of disability aimed at a mainstream audience still cannot assume its readers are
familiar with how this category is typically employed and understood.
The very definition of “disability” remains a matter of debate among scholars of
the subject.88 Consistent with the discussion of embeddedness in Chapter 1, the meaning
of this term is “diverse and complex, constructed and reconstructed according to
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particular times, cultures, contexts, and intentions.”89 A sizable portion of the literature
on disability remains devoted to conversation over which model of disability boasts the
most explanatory power or most effectively facilitates liberative ends. An examination of
these models is thus an essential task for the project at hand.90 It will become abundantly
clear that, whatever “disability” might signify, the content of this category is neither
simple nor straightforward.
Perhaps the most widely-assumed understanding of disability in Western society
is the medical model. Interpreted through this lens, a disability is, first and foremost, a
medical or biological condition found in the body.91 A body is disabled if its particular
morphology or physiology prevents the performance of statistically normal human
activities. In other words, a disability is an individual defect (e.g. his legs are incapable of
walking, or her brain has suffered a traumatic injury).92 The medical community bears
the responsibility of identifying and describing these defects, singling out what contrasts
to the common, typical human body.93
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The detection of a disability is not only a matter for diagnosis, it is also a warrant
for medical intervention. Inherent to the medical model is the assumption that disabilities
are pathological and must be treated like a long-term illness.94 Deviations from the bodily
norm represent a harm that leads to suffering, and that suffering must be prevented or
minimized. In short, intervention by medical or rehabilitation professionals is necessary
to bring patients as much as possible into line with the normal expectations for a human
body.95 For example, with regard to a man who has lost the use of his legs, intervention
would take the form of surgery or physical therapy or, where those options fail, the
provision of a wheelchair or some other assistive technology. Another prominent
example would be research devoted to the treatment or elimination of genetic birth
defects, such as spina bifida or dysmelia (a limb anomaly). The physicians, nurses,
therapists, and pathologists that comprise the medical community share the objective to
cure or alleviate an irregularity that prevents the person with a disability from
experiencing fullness of life. For many in Western society, the medical model’s portrayal
of disability appears naturally obvious and beyond doubt.96 The status of disability as a
bodily condition is objective and efforts to correct that condition seem to be the
necessary, ethical response. The warrant for intervention, then, would ultimately appear
to be a commitment to a particular vision of human flourishing.
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A medical interpretation of Jarrod’s disabilities was unquestionably operative
within the Scott household. Beyond the fact that my parents relied on the opinions of
medical specialists to understand and attend to their son, they were both nurses. Debra
was a registered nurse specializing in pediatrics, while Dale was a licensed practicing
nurse working in an orthopedic clinic. The sights, sounds, textures, and smells of
hospitals provided many of the contours of their shared world. It would have been only
natural for them repeatedly to perceive Jarrod diagnostically as “a child with sudden,
recurrent episodes of convulsion” or “the boy with spastic paralysis.” The house was full
of material reminders that their child's life deviated from the norms that governed their
common profession; objects like Jarrod’s wheelchair, his uniquely designed bed, his
increasingly larger diapers, and the bottles of prescription drugs that were daily ground
and mixed into his food. As an interpretive lens, the medical model directed our family’s
efforts to understand and manage the uncommon challenges that Jarrod’s body
introduced into daily life.
The evaluation the medical model facilitates is not, however, restricted to
objective assessment and diagnosis of bodily conditions. It also shapes perception of the
emotional and existential dimensions of a life touched by disability. In cases where
deficits of mind or body resist all available means of corrective intervention, this model
interprets the inability to conform as a personal tragedy, a misfortune with its locus in the
incorrigible body.97 As much as any parents of a child with special needs, Dale and Debra
must have felt the emotional pain of seeing profound abnormality in their son and, on top
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of that pain, the frustration of being unable to utilize any of their knowledge, training, or
professional connections to return him to the embodied state into which he was born.98
This conceptualization of disability often operates in conjunction with a second
interpretative framework, what scholars call the moral model or, alternatively, the
religious model of disability. With roots deep in the ancient world, the moral model
operated as the default understanding of disability until the Enlightenment.99 Like its
medical counterpart, this model regards disability as an individual and deficient trait. Its
signature claim is that this deficiency is the result of sin or wrongdoing. Once again, the
presence of a disability is warrant for intervention, here taking the form of religious
measures or divine action.100 Paralleling the medical model’s dichotomies of
normal/abnormal and health/illness, the moral model interprets the spiritual status of a
person as either saint or sinner and the fact of their embodiment as either a blessing or
curse.101
The story of Jesus healing a man who is blind in John 9 illustrates the typical
structure of “miracle stories” in the Christian tradition.102 Upon encountering this man,
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Jesus’ disciples ask, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born
blind?” Jesus’ responds, “Neither this man nor his parents sinned; he was born blind so
that God’s works might be revealed in him.” Jesus then uses the divine powers at his
disposal to enable this man to see for the first time in his life. Whatever subversion of the
medical and moral models might be read in Jesus’ verbal response, this narrative plays
with the presupposition that only in the removal of the man’s bodily deficiency could his
life be a revelatory site of God’s presence.103 As in other miracle stories, the narrative
presents a problematic body as clearly in need of intervention, some religious activity
corrects the deficiency, and this correction testifies to the reality and character of the true
God. This evaluation of the disabled body undergirds the long-standing practice of using
blindness, deafness, and other disabilities as metaphors for an impoverished spiritual
condition. These traits exemplify a state of brokenness, standing in for insensitivity to or
ignorance of God's ways.104 To put the matter more sharply, in the absence of divine
restoration, embodied disabilities and the persons who have them are aligned with evil
and sin, antithetical to the fullness of human life experienced only by those in whom
God’s Spirit dwells.105
Present-day expressions of the moral model often exhibit a secular bent.
Operating collaboratively with the medical model, the moral cause of disability is not sin
but the failure to abide by well-known principles of health and nutrition. As Dawn
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DeVries notes, the birth of child with congenital defects will likely prompt people to ask,
“What did the mother do, or what did she ingest, during pregnancy to make the baby this
way?”106 Cases in which debilitating forms of obesity or diabetes result in part from
patterns of poor eating and exercise can give rise to a similar habit of mind—this
condition is a punishment for one’s transgression against the instruction of medical
authorities. These authorities serve as the analogue of God here, just as biotechnology
and pharmacology replace spiritual healing as the means by which the diminishing effects
of one’s imprudence might be corrected.
The moral/religious model has the potential to both reinforce and supplement the
medical model in powerful ways, especially in cases of persons with profound cognitive
disabilities. As discussed above, the logical conclusion arrived at through the medical
model would seem to be that the embodiment of a profoundly disabled person like Jarrod
amounts to a personal tragedy with no identifiable remedy. In one sense, interpreting
such a life within the religious parameters just described only intensifies the tragic
element; that person is not only “less than whole,” but also “unholy.” Yet, in a second
sense, the moral model provides a ground for hope the medical model cannot—the
possibility of a bona fide miracle.107

Dawn DeVries, “Creation, Handicappism, and the Community of Differing Abilities,” in Reconstructing
Christian Theology, ed. Rebecca S. Chopp and Mark Lewis Taylor ( Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1994), 124-140, 136-37.
106

107

The moral model also shares a tight connection with theodicy. When a religious perspective assumes
that the presence of disability in one's life is always reason for lament, it is only natural for one to question
why a loving God would allow, or even actively cause, human persons to have disabilities. The
constructive proposal I lay out in the remaining chapters of this study details several reasons why
Christians should not assume theodicy is most appropriate theological context for reflecting upon disability.

53

The truth of our parents’ love for Jarrod was beyond question. Yet their fervent
hope that Jarrod would one day be cured of his disabilities was also evident. Although
our parents had always been active and professing Christians, when I was roughly eight
years old, I began to notice their spiritual practices take on a more charismatic flavor. I
saw these changes most clearly in our mother. Debra talked with increasing frequency
about the power of intercessory prayer and speaking in tongues. Although our family
rarely had much expendable income, she began sending money to television ministries
that placed a heavy emphasis upon “gifts of the Spirit” and healing. On more than one
occasion, Debra told me about visions she had of myself and a disability-free Jarrod
working side-by-side in the mission field. She also informed me that Dale had spoken in
tongues for the first time while praying fervently for my brother.
One of my most vivid, childhood memories captures the time our family attended
a service led by televangelist Benny Hinn (a consistent recipient of my family’s money).
At the time, Hinn’s services always ended with his invitation for persons in attendance to
come on stage if they sought healing or desired to be “slain in the Spirit.” My mother’s
anticipation for this event was immense. At the time of invitation, my entire family rose
and went to the base of the stage. Yet that service ended without Hinn’s assistants
bringing Jarrod on stage. Instead, following the time of healing, we heard testimonies
from congregants who claimed to have been healed of migraine headaches and sinus
infections; nothing so spectacular as deafness or cerebral palsy. I can still remember our
parents’ dejected silence as we made our way to the parking lot.108 Despite the depth of

108

My abiding thought as we left that evening was, not that the faith of my parents had somehow come up
short, but that there was something suspicious and unfair about that evening's events.

54

their love for their son and the tenacity of their faith in their God, Jarrod’s deficits
remained. With the event of their car accident occurring mere months later, Dale and
Debra each died without witnessing the medical or spiritual restoration their hearts
desired.109
A third approach to conceptualizing disability challenges the basic assumption
that a person with a disability is in some way less than whole. The social model of
disability (sometimes called the minority group model) portrays disability, not as a deficit
lodged in an individual body, but as the discriminatory treatment of an atypical body.110
Being a person with a disability, therefore, is not an inherently tragic or pitiable state of
being; instead it is the stereotypes, myths, and fears of the larger society that make that
person’s life difficult.111 Insofar as disability is the product of social arrangements, the
level of disability one experiences can be reduced, perhaps even eliminated.112
To communicate the constructed character of disability more effectively, the
social model also employs the term impairment. Impairment is often defined as “an
abnormality or loss of physiological form or function.”113 The term disability here
describes the consequences of a particular impairment, which may be the inability to
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perform some task or activity, especially one a society deems necessary.114 Creamer,
Eiesland, and other (but not all) disability scholars also use the term “handicap” to refer
specifically to a disadvantage resulting from an impairment or disability.115 For the sake
of clarification, consider the example of a woman whose inner ears have sustained
extensive damage and is now deaf. Losing the ability to receive auditory information is
the impairment. This woman is disabled to the extent that she experiences limitations on
account of this loss of function, such as her inability to hear announcements delivered
through the speakers of a public address system, the dialogue of a motion picture, or the
voices of people who engage her in conversation. Because the statistical majority of
human beings are not impaired in this particular way, and most forms of human
communication or popular media thus assume an individual ability to hear, being deaf is
often socially disadvantageous and a handicap.
Reconsidering this example through the lens of the social model, the woman’s
lack of auditory function is not an inherently negative trait, but a neutral fact of her
physical constitution.116 It is the larger society and culture that declares certain traits
“abnormal” (and others not) based on particular value systems. These value systems also
establish which tasks are necessary for each individual to perform. Accordingly, the
disabling consequences of impaired hearing are not the inexorable outcome of entirely
natural structures of human existence. “Deafness” amounts to “disability” in a society
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because a hearing majority has most often crafted its practices and technologies without
taking this specific type of embodiment into account. Likewise, deafness is only a
handicap where a lack of hearing results in a social disadvantage. Wherever the society
provides reasonable accommodations for “abnormal” bodies and minds, the disabling
limitations associated with one’s impairments are indeed lessened or removed. So a
woman who cannot hear is neither disabled nor handicapped in situations where over-theair announcements are accompanied by textual messages, motion pictures are subtitled,
and she is able to communicate with other people using sign language.117 Illustrating this
point strikingly, the terms Deaf community and Deaf people represent a culture of
persons who self-identify as a linguistic (not medical) minority that proudly claims sign
language as their first or preferred language.118
The social model of disability developed in conjunction with the beginning of the
disability rights movement.119 The rallying cry of this movement is a call for
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accessibility, both in terms of the physical modification of facilities and living spaces and
of the legally protected right to move and participate throughout society.120 In short, the
emergence of the social model provided activists and scholars alike with a paradigm in
which the disabled are neither plagued by God nor disease—they are minority citizens
being deprived of their rights by a dominant, able-bodied majority.121
Much of the intellectual labor of disability studies has been to identify the nature
of the prejudice against persons with disabilities, as well as the oppressive structures this
prejudice underlies and validates. The common term for this prejudice is ableism.
Ableism is similar to other "-isms" that feature prominently in theological discourse
today without being reducible to any one of them. As in other liberative theologies,
theologies of disability heed a call, simultaneously ethical and methodological in
character, to address a distinctive set of problems that boasts a signature complexity.
Where ableism is concerned, the complexity involves the organization of human
bodies such that the statistical minority of persons with disabilities are widely represented
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as less than fully human and constituted strictly in terms of their “problem” aspects.122
The disabled body comes to stand for "the precariousness of the human condition," in
particular, the susceptibility of human persons to change, decline, and death.123 The
perceived inferiority and undesirability of disabled bodies takes the material form of
architectural barriers which keep them at a physical and social distance.124 Specialized
facilities and other accommodations continue to be difficult to secure for many
individuals who need them and, when they are available, the institutions providing them
often remain more concerned with meeting minimal legal obligations than helping those
individuals succeed or flourish. Victimization within an ableist society is not necessarily
the outcome of a mean spirited system, just a life-deadening one.125 The average citizen
does not have to harbor hate against the disabled to be both a member and beneficiary of
this "constant, unspoken conspiracy of exclusion."126
Fiona Campbell observes that, within the scholarly literature, there is "limited
definitional or conceptual specificity" in the use of ableism as a technical term.127 In
response, she offers this concise definition. Ableism is:
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A network of beliefs, processes, and practices that produces a particular kind of
self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical
and therefore essential and fully human. Disability then is cast as a diminished
state of being human.128
As an ideology, ableism makes a preference for able-bodiedness the baseline for
determining humanness.129 The medical model frequently regulates this determination,
and the ostensible purpose of medical science is ultimately to bring humankind to a state
of wholeness free of disease and genetic mutation.130 Ableism provides an "ideology of
normalcy" to background medical, bioethical, and therapeutic decisions with a set of
essentially political and social values.131
The use of disability as an identity marker is, above all, "a containment strategy
for that which troubles the cultural ideal;" namely, the ideal of normalcy.132 While the
term "normal" technically functions to describe what is common or unsurprising, ableism
employs "normal" to validate a worldview based in an ideal of what it means to be human
which, as an ideal, is not actually achievable.133 Only in recent history has the concept of
a norm come to imply that the majority of people must somehow conform to its
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content.134 "Normalcy" often functions in tyrannical ways. Standards of measurement that
make it possible to adjudicate growth, capacity, or development become assessments that
effectively force a population to fit into categories of what is normal or suffer
ostracization.135
Robert McRuer refers to this state of affairs as compulsory able-bodiedness.136
Nearly everyone acts on the desire to be normal, which is a reasonable attitude given that
the alternative is to be "abnormal" or "deviant" and experience the social consequences of
segregation from "the rest of us."137 The notion of compulsory able-bodiedness helps
expose the insidious nature of ableism as an ideology which presents the appearance of
choice where there actually is none. Meanwhile, the compulsory role of persons with
disabilities is to "embody for others an affirmative answer to the unspoken question,
‘Yes, but in the end, wouldn’t you rather be more like me?'”138 McRuer also points out
the stigmaphobic dynamic at play here: "people scrambling desperately to be included
under the umbrella of the ‘normal’—and scrambling desperately to cast somebody else as
abnormal, crazy, abject, or disabled.”139 In mainstream North American culture,
stigmaphobia carries the intolerance of the abnormal beyond the confines of medical
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diagnoses to include eccentricity, rejecting as alien or dangerous what might otherwise
signify harmless expressions of individuality.140
The inherent instability of the category of disability only heightens the anxiety of
persons passing as normal or who are attempting to do so. Disability is “the one minority
that anyone can join at any time” through countless mechanisms, including accidents,
malnutrition, or simply aging.141 In point of fact, every human person that does not die
young will eventually be disabled in one way or another.142 On the whole, then, disability
identity is less stable than gender, race, sexuality, nation, or class.143 When one takes into
consideration that all persons are virtually disabled, "both in the sense that able-bodied
norms are intrinsically impossible to embody fully and in the sense that able-bodied
status is always temporary," the arbitrariness of restricting this identity category to only
certain segments of a population becomes increasingly evident.144
Campbell makes the argument that the category of "normal" is equally unstable.
She asserts, “Ableism sets up a binary dynamic that is not simply comparative but rather
co-relationally constitutive.”145 There is an elusive core to the corporeal perfection ablebodiedness claims for itself. "Normal" is only ever loosely coherent, establishing its
significance through purging threatening bodies from itself and drawing attention to
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supposedly unruly, uncivil, and disabled bodies as counterexamples to "true," "real," and
"essential" human being.146 Normalcy is simply "not disabled" and, in the same moment,
disability is simply "not normal." The content of what is stigmatized or idealized stays
inconstant amidst the shifting significations of different cultures across history and the
globe. Campbell claims that there is a fundamental sense in which disability is unthought;
feared as strange or foreign but never truly positively signified. This adds further support
to the proposition that what makes the presence of disability so threatening to the
dominant culture is its inherent instability. Where efforts to establish a universal and
unchanging concept of human being is concerned, disability "upsets the modern craving
for ontological security."147
A consistent line of discussion in recent disability literature is to point to the
ability/disability binary's shortcomings of intelligibility and stability as grounds to
critique the social model of disability itself. Tom Shakespeare remarks that what was
once this model's greatest strength has become its most conspicuous weakness.
Beginning as it did in the social justice movements of the twentieth century, the social
model initially consisted of the formal definitions underlying a set of political
propositions, and these propositions were easily turned into effective slogans.148 This had
the unfortunate consequence of its proponents identifying with the social model so
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thoroughly that disability studies failed to revise or reconceptualize it in any substantive
way for thirty years.149
There are presently several disability scholars who have started the work of
bringing the resources of postmodern thought into critical engagement with disability
issues. Perhaps their foremost critique of the social model is that it mimics the moral
model's tendency to explain disability universally and, for that reason, ends up creating
totalizing meta-historical narratives that exclude important dimensions of disabled
peoples’ lives and much of their knowledge.150 Lennard Davis contends that the
continued, persuasive power of disability studies will suffer and its larger relevance
decrease if the field were to "ignore the current intellectual moment" and cling
dogmatically to "increasingly antiquated models."151 Not only does the diversity of lives
included in the category of disability make a single, unitary disability perspective
impossible, it is also the case that persons with disabilities always employ a disability
perspective alongside and in collaboration with other critical lenses and other identity
categories.152 Whether or not one can successfully group this new wave of disability
scholars together under a heading such as the postmodern model or the cultural model,
there remains an agreement among them that disability studies must improve in its ability
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to capture the complexity of people's lived experiences of impairment, empowerment,
and oppression.153
Of special relevance to a project on profound cognitive disability is the critique
that the social model overlooks how concrete bodies experience disability not only on
account of oppressive environmental factors, but also involuntary restrictions that
themselves lead to pain and discomfort (e.g. a child with autism experiencing frustrating
obsessions that do not have a direct, social cause).154 Likewise, there are different
emotions and adjustments one goes through when dealing with a congenital impairment
rather than an acquired one.155 Davis warns that honoring these insight properly will
mean staying mindful of the ways that even postmodernism posits a universal subject—
one that retains the modern subject's qualities of wholeness, independence, unity, selfdetermination, and normal capability.156 As an alternative, he posits the notion of a
subject that only comes to be itself under conditions of dependence and interdependence
rather than independence and autonomy.157 Tom Koch similarly advocates opposing the
ideology of normalcy with an "ideology of difference," where it is assumed that each
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individual is somehow "incomplete and un-able, gaining full personhood only
interpersonally and socially."158 When a disability perspective takes up this agenda, the
perceived messiness and strangeness of persons with profound cognitive disability,
especially their lack of purposive agency, no longer count as valid reasons to exclude
them from human communities or the theoretical consideration of human being itself.159
What this survey of different models of disability makes clear is that the academic
study of disability is now at a crossroads. The path (or paths) that future research and
theorization ought to take is a matter of fervent debate. Given this situation, a theological
project, such as my own, cannot simply adopt a methodology or theory base wholesale
from disability studies. A true conversation must be had—one in which the salient
arguments of disability literature come into constructive engagement with the elements of
theological discourse that resemble, amplify, or even challenge those arguments.
Before considering two proposals for how best to put the insights of disability
studies to use, a brief summary of the preceding journey through disability studies should
prove helpful. What the term “disability” actually signifies is indeed underdetermined.
The medical and moral models each present disability as a defective trait lodged in the
body of an individual person, and everyday usage of the term would seem to affirm this
characterization as common sense. Nevertheless, a closer examination of these two
models shows them to be reductive—focused so intently on the diagnosis of a deviation
from an ideal human body or the assessment of the spiritual connotations of one’s bodily
function that the very personhood of a person with disabilities goes unaccounted for and
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is tacitly qualified or denied. The social model, introduced amidst the rise of disability
studies and disability culture, highlights the ways in which persons are disabled chiefly
by the stigma and prejudiced structures of human communities, rather than by their own
embodiment. The exposure of ableism, as well as the artificiality of “normalcy,”
facilitates the liberative end of promoting greater attentiveness to bodily difference and
the diversity of human abilities. Yet the social model itself also loses sight of an
individual’s personhood by making disability entirely a matter of social construction,
overlooking concrete frustrations and bodily pains that cannot be reduced to oppressive
ideology. The current dilemma for scholars interested in disability issues is what the
focus and goals of the next wave of scholarship should be.
One well-known scholar who attempts to integrate the insights of disability
studies into a universal theory of justice is Martha Nussbaum. Adopting what she calls a
capabilities approach, she is straightforward about her intentions to include all persons
with disabilities into her moral and political philosophy.160 I now turn to consider the
potential value of her work for my own project.

160

Another well-known version of the capabilities approach appears in the work of economist Amartya
Sen. Sen and Nussbaum began developing their respective versions of this approach independently,
although they continue to engage one another in public dialogue. See Amartya Sen, Development as
Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999); The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011).

67

Dignity in the Capabilities Approach of Martha Nussbaum
At the heart of Martha Nussbaum's theory of justice is a commitment to address
three significant problems that even the strongest, contemporary theories of justice
consistently leave unsolved. The first is “the problem of doing justice to people with
physical and mental impairments.”161 To deal with this problem effectively, Nussbaum
urges us to adopt “a new way of thinking about who the citizen is.”162 She seeks to
develop a social contract theory in which the contract is not fundamentally an
arrangement of “mutual advantage” between “free, equal, and independent” parties.163
Her focus moves beyond just mutual advantage to include benevolence and altruism
among the basic motivations for entering into the contract.164 On this view, the citizen is
a political animal who is both dignified and needy.165 Proper treatment of such a being
demands that the element of care define just relationships between citizens in addition to
the modern value of respect.
Nussbaum christens her theory the capabilities approach because it begins by
examining “what people are actually able to do and to be.”166 A capability is an
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“opportunity to select,” in other words, an area of free choice.167 For Nussbaum, the
guarantee of certain freedoms is the heart of justice. She identifies a specific set of
capabilities as “core human entitlements”—substantial freedoms that all governments
should honor and provide.168 She arrives at this list by explicating what is implicit in the
idea of a life worthy of dignity. She admits that dignity is a vague idea, yet remains
adamant that “this intuitive starting point offers definite, albeit highly general,
guidance.”169 When dignity is placed alongside other important notions (such as freedom
and justice), its content becomes more fixed. The argument for each core entitlement, or
central human capability, is thus also intuitive; it entails imagining a form of life where
conditions that honor and enable each person's substantial freedoms are present.170
Nussbaum asserts that a life worthy of human dignity requires, at a bare
minimum, “an ample threshold level of ten Central Capabilities.”171 The central human
capabilities Nussbaum identifies are: life itself; bodily health; bodily integrity; the
development of the senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason;
affiliation (both communal and political); relationships with other species; play; and
control over one’s environment.172 When examining this list, Nussbaum would have the
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reader note that the ends of a just society are necessarily plural and diverse.173 A
governing body, therefore, must provide all ten central capabilities. Furthermore, it may
not engage in trade-offs whereby one capability is provided at the expense of another.174
Nussbaum also follows the Kantian tradition that every person ought to be treated as an
end and never “as a mere tool of the ends of others.”175 In short, Nussbaum’s theory of
justice prescribes that the governments of all nations secure for each and every citizen the
minimal conditions required for human flourishing—“not just mere human life, but good
life.”176 A life that lacks one of the central capabilities is a life “not worthy of human
dignity.”177
Another noteworthy methodological commitment Nussbaum makes is that she
intentionally abstains from grounding her theory in “divisive religious or metaphysical
principles.”178 She regards the intuitive consideration of the notion of dignity to be a
sufficient conceptual base. She writes, “We can accept without profound metaphysics
that human life has a characteristic shape and form, and that certain abilities…are
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generally agreed to be very important to success.”179 The capabilities approach would
appear to have global applicability because a nation may adopt it without joining its
policies to a particular religious or philosophical system.
Nussbaum’s hesitance concerning theoretical foundations is motivated by her
commitment to political liberalism. Her rigorous emphasis on free choice requires her
approach to be “pluralist about value.”180 The fact that personal abilities combine with
environmental factors to create areas of freedom means that societal understandings of
each central capability will inevitably vary across cultures and across time. Nussbaum’s
list is general and abstract by design in order to leave room for citizens and legislatures to
deliberate on each item, while taking “their histories and special circumstances into
account.”181 The central capabilities list is thus subject to revision. Nussbaum maintains
that this quality makes the capabilities approach a sufficiently complex and versatile
theoretical framework.182 What appears to be nonnegotiable is the notion of human
flourishing this approach is designed to promote. The disconcerting implications of this
notion become apparent in Nussbaum’s remarks on disability.
On matters of disability, the capabilities approach first appears to be an instance
of the social model. The altruistic orientation of Nussbaum’s social contract obliges
governments to ensure that persons with impairments have access to public spaces and
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political processes.183 Nussbaum observes that the perceived impediments to assisting
these persons are often social and far from inevitable. Policy makers incorrectly point to
the “naturalness” of certain impairments to justify their refusal to spend the money
necessary for large-scale changes.184
Justice, however, demands that persons with disabilities receive diverse
opportunities for choice, as well as the care necessary to reach socially appropriate
threshold levels.185 This will require an honest assessment of what each person with a
disability is truly capable of doing. On these points, the capabilities approach dovetails
with the disability rights movement and scholarly efforts to deconstruct the category of
disability. Yet these liberative elements do not constitute the whole story of how
Nussbaum theorizes disability.
For all its attentiveness to social concerns, the capabilities approach resembles the
medical model in its basic characterizations of the “disabled” and the “able-bodied” alike.
Nussbaum’s intuitive explication of dignity depends heavily on scientific and clinical
interpretations of human life. In her book Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum acknowledges
that the process of naming the central capabilities takes into account “the species norm,”
that is, “the many actual features of a characteristic human form of life.”186 This emphasis
on a species norm is not necessarily problematic for persons with impairments who
remain capable of self-expression, self-advocacy, and participation in “characteristic”
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human relationships. But this evaluative description of human nature is highly
problematic with regard to persons with profound cognitive disabilities who, as a
statistically small minority group within a minority group, are unlikely to influence the
discernment of what is characteristic.
Nussbaum, to her credit, openly addresses this difficult issue. She maintains that a
being must be considered a subject of justice if its life demonstrates “the presence of any
type of agency or striving accompanied by sentience.”187 Persons with cognitive
disabilities who nevertheless appear capable of perception, affiliation, and forms of play
meet these criteria.188 Nussbaum advocates the political strategy of treating these persons
as if they could demonstrate all ten central capacities. In the absence of such a strategy, a
society could reasonably absolve itself of its obligation to promote the flourishing of
those with severe impairments. In the case of someone in a permanent vegetative state,
however, Nussbaum frankly asserts that the human form of life is absent because such a
state of being is close to “the medical definition of death.”189 It seems that, for Nussbaum,
the important difference between the being in a vegetative state and one with a severe
impairment is that, only in the former case is an entire group of major capabilities
completely and irrevocably cut off. She claims one may justifiably regard whatever
flourishing persons with profound disabilities may achieve to be achieved within a human
form of life.190
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On this point, I do not think Nussbaum has sufficiently dealt with the
disconcerting implications of the capabilities approach. On the same page as her
comments about vegetative states, she declares that each central capability is an
entitlement so fundamental that “a life without any possibility at all of exercising one of
them, at any level, is not a fully human life…even if the others are present.”191
Amplifying the cause for concern here is her claim in Creating Capabilities that practical
reason (alongside affiliation) plays "a distinctive architectonic role" within the list of
Central Human Capabilities in that it organizes and pervades the others.192 In light of this,
the denial of the humanity of someone with profound cognitive disabilities would appear
warranted.
Reconsider this example of Jarrod. By any standard convention, he is incapable of
reaching minimum thresholds of practical reason or control over his environment. It is
highly probable that no amount of state-provided care can further develop these
capabilities in him. From Nussbaum’s political perspective, our government has not done
Jarrod an injustice so long as his equal citizenship is affirmed and his political interests
are represented through an assigned guardian.193 But the representation of Jarrod’s
interests is not equivalent to the establishment of his full humanity. Within the
capabilities approach, nonhuman animals also qualify as subjects of justice. Insofar as

191

Ibid., 181.

192

Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 39.

193

Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 196-97.

74

Jarrod is markedly deficient in certain Central Human Capabilities, advocating on his
behalf would arguably be a matter of animal rights rather than of human rights.194
Nussbaum has set up a framework in which those with severe cognitive
impairments are disabled, not just in terms of how they are treated, but in their very way
of being. This framework leads inexorably to the claim that the life these persons live is
not to be preferred and that a distinctly human mode of flourishing is unavailable to them.
Adding credence to this interpretation of her position, Nussbaum explicitly states that it is
always better for someone to have a central human capability on one’s own than to have
it provided through a guardian.195 Furthermore, if a cure for a condition such as Jarrod’s
became available, then “a decent society” would pay for its implementation, up to and
including the performance of gene therapy on the unborn.196
Apart from these alarming elements, there remains much to appreciate about
Nussbaum’s theory of justice. Her placement of disability rights at the heart of her
political philosophy is certainly laudable. Nevertheless, I contend that the most
disconcerting elements of the capabilities approach have their source in Nussbaum’s
reliance on an ableist concept of human flourishing. On the surface, Nussbaum seeks to
maximize the applicability and appeal of her theory by denying allegiance to any
particular metaphysical foundations. All the while, the coherence of the central
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capabilities list depends on a particular ontology.197 A specific vision of being human
must be taken as given by any government that may adopt Nussbaum’s theory of justice.
This ontology perpetuates the assumption that purposive agency is indeed the basis of
human dignity. Nussbaum urges the world's citizens to affirm that worth as a political
strategy, but her theoretical framework cannot mandate such generosity.198 I believe that
to see this problem for what it is and dismiss it would extend a theoretical shortcoming
into moral failure.
If one is to reconstruct the concept of human flourishing in a manner which
thoroughly affirms that profound impairments count among the plurality of ways human
being manifests itself, then one cannot simply adopt the capabilities approach any more
than the social model of disability. What is required is a model of disability where the
lives of persons with profound cognitive disabilities do not represent problematic,
outlying data but are instead inexpendable content for discerning the distinctive shape of

I need to clarify the sense in which I employ the term “ontology,” especially since it becomes a
important term in my theological proposal. Consistent with traditional uses of the term, I understand
“ontology” to refer to a theory of being. Contrary to traditional uses, however, I do not use it to refer to an
essential nature or substance and, similarly, I sever the historical connections between ontology and
metaphysics. My understanding of ontology, then, is a distinctive way of being or becoming in the world.
In other words, ontology refers to a mode or pattern of existence that may be intelligibly defined without
being reified. For example, I make the case from Chapter 3 onward that one ought to understand human
being in terms of relationships of radical interdependence. This is an ontological claim insofar as I posit a
particular mode of embodied life as distinctly human. But it is not a metaphysical or essentialist claim
because I do not presuppose that the anthropology I am constructing boasts a one-to-one correspondence
with reality as such and neither do I endeavor to provide a positive description of a human nature that
transcends the material conditions of embodied and embedded existence.
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a dignified human existence. I find such a resource in the constructive theological
proposal of Deborah Creamer.

The Embodied Limits of Human Being
Deborah Creamer asserts that Christian theology has a vital contribution to make
regarding the current dilemma in disability studies. I find that the approach to disability
issues she outlines opens up a conceptual space in which informed and fruitful
consideration of profound cognitive disability is possible. What Creamer proposes is a
limits model of disability. This model provides a strong warrant for deconstructing the
binary of ability/disability that undergirds the medical, moral, and social models. The
core insight of the limits model is that being human necessarily entails regular encounters
with the limits of one’s capacities and functions.199 If disability is understood broadly as a
condition that falls short of some ideal human embodiment, then disability is a more
normal human experience than nondisability, making each human being, at best,
temporarily able-bodied.200 Not merely a topic of “special” interest for those with
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personal (read: nonacademic) investments, disability illuminates something
fundamental—not exceptional—about being human.201
Creamer’s efforts to articulate her limits model grow out of her discontent with
how Christian theology has treated the body over the past few decades. While she affirms
the methodological commitment to understand human existence according to its
embodied and contextual dimensions, Creamer critiques the widespread tendency of
theologians to assume that the “normal” human body is a “healthy” body. In this way, the
constructive work of many theologians is not nearly as grounded as they profess.
Creamer’s entry point into theological anthropology is primarily epistemological, as her
project repeatedly interrogates the hermeneutical claims involved in appeals to embodied
experience. To direct one’s reflections on the body through the lens of the limits model
requires one to remain vigilant against practices of thought that abstract too greatly from
the materiality of the body.202 In short, the aim of the model is “to reflect upon and to
represent the experiences of actual bodies in all their lived and constructed diversity.”203
As a theological understanding of what it means to be human, Creamer organizes
the limits model around three religious claims present within the Christian tradition. First,
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limits are an unsurprising characteristic of humanity.204 This recognition divests limits of
the negative connotations of lack and deficiency. Positively, consideration of personal
and communal limits can lead toward creativity, as well as a refined understanding of the
boundaries and possibilities specific to a particular context.205 To encounter limits in the
other or oneself is commonplace and theorization should reflect that.
Second, limits are an intrinsic part of human existence, rather than strictly
environmental constraints impeding the full exercise of human capacities from the
outside. Accordingly, Christian thought should not consider limitation as such to be either
punishment for sin or an obstacle on the path to human perfection. To do so would lose
sight of the fact that Christianity has long held to a view of living in community in which
personal inability positively serves to define the divinely bestowed gifts each member
possesses.206
Finally, to have intrinsic limitations, what Creamer calls the quality of
"limitness," is good or (at a minimum) not evil.207 It is not an unfortunate alternative to
omnipotence.208 To find a theological precedent for this valuation, one need look no
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further than Genesis 1:31, where God surveys the entirety of finite creation and
acknowledges, in simply being as it was created to be, creation is very good. In this light,
a more appropriate way to define the connection between limitness and sin is as "an
inappropriate attitude toward limitness as we both exaggerate and reject our own limits
and the limits of others."209
Together these three claims express a vital insight that Christian theology brings
to the discussion about disability: human beings are creatures. To flourish as a human
being, therefore, requires one to live as a creature. Restating this remark in Creamer's
exact terms, "We are called into limit-ness to be fully present in our embodied limits.”210
Such full presence remains impossible as long as human aspirations and selfunderstandings find their source in illusory concepts, such as the ableist portrait of
normalcy. The most meaningful visions of flourishing will instead be informed by a
renewed grasp of the boundaries and possibilities that both restrict and enable human
becoming.
Within this interpretive framework, "disability" is present wherever one's
environment fails to accommodate one's limits, whether or not those limits have been
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traditionally defined as "impairments" or "conditions."211 A limits approach to disability
pursues questions about what disability is, rather than attempting to classify who is and is
not disabled.212 What Creamer’s constructive proposal amounts to, then, is a challenge to
examine our limits honestly, embrace the fact of them earnestly, and interpret them in
ways that continue to pursue the complexities of embodied existence.213
The limits model's ability to expose how long-established categories gloss over
the full variety of human abilities is precisely what makes it so promising as a resource
for reconstructing theology in light of profound cognitive disability. The persistent
assumption that a profound disability is obviously and quite naturally a deficiency is the
primary obstacle to affirming the inherent worth and full humanity of persons like Jarrod.
Following the cues of the limits model, one can bring insights regarding the embodied
and embedded diversity of human existence to bear on the theme of relationality since
acknowledging the fact of this plurality requires one to conceptualize how these
differences exist together with one another. Reconceptualizing relationality in these terms
offers a challenge to homogenizing anthropologies that name rationality or purposive
agency as humanity’s universal marker. Within the human family, embodied diversity
certainly includes human encounters with cognitive limitation, from the mundane
experience of forgetfulness to the comparatively rare manifestation of profound
impairment. The limits model thus provides me with a cogent agenda and flexible
Ibid., 112; cf., “Toward a Theology That Includes the Human Experience of Disability,” 65. It is on this
point that the deep influence of the social model on a limits approach is most evident.
211

212

Creamer, “Toward a Theology That Includes the Human Experience of Disability,” 64.

213

Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 119. What Creamer literally says is that the complicated
proposal of her monograph is "to examine and embrace and reinterpret our limits."

81

framework to utilize as I endeavor to give theoretical expression to the connections I feel
to Jarrod as both brothers and fellow human beings. Although Creamer notes the
appropriateness of using the limits model for a project on cognitive disability, she has
thus far left the performance of that work up to other scholars.
Alongside this promise, however, there remain challenges for any scholar who
would incorporate Creamer's limits perspective into his or her own methodology. In its
present form, this model aims at capturing great complexity while offering little in the
way of clear guidelines for theorizing the embodied limits of particular individuals or
communities. The critical consensus in peer-reviewed journals is that Creamer's proposal
is insightful and important, but strikingly underdeveloped.214 Creamer owns up to this
characterization, identifying the end of her project as "uncertain and indeterminate" and
acknowledging the need to name criteria for discerning which limits are "good" and
which are "wrong.”215 As Julia Watts-Belser notes, "the immense cultural tendency to
regard disability as a devastating limit" may lead to unintended appropriations of the
limits model; namely, uses that deepen the perception of persons with disabilities as more
limited than others and, in that sense, victims of a tragic condition after all.216 Michael
Mawson raises the concern that Creamer occasionally loses focus on the radical nature of
214
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human limitness and, as a result, her proposal may overestimate how fully human beings
are able to grasp and embrace their limits.217 Adding further complexity to the
deployment of a limits perspective is Creamer's insistence that her model is a necessary
“companion piece” to the other three models of disability, supplementing their insights
without superseding them.218 To date, she has not specified a strategy for how to best
utilize these lenses alongside each other or deal with the inherent tensions and
contradictions between them.
Yet one need not regard these apparent weaknesses as fatal flaws. They are
instead simply a few of the specific challenges theologians and other theorists will need
to address if they assume Creamer's vantage point on disability issues and theological
anthropology. In the final analysis, I see Creamer's primary contribution to Christian
theology to be the articulation of a basic orientation for reflecting upon human being in
innovative ways. Her work is an effort to flesh out the deep implications of values that
are popular within her field, especially the commitment to capture the reality of human
embodiment more fully. Instead of producing a full-fledged theological anthropology or
detailed methodology, what she provides are insightful prolegomena to that constructive
work. She compels her peers to consider what directions Christian theology ought to take
if they embrace limitness as an unsurprising, intrinsic, and good aspect of being human.
I suggest that, as with constructive theology in general, the limits model only
takes on a more discernable shape, and it can only provide more specific guidelines for
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reflection, once the theologian brings this basic orientation to bear on particular subject
matter. In the remaining chapters of this study, I will put the values of the limits model to
work in the construction of my own theological anthropology. In the process, I intend to
demonstrate by example how generative and enriching a limits perspective can be within
a discussion of human being and its flourishing.
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CHAPTER THREE: RADICAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN CREATION AND
CHRISTOLOGY

Setting the Terms for a Constructive Theological Proposal
The chief and abiding aim of the present study is to construct a theological
anthropology that funds a vision of human flourishing robust enough to include persons
with profound cognitive disabilities. As I have stated since its opening pages, my
personal incentive to reconceive human being in these terms stems primarily from my
relationship with my brother Jarrod. When I share space with Jarrod, I encounter a being
whose dignity and humanity appear to me as full and as certain as my own. In the
preceding chapters, I have identified, interrogated, and challenged numerous
understandings of the basic nature and structure of human existence that privilege
abilities—rationality and purposive agency foremost among them—that Jarrod seems to
lack or possess only in small measure.
According to the prevailing assumptions about human being, Jarrod's diminished
abilities correlate, if only implicitly, to the diminished worth of his life. Here a life
marked by profound cognitive disability is worth-less to such a degree that it is
effectively invisible, typically failing even to register as a way of being in the world for
which a concept of the human must account. Christian theology and ethics are just as apt
to marginalize or ignore persons such as Jarrod from theorization as any other discipline
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(as detailed in the survey of recent theological anthropologies in Chapter 1). On what
possible grounds then might I credibly maintain that Jarrod is indeed "one of us," a
person every bit as deserving of a flourishing life as those with the intellectual and
symbolic abilities to understand the words on this page? What warrant might there be
beyond "personal incentive" to justify a study like this in the first place? The purpose of
the remaining three chapters is to offer a careful and extended response to these
questions.
In the argument that follows, I transition from the task of identifying common
obstacles or potential resources for theoretical reflection on profound cognitive disability
to the task of articulating what it means to be human in a manner that is actively
constructive and overtly theological. The central tenet of the anthropology I present here
is that human being is best understood in terms of an ontology of radical
interdependence. As I noted in my brief discussion of expressivism in Chapter 1, the
notion that "human being" is not a static essence, but rather something that manifests
itself pluralistically amidst the historical conditions of individual lives, is a nineteenthcentury invention and thus a relative novelty. Much remains to be done to separate it
further from the Enlightenment portrait of the autonomous, rational subject it arose to
challenge. An emphasis on radical interdependence drives theological anthropology in
precisely that direction.
The insistence that human interdependence is radical involves the affirmation of a
second, similar proposition: community precedes individuality. There are numerous
theoretical models of human being that assume the truth of this proposition, yet also
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perpetuate the identification of basic humanity with the exercise of a specific ability. But
there is no strict necessity to hold those two convictions simultaneously. The fact of
human relationality is the logical precondition of rationality and purposive agency alike,
and it often becomes manifest without the expression of either ability. An emphasis on
interdependence seeks to honor the full extent to which human existence is primordially
communal.219 The onus now falls on me to explore at greater length how human persons,
as embodied beings, are entwined with one another by virtue of their vulnerabilities and
their persistent needs for care and cooperation. By the time I have finished articulating
my theological anthropology, it should be abundantly clear that a notion of
interdependence that shies away from the concrete details of true dependence is a false
notion.
Placing the lives of persons with cognitive disabilities at the center of theoretical
reflection on human being serves as a check against any half-hearted embrace of
interdependence or its radicality precisely because their lives lack the qualities with
which today's scholars are typically enamored. I intend to demonstrate that an ontology
of radical interdependence finds a welcoming home in the context of Christian theology,
despite the current persistence of the modern subject within the discipline. Beyond this, I
will demonstrate how several perennial Christian doctrines are not only compatible with
efforts to affirm the full humanity of persons like Jarrod; they already contain an inner
rationale that speaks to the necessity of such a project.
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Theological Themes and Methodological Commitments
Before identifying and reflecting upon these doctrines, however, some clarifying
remarks about my methodological commitments in this chapter are necessary. My
intended audience in this chapter is my most immediate colleagues and peers—
theologians, clergy, and laity who identify with the Christian religious tradition. The
interdisciplinarity of earlier chapters does not disappear below, but it is deemphasized in
favor of a discussion with a distinctively theological orientation.220 For all the careful
theorization and critical correlations with concrete, lived experience I endeavor to
perform here, an element of confessionalism permeates my treatment of the subject
matter. In other words, there is a degree to which, for my proposal concerning theological
anthropology to be entirely convincing, the reader will need to concede (if only for the
sake of argument) that a project of Christian theological construction is a worthwhile
endeavor.221 I aim to show how, when traditional elements are freshly arranged in "the
key of disability," Christian theology's unrealized potential to affirm disabled lives
becomes powerfully evident.222 Even subtle tweaks in doctrinal content can have a
tremendous impact on its interpretation. Along the way, the sheer arbitrariness behind the
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marginalization of profound cognitive disability from theological reflection should
become equally obvious.
Because the interconnected arguments of Chapters 3-5 build upon the conceptual
space I have cleared up to this point, I should also identify how I plan to bring the salient
insights of the preceding chapters into my constructive proposal. The combined purpose
of Chapters 1 and 2 has been to provide my theological reflections with both a framework
and a set of resources customized to the task before me. Although the core argument of
Chapter 1 is the call to remove the capacity for purposive agency from the center of
theological anthropology, I want to reaffirm and adopt several of the key values and
assumptions that are common among the theologians I surveyed. Above all, I affirm the
basic assertion of expressivism, that "human being" manifests itself dynamically and
pluralistically within the conditions of concrete existence and, as such, the revelation of
its content is ongoing. As I posit an ontology of radical interdependence, I am envisioning
human being in largely phenomenological terms as a distinctive way of being in the
world. This brand of ontology resists both traditional essentialisms and any perceived
need to portray the human as one cog in some elaborate metaphysical apparatus. Also
from Chapter 1, I shall continue to work with the five common themes of theological
anthropology I identified there: embodiment, embeddedness, relationality, rationality, and
agency. I maintain that each of these themes will be present in any adequate theological
anthropology; it is the chosen configuration of these themes that determines the
descriptive power of one's anthropology.
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The engagement of disability studies in Chapter 2 makes the case for why critical
consideration of the theme of embodiment remains to be done, largely because most
theologians fail even to take notice of "disability" as a topic worthy of theological
reflection. Although this chapter presents several strands of disability studies, the
approach to this discourse I identify with most closely is Deborah Creamer's limits
model. The limits model facilitates the present study in two significant ways. First,
Creamer's work highlights how disability scholars also tend to valorize purposive agency,
making it rare for cognitive disability to register as a topic of importance even within
disability studies. Second, the limits model is an explicitly theological model that
provides a strong foothold for additional theological reflection upon cognitive disability.
The vital insight of this model is that, if one takes seriously the fact that every human
being lives an embodied life, then every human life bears the quality of "limit-ness."
There is a sense, therefore, in which every human person experiences disability as a basic
consequence of being a finite creature, unable to perform certain functions because of
either bodily limitations or environmental constraints. The fact of being limited is thus
not an unfortunate or undesirable state to bemoan but an aspect of human existence that
each person must embrace to know oneself truly. In short, embracing embodiment means
focusing more on where "disability" occurs for any of us rather than attempting to
constrain this category to an identity marker that applies exclusively to people whose
bodies do not appear "normal." Creamer also insists that the limits model be employed as
an interpretive lens alongside other prominent models of disability—namely, the medical
and social models—in order to protect the limits model itself from abuse and
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misinterpretation. I will demonstrate through example what it might look like to allow for
the interplay of these models as part of theological construction.
My preferred configuration of the five anthropological themes is to treat
relationality, here understood in terms of radical interdependence, as the focal point of
authentic human being. Arriving at a more rigorously conceived concept of relationality
will require tightening the conceptual bonds it shares with embodiment and
embeddedness, while simultaneously loosening its familiar ties to rationality and agency.
The limits model facilitates this reconceptualization through its central insight that taking
embodiment seriously means paying attention to all the forms and functionings human
persons exhibit, not merely the ones that fit neatly into the concept of human being that
one's preferred theology presupposes. From this perspective, ignoring the lives of persons
with profound cognitive disabilities is not only ill-advised, it is outright irresponsible.
Nevertheless, even if this is conceded, there is still an outstanding need to provide
convincing warrant for representing persons such as Jarrod as "one of us," as opposed to
living examples of the undesirable low end of human finitude. The limits model is once
again helpful here, directing attention to Christian theology as the specific field in which
this crucial warrant awaits discovery.
Creamer's signature affirmation of "limit-ness" derives its own justification in no
small part from the doctrine of creation, in particular God's declaration that all the
creatures God has made are "very good" (Genesis 1:31). In picking up this thread of
reflection, I meditate at much greater length on the subject of creation than Creamer has
done in her publications to date. As I will show, the task of teasing out the importance the
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doctrine of creation has for theological anthropology very quickly leads one to trace its
systematic connections to other doctrines. The effort to understand what human life is
before the Creator demands that one also attend to matters of the person and work of
Christ (Christology), the nature of the church (ecclesiology), and the final end of human
being (eschatology). My treatment of these other relevant doctrines will be comparatively
narrow, discussing each only in as much detail as I need to highlight the anthropological
thread I see running through and binding them together. That thread is the concept of the
imago Dei. It is ultimately through my reflections on how the distinctive shape of human
existence resembles the divine life that I establish the secure place persons with profound
cognitive disabilities ought occupy within the web of human interdependence.

Creation Ex Nihilo as the Backdrop for Human Being
Since the classical period, creation has provided the primary doctrinal context for
theological reflection upon human nature.223 Among the varied attempts of Christian
theologians to generate a compelling account of humankind's creation, two Latin phrases
consistently appear: creatio ex nihilo ("creation from nothing") and imago Dei ("image of
God"). I find great promise for theological reconstruction in both of these traditional
resources. Although my examination of creation ex nihilo is relatively brief, and my
mediation on the imago Dei takes up most of the present study, my preferred
interpretation of the former phrase shapes my chosen understanding of the latter.
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The idea that God brings all earthly entities into being "from nothing" is a
generative idea with the potential to fund a vision of creation that is expansive in scope,
as well as attuned to the nuances of life in the world. Unfortunately, the typical use of
creation ex nihilo in modern times has been to minimize the scope and explanatory power
of the doctrine. In point of fact, the doctrine of creation has served many purposes across
the long history of Christian thought: a rejection of metaphysical dualism, affirming the
inherent worth of the natural order, establishing the quality of the relation between God
and creation, providing a characterization of the Christian God, tracing an etiology of
human sinfulness, or articulating a cosmogony, i.e. an account of the origins of the
universe.224 Yet, in the modern era, Christian theologians have tended to restrict the
content of the doctrine to etiology and cosmogony. As a result, there is a prevalent
assumption that creation ex nihilo is strictly a statement about the Creator's past activity
"in the beginning."
Resisting this trend, Ian McFarland posits that the doctrine of creation is only
marginally concerned with the question of temporal origins. “Far more fundamentally,
the doctrine of creation from nothing is a proposal about the character of God's
relationship with the world."225 Dawn DeVries concurs, identifying the character of this
relationship as the absolute dependence of all created beings on God as their common
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source.226 This leads her to the related observations that the "radical meaning" of creation
ex nihilo is that "in relation to God, we are all alike God's creatures, even though we are
all very different in relation to one another."227 Succinctly put, the chief relevance of
these remarks for the present study is this: If one affirms and appropriates the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo, this doctrine precludes the theologian from establishing ontological
hierarchies. All creatures, human or otherwise, are ontologically the same in that they are
all radically different than their common Creator and Sustainer.228
This doctrine also resists the identification of autonomy as the natural state of
human existence. Before God, no creature enjoys ontological autonomy.229 Profound
dependence is the fact of creaturely existence, a fact that logically precedes and directs
any theological efforts to describe what is peculiar to humankind among its fellow
creatures. Furthermore, whatever one ultimately concludes about human being as a
reflection of divinity, this imaging will occur in and through a state of absolute
dependence, neither circumventing nor nullifying this most primordial condition.
It should not be overlooked that the complement to the fact of this dependence is
the continuous, generative activity of God. The conceptual distinction between creation
and providence thus proves to be largely artificial. As Descartes observed, a finite being
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cannot exist through its own powers and so requires divine power to continue to sustain
it.230 The Creator's activity is thus ongoing rather than a finished act.231
A recurring concern among present-day theologians, process theologians in
particular, is that any reference to creation from nothing unavoidably assumes a
cosmogony inconsistent with the current models of natural science. Catherine Keller is
one prominent scholar who advocates a doctrine of creation from chaos.232 Much could
be said about this important debate. Nevertheless, I wish to engage it only insofar as
doing so helps draw attention to the opening verses of Genesis 1 and what they
communicate about the nature of God's creative action. As Amos Yong notes, this
narrative presents God as establishing the form of the world by subjecting primordial
disorder to processes of division, distinction, and particularization.233 Thomas Reynolds
sees a basic compatibility between this biblical scene and creation ex nihilo. Creation
from nothing, he explains, is "not out of a negative absolute nothing, but rather out of a
positive relative nothing, a matrix of chaotic non-being full of potentiality for God's
ordering work."234 Conceding this point does not compromise the most important
implication of the doctrine, that literally no earthly being can exist outside of the
Creator's providential activity. Yong further remarks on the way in which the God of
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Genesis 1 "revels in plurality and difference," as evidenced by the multitude of forms
God guides into being during the six reported days.235 A theology of disability can do
much with a God who delights in difference. As the product of the same developmental
advance that produces all creaturely qualities, embodied impairments may be human
traits that God neither spurns nor intentionally wills.236
Focusing one's understanding of creation ex nihilo on these insights (as opposed
to cosmogony) also protects against certain idolatries. On the one hand, the theologian
avoids the reification of any "best-case anthropologies" by eliminating the need to posit
an ideal, prelapsarian world in which the first human creature lived.237 On the other hand,
this understanding mitigates against excessive confidence in the content of Christian
theism. The doctrine points towards the source of all creation as One who transcends the
finite and contingent processes of this world and, in doing so, places that source beyond
the grasp of metaphysics and all other human means of rationalizing the universe.238
Moving from the consideration of transcendence to immanence, this portrait of
creation affirms an ontological solidarity that pervades all creation as an alternative to
ontological hierarchies. The wide threads of continuity between human and nonhuman
life ought to inform anthropology while simultaneously undermining anthropocentrism.
As Sallie McFague argues, attention to the embodied and embedded character of human
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existence also requires recognition of how materiality binds human beings into a web of
radical relatedness and interdependence that spreads beyond intrahuman relationships to
the larger cosmos.239 Closely tied to the need to affirm the reality of this web is the need
to recognize the theological importance of practices of care. Creation ex nihilo establishes
that everything, insofar as it exists at all, is of immediate concern to God; therefore, there
are no grounds on which to be indifferent toward the flourishing of any part of
creation.240

The Case for a Relational Approach to the Imago Dei
The recognition of the material and ontological continuities human being has with
the rest of the created order does not preclude further investigation into what might
distinguish or differentiate this family of creatures from the rest of creation. The imago
Dei is often the conceptual tool theologians use for just this intellectual labor.241
Curiously, as important as this notion may seem at present, it has not historically been a
topic of central emphasis or ecumenical debate within the Christian tradition. There is no
creedal statement that prescribes orthodox teachings about what it means for humankind
to image God in the manner that the Nicene Creed regulates consideration of the Trinity
or the Chalcedonian Definition governs Christological discussion. As a result, churches
continue to have imprecise and speculative understandings of the imago Dei, and
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disagreements on the subject never held enough importance to serve as grounds for
schism.242 Olli-Pekka Vainio characterizes the notion of the imago Dei as a placeholder
where concerns regarding the nature, value, and place of the human being before God
present themselves for theological reflection.243
The turn to scripture does little to resolve the indeterminacy. Despite the phrase's
prominent appearance in Genesis 1, biblical authors only mention "the image of God" six
times, or a mere eight times when one also considers intertestamental literature. Genesis
1:26 provides the famous declaration of the Creator, "Let us make humankind in our
image, according to our likeness," while the narration of 1:27 reports the performance of
that act.244 The language of both Wisdom 2:23 and Sirach 17:3 essentially just echoes the
Genesis account. Genesis 9:6, however, does provide more explicit warrant for
associating human dignity with creation in the image of God, appealing to the imago Dei
as grounds for prohibiting acts of human bloodshed.245 Yet this is the last time the phrase
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occurs in Genesis or the remainder of the Hebrew Bible. In the New Testament, the
imago Dei reappears in Colossians 1:15, 3:10, and 2 Corinthians 4:4, all of which
associate the image of God with the life of Christ (a point to which I return at length
below). In short, although this handful of verses certainly seems to support the traditional
consensus that the imago Dei signifies both the inherent worth and distinctiveness of
human being, their collective lack of forthrightness regarding how exactly human
existence images or is the likeness of God leaves open questions concerning what it is
about human being that reflects and concerning what is reflected.246
Because none of these ancient authors chose to define this phrase, it is likely futile
for later scholar to attempt a precise definition.247 Furthermore, as McFarland observes,
although the imago Dei remains an evocative phrase, "such a sporadic pattern of use
would seem to suggest caution in according it excessive theological weight."248 I
maintain that the vitality of the imago Dei as a resource for constructive theology resides
in its ability to forge intimate links between doctrines more central to the Christian
tradition than itself. When these links are viewed from a limits perspective, it becomes
readily evident that radical interdependence remains a consistent feature of the imago Dei
across a number of doctrinal contexts. These assertions beg the question of how a notion
that is seemingly underdetermined in biblical texts, and often inconspicuous within its
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own religious tradition, can play such a determinative role. This is the juncture at which
the prioritization of the theme of relationality becomes a revolutionary shift for
theological anthropology.
Since the patristic period, the most common strategy for giving determinate
content to this vague yet venerable idea has been the substantialist (or structural)
approach. A substantialist portrait of the imago Dei interprets the phrase as referring to
the human being's possession of "some quality, capacity, or characteristic inherent in its
creaturely substance that renders it similar to God."249 In other words, this approach
adopts the classical philosophical assumption that "human being" is an essential,
universal nature and then seeks to identify how it is structurally composed in a manner
that resembles the structure of God's own revealed nature. It is also typical of this
understanding of the imago Dei to emphasize capacity over against latency, meaning that
truly imaging God entails the conscious demonstration of privileged abilities rather than
the possession of a status all persons share in common irrespective of individual
behavior.250 The substantialist approach is thus directly responsible for the Christian
tradition's penchant to produce the sort of anthropologies I am singling out as
problematic, especially those that insist on the centrality of rational thought (be it
theoretical or practical). Despite its historical ubiquity, there is a considerable amount of
recent theological literature that finds the substantialist conception of the imago Dei
unsatisfactory.
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Several critics highlight the substantialist conception's basic incompatibility with
the understanding of the doctrine of creation articulated above. William Barr remarks that
its casting of the imago Dei is excessively static and abstract, which prevents it from
adequately representing the cultural, racial, and economic differences that characterize
life in a pluralistic world.251 One result of this insensitivity to human embeddedness is
that the traits Christian theologians valorize as identical with the image are often the
qualities already esteemed by the societies to which they belong.252 Because this
conflation collapses any critical distance between the prevailing concepts of the human
and the imago Dei, it deprives Christian communities of a distinctive anthropology by
which to critique contemporary social biases.
A substantialist approach also encourages the reinstatement of hierarchies undone
by creation ex nihilo. Ron Highfield observes how the location of dignity in structural
qualities that can be quantified leads directly to a "moral catastrophe"—theologies in
which it becomes thinkable that some human beings possess more dignity than others.253
Meanwhile, as Molly Haslam points out, the identification of a particular capacity with
the ground of human distinctiveness often also leads to the identification of that same
trait as the grounds of humanity's unique superiority vis-a-vis all creatures.254 Yet, even
when that superiority goes unchallenged within theological discourse, discoveries within
the sciences persistently undercut them by demonstrating that the revered qualities appear
251
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in comparable form or degree in the animal world as well.255 For example, Vainio
remarks that human reasoning is not as distinct from non-human reasoning as previous
scholars believed. Rather than rationality being the instrument of the human being's selfpossession, it is "to a large extent subconscious and not under our direct voluntary
control."256
Other criticisms lift up the shortcomings of the substantialist approach as a
theological framework. Drawing on the insights of Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Barr takes exception to any effort to narrow the locus of the human life before God down
to one part of its existence. Instead it is the entirety of humankind's creaturely existence
that God has brought forth and to which God has laid claim.257 Corroborating this point,
McFarland notes how creation ex nihilo also precludes the establishment of hierarchies
within the human creature because all features of creaturely existence are absolutely other
than God and thus equally distant from God.258 On an even more poignant note, Highfield
warns that the identification of the imago Dei with inherent, natural qualities results in
"theological disaster."259 By endeavoring to define human being precisely in terms of a
particular observable structure, the theologian implicitly eliminates the need to take
Reinders, Receiving in the Gift of Friendship, 238n27. Reinders’s primary interlocutor here is Francis de
Waal. See Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge,
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account of the God this capacity ostensibly resembles. Alistair McFadyen likewise asserts
that this methodology "suggests that theological anthropology is primarily descriptive,
oriented toward a reality already set unproblematically in place (which might therefore
equally be approached through empirical as well as more speculative nontheological
disciplines)."260 A truly theological anthropology will not treat the idea of God as an
optional adjunct to a concept of human being already articulated by other disciplines.261
Substantialist approaches to the imago Dei thus continually run the risk of
vitiating the notion itself of any true relevance or descriptive power. In point of fact, a
recent textbook in the area of theological anthropology recommends that Christian
scholarship "drop the structural approach entirely."262 Nevertheless, Christian theology as
a discipline currently lags behind philosophers and scientists in the exploration of more
holistic and dynamic models of human nature.263 Substantialist assumptions remain so
firmly entrenched in the tradition that many Christians believe they are essential to a
biblical understanding of human being in general and the imago Dei in particular.264
The functionalist approach provides a second conceptualization of the imago Dei.
Although it can be distinguished from the substantialist approach categorically, it shares a
number of the same shortcomings. Functional theories identify the imaging of God with
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humankind's performance of a particular role, such as being God's representatives within
the created order.265 Thus a human creature reflects the life of its Creator by means of
something it does rather than by the structure of what it is.266 The most common example
of the functionalist approach at work in the Christian tradition involves the theme of
dominion. Appropriately enough, in the effort to figure out what the image of God means
in Genesis 1:26-27, many interpreters have pointed to verse 28 as the hermeneutical key.
Here the Creator utters two initial commandments to humankind: be fruitful and multiply
and subdue the earth. Although this interpretive move shifts the conversation about the
imago Dei in a more specific direction it simultaneously introduces a new conundrum:
What does "dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every
living thing that moves upon the earth" look like when it truly images God?
Regardless of the answer, a functionalist approach ultimately amounts to another
species of a capacity-based anthropology and another framework amenable to ontological
hierarchies. It is no secret that the biblical motif of dominion has repeatedly functioned
throughout Christian history to justify anthropocentrism and the exploitative treatment of
nonhuman creatures. Similarly, whenever the divine likeness amounts to the successful
performance of a certain task, a bias against those who are less capable will be operative.
Finally, mirroring how fixation on structural qualities often directs attention away from
the Dei of the imago, functionalists anthropologies can become so enamored with the
observable, agential role that humankind plays in the theater of creation that the
Commissioner of this vocation falls easily from view. This, in turn, allows the
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responsibility of being God’s representative to degenerate into human carte blanche. A
third conceptualization of the imago Dei is thus required: a vision of human being before
God that is compatible with creation ex nihilo, that honors the dynamic and egalitarian
character of creaturely existence, and that accounts for how the doctrine of God is
determinative for the content of theological anthropology.
A relational approach to the imago Dei offers the most promising framework for
achieving all of these objectives. Proponents of this approach tend to note that the very
notion of an image logically requires one to conceive its meaning in terms of the
relationship between what images and what is imaged. Given that the first biblical
reference to the imago Dei is in a creation narrative, discerning its content is not chiefly a
matter of ascertaining the semiotics between two abstract symbols but is, first and
foremost, a matter of identifying the personal dynamics between living beings. The
imago Dei is accordingly something that occurs as a result of the relationship between the
Creator of all and a particular sort of creature.267 This imaging centrally concerns being
or activity rather than something possessed. Identifying the image-bearing quality in
relationship itself is consonant with the conviction that God lays claim to the whole of the
person because relationship is irreducible to any single capacity.268
This bit of conceptual analysis is consonant with the work of Hebrew Bible
scholars. Christopher Wright notes that the contextual function of the phrase "in our
image" is adverbial (the way the human is made) rather than adjectival (describing a
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human attribute), and thus best understood as describing a dimension of humankind's
very creation.269 Claus Westermann likewise asserts that Genesis 1:26-27 describes a
process of creation rather than the character of human nature.270 For him, the assertion
that humankind is made in the image of God serves the purely narrative function of
setting the stage for God's future interactions with these creatures. Indeed, the narrative
thread of God's ongoing desire to be in relationship with human beings and
responsiveness to the concerns of God's people runs throughout the Pentateuch, the
Prophets, and the Writings.271
When developed against the backdrop of creation ex nihilo, a relational approach
does not ignore what empirical observation suggests about human structures and human
functions, but widens the boundaries of an anthropological framework to take account of
the interrelationality between embodied persons.272 As the details of the narrative in
Genesis 1 indicate, God's initial statements about creating humankind in the divine image
have immediately to do with male and female beings, not one human creature in isolation
from all others of its kind.273 Weaving in the themes of embodiment and embeddedness
here becomes a necessary safeguard against inherited methodologies that would treat the
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relational dimensions of the imago Dei as accidental expressions of some underlying and
universal nature instead of a phenomenon that only becomes manifest in the concrete
details of human entanglement.274 As a shorthand for this relational vision of human
being, I will use the term being-together.
Amidst the current variety of relational approaches to theological anthropology,
one must be careful to avoid equivocation on the theme of relationality. Thus how I play
out my commitment to an ontology of radical interdependence becomes key. A relational
approach to the imago Dei could just as easily collapse into the mimicry of
nontheological anthropologies as do substantialist or functionalist approaches if
attentiveness to being-together becomes just one more methodology in which
consideration of the Creator is optional. I concur with McFarland's thesis that "knowing
what we are as human beings is less important than knowing who makes us what we
are."275 To appropriate the imago Dei as a constructive resource into one’s theological
reflection is to concede (if only tacitly) that the conceptual content of "human being"
must be discerned in concert with one's constructive treatment of the doctrine of God.
Within a relational approach, that means acknowledging that humankind has its being as
274
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a reflection of the divine life only because God is already engaged in the more primordial
movement of initiating relationship with these creatures. No theological reflection is
needed to establish the fact of relatedness, but the details of that fact are rife with
ambivalence.276 However, understanding human relationality within the context of the
doctrine of creation is one powerful avenue for rendering the conceptual and moral
content of being-together more determinate. Human being is, above all, a manner of
living under the conditions of embodiment, embeddedness, and interrelatedness in such a
way that the observable details of that life reflect the character of the God of all creation.
Here is a broad thesis about what it means to be human that demands further specification
and more explicit reference to the lives of persons with profound cognitive disabilities.
Further interrogation of the relational approach to the imago Dei will provide both.
This acknowledgement of the primacy of God's movement toward humankind has
several important implications for how best to conceptualize the imago Dei. First, just as
God's creative and providential activities prove to be one and the same, God's creation of
human being and God's self-disclosure to humankind are the very same divine action.
God not does creatively act to establish the existence and nature of a human being, then
providentially act to sustain it, and then, at some later point, perform yet a third act of
divine revelation. God's creation of human being is a particular instance of a continuous
calling forth of an order of finite creatures, oriented toward establishing a creaturely
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embodiment of God's own way of being. In short, a relational image of God is
simultaneously a revelational image of God. Second, because God's movement towards
humankind is also God's movement for humankind, to encounter the Source of creation is
also to encounter the Consummator of creation. This is the One whose generative
embrace of all creation has a deeper purpose than bare existence, which is a more
intimate mode of relationality than even creation ex nihilo provides. This means that the
pursuit of a fully wrought imago Dei will go beyond the boundaries of the doctrine of
creation and into the territories of other doctrines, such as eschatology.277
This discussion of creation makes the vital contribution of orienting an expressly
theological construction of human being, but its insights fall short of constituting a
sufficiently robust anthropology. Perhaps its most important takeaway is that the fullness
of human being has not been reached since the imago Dei that informs it is best thought
of as "an ever active and extending potentiality."278 Accordingly, the theologian ought not
treat the concept of the human in terms of either a settled definition or universal criteria
but as a question to be taken up or something to be sought though never finally
captured.279 This understanding of creation in the divine image is a tremendous boon for
my efforts to recognize common dignity among a plurality of concrete embodiments.
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However, even this conceptualization of the imago Dei is still too indeterminate
and far too abstracted from the fleshy realities of life of the ground.280 This state of affairs
is due in no small part to the fact that the primary participant in humankind's most
fundamental relationship is a transcendent reality that is ultimately unknowable. As Anne
Inman notes, "what it means to be human is and will remain a mystery since what defines
the human being is its relationship to that which is Absolute mystery, that is to say
God."281 Attention to the idea of a wholly other divine Creator may undercut creaturely
hierarchies, as well as bring notions of purpose and care into the heart of theological
anthropology, but an absolute mystery contributes no flesh. Epistemologically speaking,
if there is no earthly analogue for the Creator, what framework can the theologian rely
upon to know how to move from the image of God to an accurate understanding of its
Prototype?282
A second outstanding issue is that there needs to be more distance between the
relationality at play here and the notion of purposive agency. An anthropology that
conceives of human relations as always the result of self-conscious centers of agency
choosing to reach out to one another could affirm the relational approach to the imago
280
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Dei and effectively reestablish the values of the substantialist approach and the
autonomous self.283 Nevertheless, in the face of this uncertainty, there is no need to
abandon hope of bringing increased intelligibility to the imago Dei or to despair that
ableism is too firmly entrenched. The Christian tradition's most definitive Word on the
divine image will speak to these concerns.

Jesus Christ as the Imago Dei
The assertion that the figure of Jesus Christ ought to be at the center of Christian
reflections on human being would appear to be a truism. Yet it is no more assured that the
methodology of a particular theological anthropology will bear this out than that an
investigation into the image of God will treat the idea of that God as inexpendable. For
this reason, it is meaningful to note biblical statements that undercut the practice of
treating Christology as an optional gloss on a theologian's concept of the human. This is
especially true when it comes to articulating a cogent understanding of the imago Dei.
Several New Testament passages unequivocally state that Christ is the human creature
"who is the image of God" (2 Cor. 4:4) and the person in whom the invisible God has
been made visible (Col. 1:15). The author of Hebrews likewise asserts, "He is the
reflection of God's glory and the exact imprint of God's very being" (1:3). Although
scripture never explicates the epistemological basis on which this is so, it leaves no
question that this man is how God may be concretely seen and known.284 It is passages
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like these that first led early Christians to focus on references to the imago Dei in Genesis
and to elevate that phrase to a prominence it did not (and still does not) hold in Hebrew
and Jewish thought.285 Yet the original warrant for prioritizing these references has all too
often fallen from view, enabling the Christian tradition's tendency to forge an overly tight
association between the imago Dei and the doctrine of creation. When effectively isolated
from the soteriological and eschatological concerns that first grounded its importance, the
idea of the image lends itself all too easily to essentialist treatments and idealized
anthropologies.
Contrary to this precedent, Christian scripture's identification of the divine image
with Jesus of Nazareth places primary focus on the life of a historical individual rather
than simply an example of a universal human nature.286 So much is Jesus the true image
of God that to see him is to see the divine (John 14:9). The uniqueness with which this
life images the divine has centrally to do with Jesus's embodiment. Far from a
postmodern sentiment eisegeted into ancient texts, Colossians 2:9 explicitly states: "For
in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily." It is thus fair to say that the biblical
starting point for a Christological conception of the imago Dei is to consider the bodily
existence of this one human creature as well as it can be known. Under the terms of
substantialist approaches, the insistence on this criterion amounted to a "scandal of
particularity," for how could the life of one Jewish peasant in the first century possibly be
abstracted from its immediate context and transmuted into a normative model of human
285

McFadyen, "Imaging God," 920.

286

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, "Christian Redemption between Colonialism and Pluralism" in
Reconstructing Christian Theology, eds. Rebecca S. Chopp and Mark Lewis Taylor (Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress Press, 1994), 269-302, 299.

112

being. But under a relational approach that values the embeddedness of creaturely
existence alongside human embodiment, the particularity of Jesus Christ does not signal
the impossibility of meaningful speech.
Without dispelling all mystery from the doctrine of God or reifying the
descriptive power of theological language, the story of Jesus Christ provides a fixed
starting point for faithful description of the God reflected in human being. As McFarland
puts it, this story is "the unique and unsubstitutable touchstone against which all talk
about the nature and character of God (that is, all claims to know God) must be tested."287
Jesus brings the flesh to the discernment of the imago Dei that absolute mystery cannot.
To comprehend this claim in the register of a limits approach leads to the refusal
to accept just any Christology that may nominally acknowledge the theological
importance of Jesus's body. The recovery of the soteriological and eschatological
implications of the image of God prevents the creatureliness of human being from
receding into the background instead of promoting that recession.288 Humankind's origin
is equally as christomorphic as its destiny.289 The particularity of Christ's embodiment
means that the criterion of true humanity is also caught up in and constituted by the
dynamic processes of creation's coming to be and human being-together. Conceptualizing
the imago Dei, therefore, does not amount to the progressive abstraction of a best-case
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anthropology or metaphysical theism from the concrete details of empirical reality.290 It
involves delving into the revelation that both divinity and humanity disclose themselves
in the fragility and vulnerability of an earthen vessel.291 In more technical terms, what
this critical correlation of the doctrines of creation and Christology calls for is a
reimagining of the Incarnation within a limits perspective.

The Incarnation Embraces All of Human Being
Early orthodoxy's confession of the Incarnation was, of course, an affirmation of
the fact of Christ's embodiment in opposition to movements, particularly Docetism,
which taught his body was an illusion without true reality. This entailed the dual claim
that the life of Jesus "was in the form of God" and that he was "born in human likeness"
(Phil. 2:7). Yet classical Christology never successfully relinquished late antiquity's
discomfort with the flesh. Because of the debt patristic theology owed to Neoplatonic
metaphysics, this dual affirmation amounted to a paradox. (How could a mortal, mutable,
and corruptible body enjoy a fundamental unity with the eternal, unchanging, and pure
nature of the divine?) The Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) dictated approved parameters
for reflecting up this paradox but did not seek to resolve it.
In mentioning this bit of church history, I am not any more interested in a
tangential debate about the two natures of Christ than I was keen to indulge in the
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controversy surrounding cosmogony. How Jesus is the incarnate God is not the aspect of
the Incarnation that interests me. That it is a core confession of Christian theology does.
Methodologically speaking, merely the acknowledgement that Jesus is the incarnate God
makes him the most necessary touchstone for theological anthropology, irrespective of
whatever theoretical conundra continue to attend it. For instance, even if the theologian
declares, as Dwight Hopkins does, that God "manifests, for me, decisively, but not
exclusively, in Jesus," that qualified confession still ought to have the direct and
substantive impact of making Jesus's humanity the determinative element in one's
theological approach.292 My adoption of the limits model is the means by which I
endeavor to do just that. I contend that maintaining a tenacious emphasis on the material
dimensions of Jesus's life is the most effective resistance to the Christian tradition's
lingering temptation towards docetic Christologies.
Including the doctrine of the Incarnation in the understanding of the imago Dei
under development here makes it possible to begin specifying the attributes of the God
whose relational movement toward the human creature determines the fact and the form
of its existence. The task is not one of anthropomorphizing an impersonal metaphysical
principle but of discerning the eternal significance of embedded existence as modeled by
God enfleshed. Exceeding even Genesis's declaration that human finitude is inherently
good, the Incarnation expresses that human being is so far from being antithetical to
godhood that the divine life is able to join intimately with it. Although the deepest
mysteries of God in God's self remain forever beyond the grasp of creaturely knowledge,
292
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God makes some measure of creaturely knowledge possible by entering into creation as
one of its constituents.293
God's attributes have always permeated the cosmos, but only in the light of Christ
do they truly become visible.294Above all, this light reveals that God's providential
activities are ultimately redemptive in purpose.295 God is neither a dispassionate unmoved
mover nor a malevolent cosmic power. In becoming "one of us," God also proves to be
"with us" and "for us."296 Empirical observation of the natural order reveals forces of
cruelty and destruction as well as those which promote flourishing. Insofar as Christ is
the evidence that God has embraced human being so thoroughly that it is raised up into
God's own being, the fundamental nature of the Creator-creature relation discloses itself
to be compassion.297
The vital detail of the doctrine of the Incarnation, the one that keeps the present
discussion from considering only the abstract Christ and never the concrete Jesus, is that
God's assumption of human being is total. The church father Gregory of Nazianzus
famously wrote, "For that which [Christ] has not assumed, He has not healed."298
Through the greater determinacy it brings to the conceptualization of the imago Dei, the
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doctrine of the Incarnation establishes an indispensable continuity between the doctrines
of creation and soteriology: God in Christ moves to embrace the whole of human being
just as God the Creator lays claim to the whole of the human creature. The claim of
Hebrews 2:17 further buttresses this assertion: "he had to become like his brothers and
sisters in every respect." Redemption elevates all that creation dignifies. In short, the
intimate union of divinity and creaturely form does not nullify a single vicissitude or
vagary of the human condition; accordingly, the process cannot leave out human
vulnerability and brokenness.299
Nor is it the case that, in addition to the assumption of all these creaturely traits,
Jesus' body exhibits singular functionings that ameliorate the vulnerabilities of concrete
human life. On this point, orthodoxy dovetails with a limits approach in its promotion of
the biblical theme of kenosis. According to this teaching, the God enfleshed does not
bring redemption through the ostentatious display of a divinized, superhuman
embodiment. Instead of viewing his divine status "as something to be exploited," Christ
"emptied himself" (Phil. 2:6-7). Once again, irrespective of Chalcedon's concerns over
the mechanics of this emptying, to acknowledge the kenotic character of the Incarnation
is to confess that Jesus is the definitive likeness of the invisible God strictly through the
earthly features of a thoroughly human life. The confession that to see Christ is to see
God directs attention to a story organized around a material body that is no more
empirically remarkable than countless others. The combined effect of these statements is
the necessary realization that, in the embodied and embedded existence of Jesus of

299

Iozzio, "Norms Matter, 102; Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 18-9.

117

Nazareth, the Incarnate God lives under the conditions of limitness and thus experiences
the human frustrations of disability.
What would it look like to conceptualize the imago Dei according to the story of
this Jesus? At a minimum, it will mean revisiting that story, if only briefly; hearing it in
the key of disability. For the God whose primary movement initiates the relationship that
constitutes human being unexpectedly approaches humankind as a fellow human
creature. Even as the definitive likeness of the Creator, Jesus of Nazareth remains
profoundly dependent on the Source, living an earthly existence that includes the
dependencies best-case anthropologies habitually overlook but the lives of persons with
profound intellectual disabilities most clearly exhibit. Like any other human creature, not
one of his capacities is a more exemplary instance of his image-bearing than any other.300
To learn from this exemplar what it truly means to image God, one must examine his
whole person and, because his incarnational being is no less in process than that of any
other person, also the entirety of his life.301
This is precisely the juncture at which adopting a disability perspective becomes
invaluable. Disability theologies have spent decades establishing a vantage-point from
which to overturn the tradition's tendency to restrict Christology to the terms of best-case
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anthropologies.302 Proper utilization of that perspective inclines the theologian to make
clear note of when dependency, vulnerability, and impairment are key details in the story
of Jesus. This is especially true with regard to the moments of his life that the history of
Christian thought has tended to treat only generally or swiftly in favor of those reported
events where most believers regard his divine agency to be most evident (e.g. his
crucifixion and resurrection).303 Furthermore, identifying which of the moments in Jesus's
life may receive short shrift should also bring to the surface aspects of well-traveled
narrative territory that go similarly underexamined.
The limits model rounds out these observations by keeping a suspicious eye out
for the reestablishment of capacity-based approaches, cataloging when the ongoing event
of the Incarnation embraces material aspects of Jesus' life that are non-agential or, more
importantly, signal a marked absence of self-assertion and self-determination. Drawing
these details into the open will go a long way toward establishing what place profound
cognitive disability ought to occupy within a relational approach to the imago Dei, as
well as how the lived experiences common to this minority within a minority are actually
basic to human being itself. Toward this end, before offering my own reading of the Jesus
story, I want to draw in one last hermeneutical resource.
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Eva Feder Kittay on Interdependence
As I discussed in Chapter 2, Creamer effectively establishes the promise a limits
approach offers for theological reflection on cognitive disability, but she has yet to
publish more thoughts on the subject. Accordingly, there remains a need to bring her
insights into conversation with scholarship that more closely examines the lives and
relationships of persons with profound cognitive disabilities. In this area, one would be
hard pressed to find a better interlocutor than Eva Feder Kittay. In the short treatment of
her moral philosophy that follows, I am most interested in her signature understandings
of three ideas: interdependence, the transparent self, and "some mother's child." I will
draw on these understandings as I interpret the life of Jesus through the lens of the limits
model.
Kittay articulates a relational anthropology of her own, one that emphasizes the
tight connections between the concept of "human being" and those of "dignity" and
"justice."304 She recognizes that, in the final analysis, to identify certain individuals as
"human beings" is to identify them as persons who deserve the dignity and respect
associated with that designation.305 Kittay parallels the criticisms of substantialist
approaches to the imago Dei in arguing that a person's dignity is not established by
comparing one's attributes to a universal, abstract model of humanity. Dignity, and by
extension humanity, is encountered and conferred within the context of embodied
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relationships of dependency and care. Kittay thus shares the present study’s commitment
to resisting the Western valorization of autonomy and self-sufficiency. As a feminist
philosopher, Kittay observes that even her colleagues who emphasize human
interdependence still portray human relationality as a connection between comparably
able parties that finds its most authentic expression in mutually chosen and reciprocal
arrangements. Regardless of whatever postmodern considerations might inform it, this
notion of interdependence ends up reiterating the social contract theories of the
Enlightenment by basing the moral community on a union of independent wills.306 What
is missing in this interdependency, Kittay says, is a proper account of dependency.
Kittay defines a dependent as someone who relies on another "in order to meet
essential needs that they are unable to meet themselves because of their youth, severe
illness, disability, or frail old age."307 Theories that base dignity in rationality or agency
fail to account adequately for why dependents make moral demands on other persons and
why human communities continue to devote so much time and resources toward caring
for members who are the most vulnerable and contribute the least.308 Given the fact that
Kittay's daughter Sesha is a woman with cerebral palsy and severe-to-profound cognitive
disabilities, she certainly has those sorts of dependencies in mind here. But Kittay is most
concerned with the inevitable dependencies any human community encounters, such as
306
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infancy and frail old age. Caring for these people is a relationship that is often decidedly
asymmetrical, not always voluntarily chosen, and frequently lacks any promise of
reciprocity.
The most effective caregivers must become a transparent self, a person who looks
through one's own needs and desires to those of a dependent, thus prioritizing the wellbeing of another.309 A transparent self, in turn, experiences a secondary dependency on
persons outside of the caregiver-dependent relationship to promote one's own well-being
because one's responsibilities limit opportunities for securing goods for oneself. This is
especially true of those caring for persons with profound disabilities, as the period of
required care is unending. As long as prevailing theories of dignity and justice continue
to neglect the lived reality of dependency, they will continue to promote a low estimation
of the profoundly dependent and their caregivers. This has the practical effect of making
one of the most essential forms of human relatedness either an unwelcome necessity or an
ignoble vocation.
Yet even with the marginalizing attitudes surrounding dependency and
caregiving, Kittay identifies the seed for an alternative perspective. Although popular
opinion finds a lack of self-sufficiency and dependency work undesirable, there remains
the begrudging concession that a just society owes some support to the profoundly
dependent. Kittay sees this as the meager form of a robust moral intuition. She captures
that intuition with the aphorism: "We are all some mother's child."310 Here the motherchild relationship stands in metaphorically for any relationship of dependency or
309

Kittay, Love's Labor, 51.

310

Kittay, "Disability, Equal Dignity and Care," 113; Kittay, Love's Labor, 25-6.

122

interdependency. This aphorism expresses the sense that, even if our estimation of
another person is unfavorable, the fact that someone else has invested care into that
person is reason enough to grant them a measure of respect to be who they are. For
Kittay, finding dignity in being some mother's child is attractive insofar as it is an
inherently relational ground. The worth of the dependent is realized in the reception of
care, and the promotion of the dependent's well-being reveals the worth of the caregiver.
Kittay asserts this dynamic is true of all human relationships. It is merely most evident in
relationships involving persons with profound disabilities because there the signs of
rationality and agency with which we are easily enamored are largely stripped away.
The main point I glean from Kittay is that the disclosure of human dignity occurs
within interpersonal encounters where dependency is embraced rather than denied or
named only as an obstacle to true humanity. In short, a person does not command my
respect through a demonstration of what he or she can do. Instead, an individual's worth
is revealed by the moral demand placed on me as I encounter what he or she is incapable
of doing. I recognize that this vulnerable being will only survive and flourish with the
assistance of others and—in that vital sense—this individual is “one of us," regardless
whether he or she has all the same attributes as "me." Because the encounter between
interdependent beings is always an embodied encounter, the moral demand on me is
always local, personal, and particularized. In attending to that demand, my care reveals
the dignity and worth of my own existence as a way of being that is open and attentive to

123

being present with another. Humanity is co-humanity, as Barth would say.311 Where the
flourishing of that humanity is concerned, well-being is being-together.
I find in this rich, philosophical account of human being a perspective entirely
congruent with the relational conceptualization of the imago Dei I am still constructing
here. Kittay's reflections on the material and political dimensions of dependency work
make substantive additions to my claim that relationality is more primordial to human
existence than the capacities for rationality or purposive agency. Her case for the
relational ground of human dignity provides warrant for claiming that, more than simply
the precondition of those capacities, relationality constitutes the highest end of an
authentically human existence, making rationality and purposive agency each conditional
goods whose worth depends upon their potential to facilitate being-together.
Nevertheless, despite the great promise these insights might provide for constructing an
anthropology that includes persons with profound cognitive disabilities, there remains the
question concerning whether they can serve as fundamental resources for a distinctly
theological anthropology? Does the story of Jesus Christ as the touchstone for all
Christian claims concerning the nature and character of humankind's Creator support
such an account of human relationality? I answer both these questions in the affirmative.
As I will now demonstrate, attention to Kittay's reflections helps illuminate threads of
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radical interdependence that weave inextricably throughout the narrative of the God's
incarnate image.312

Radical Interdependence in the Life of Jesus
The earliest experiences of Jesus's life occur within a relationship of
asymmetrical power. Yet this asymmetry is the reversal of the power relationship one
encounters in Genesis 1, not its recapitulation. The birth narratives of the New Testament
present God-in-the-flesh as utterly dependent upon a human being, specifically a young
woman. At Bethlehem, the Son of God enters creation as some mother's child. Although
the ongoing significance of December 25th for the Western calendar alone guarantees that
this birth remains the subject of widespread veneration and reflection, religious
considerations of the iconic infant typically address him with regard to what he is
expected to accomplish in his adult life.313 Soteriologies that conceive of Christ's
redemptive activity in punctiliar rather than processive terms discourage even pious
imaginations from dwelling for long on the ways in which human, all too human frailty
colors every detail of the Incarnation's inaugural event.
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Reynolds finds in the infancy stories about Jesus clear indication that the selfrevelation of God “traffics in vulnerability," for there is no more poignant image of
vulnerability and dependence than a child.314 The baby Jesus develops in utero like every
other human creature, requiring both the autonomic functions and healthy maintenance of
Mary's own body to enflesh his existence. It is the maternal agency of her love push that
delivers him naked and screaming into outside world.315 He is swaddled and placed in a
manger to meet his frail form's needs for warmth and rest. Immediately, the God-child
craves the love of his mother's heart and the milk of her breast.316 Irrespective of the adult
he might grow to be, this newborn lacks purposive agency, self-sufficiency, and
intentional communication. In short, aspects of embodied human existence that often fail
to register for Christian theologians are the very first dimensions of human being to be
elevated into the divine life and through which the progressive disclosure of the imago
Dei begins.

314

Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 200-2. Much like persons with disabilities, Christian theology rarely
considers the lives of children worthy of "serious" reflection. Not coincidentally, children are another
segment of the human family marked by dependence, vulnerability, and the inability to self-advocate.
Nevertheless, several theological books on the topic have been published in recent years. See David H.
Jensen, Graced Vulnerability: A Theology of Childhood (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press, 2005); Bonnie
Miller-McLemore, Let the Children Come: Reimagining Childhood from a Christian Perspective (San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2003); Joyce Ann Mercer, Welcoming Children: A Practical Theology of
Childhood (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2005); Jerome W. Berryman, Children and the Theologians:
Clearing the Way for Grace (New York: Morehouse Publishing, 2009); Marcia J. Bunge, ed., The Child in
Christian Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001).
315

I borrow this image of the love push from Cornel West. See Examined Life, directed by Astra Taylor
(Zeitgeist Films, 2008), DVD 2010.
316

de Pichon, "The Sign of Contradiction," 95. The footnoted sentence is only loosely based on de Pichon's
actual statement, which poses the irresolvable question of why an all-powerful God chose to take on the life
of an infant that craves its mother's love. Given the limits model's concerns for materiality, I have added the
remark about milk.

126

Tracing the bonds of Jesus's radical interdependence to Mary herself brings into
relief a striking illustration of the dependency worker. Her responsibility to her newborn
son challenges the modern dichotomy between coerced and voluntary action. For years,
the well-being of the incarnate God will depend mostly upon her continued willingness to
be a transparent self ensuring his care. In Mary's case, the great vulnerability that
typically attends parenthood is intensified by the fact that she has conceived this child out
of wedlock, marking her as an unsuitable bride in a thoroughly patriarchal society. The
fact that Joseph, her husband to be, would honor and care for her in the midst of her
dependency work was not a foregone conclusion. As one Gospel account indicates, the
stigma surrounding her pregnancy was so great that it took divine intervention to
convince Joseph not to annul their betrothal (Matt. 1: 18-25). The life of the incarnate
image of God begins in acute social vulnerability as well as biological and emotional
dependency.
In the face of all this, Mary took on the role of caregiver day after day. The infant
Jesus evoked her care and love, not because of his latent potential to develop distinctly
human qualities or because she saw past his humanity to some unique ontological
substance, but because his vulnerable presence made a demand on her for which she
knew herself to be responsible. It is in the image of blessed mother and holy infant beingtogether, bodily present with one another in love and affirmation, that we see the life of
our Creator and Sustainer first mirrored in the intimacy of human relationship. Insofar as
this familial relation is emblematic and not exclusive, a photograph of Eva and Sesha
Kittay, or of Debra and Jarrod Scott, has as much potential as, say, Michelangelo's Pietà
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to communicate powerfully the image of God. My careful consideration of Jesus's story
has only got as far as his birth and already the embodied existence of human being's
exemplar defies the assumptions of capacity-based anthropologies and the model of a
"normal" family.
It is no secret that the New Testament canon has precious little to say about the
remainder of Jesus's childhood. Apart from the brief accounts of a flight to Egypt (Matt.
2:13-23) and an adolescent Jesus showing precocious wisdom at the Jerusalem temple
(Luke 2:41-52), biblical accounts also seem to be in a hurry to get to his adult ministry.
Yet even the adult Jesus—the one who displays considerable powers of purposive
agency, self-understanding, critical analysis, and language communication—provides a
model of human being that honors radical interdependence. His status as some mother's
child is not left behind as some requisite but lesser stage of his personal development.
Jesus instead becomes the transparent self par excellence and remains in a position of
considerable dependency even as he actively adopts values and activities associated with
dependency work.
In the oldest of the canonical Gospels, the first saying attributed to Jesus is: "The
time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God has come near; repent, and believe in the good
news” (Mark 1:15). The invitation to join this kingdom does not take the form of a
triumphalist monarch enlisting knights into his service. Examined once again through a
social lens, this man who was born a bastard is also a peasant from a village of poor
repute (John 1:46). When divinity enters the world through the kenotic process of the
Incarnation, it assumes the humble and obedient posture of a servant (Phil. 2:7-8). What
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history tells of Jesus of Nazareth is that his preaching and his life-praxis emphasized his
solidarity with the outcasts of society and with the victims of prevailing power structures
(Matt. 11:4-6; Luke 4:18-21).317 The healing he promised he himself pursued through a
ministry that countervailed exclusionary practices.318 Numerous liberative theologies
have put this historical information to great rhetorical use. But such a characterization of
Christ reaches its fullest resonance when the liberation in view is those with a profound
need for care.
When Jesus makes the constructive theological move of summarizing the heart of
Hebrew faith, he famously distills all of inherited religion down to two commandments:
"you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all
your mind, and with all your strength," and, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself"
(Mark 12:30). The fulfillment of these two commandments are no more separate tasks
than are the creative and providential activities of the God Jesus commands his followers
to love. It is precisely through his work of inviting others to participate in the coming of
God's kingdom into the world that Jesus is most of all himself; in his ministry to and with
others—and never apart from it—he lives in the power and presence of God and
communicates them to others.319 He instructs his disciples that the one who would
become great must also assume the role of a servant to all, just as he has (Matt. 20:26-28;
Mark 9:35). It is by virtue of his active orientation to promote the full humanity of the
317
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women, children, and men around him that Jesus perfectly images God and discloses that
flourishing is indeed an emphasis of the Creator's providential relationship with
humankind.320 As the imago Dei, Jesus is simply "the man for others."321
In modeling what this involves, Jesus exhibits a subversive attitude toward
established honor codes.322 He has regular physical contact with persons with disabilities
and persons with chronic illnesses whom religious tradition labels unclean. He makes
lepers and Samaritans the protagonists of parables concerning authentic faith and love.323
He dares to share a dinner table with other people of ill-repute, such as tax collectors and
sex workers. Jesus does not move towards others in affirmation and friendship based
upon the principle of how observably alike those persons are to him, but upon a principle
of grace.324 Jesus invites each person into the Kingdom of God as gratuitously as the
Creator offers life itself. Summing the matter up nicely, Jason Reimer Greig remarks that
the ministry of Jesus establishes a "pattern of reality" in which the “strange and
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disturbing are not pushed outside the community's boundaries but called, hosted, and
included."325
Jesus thus proves to be a transparent self in a decidedly theological sense. In his
radical availability to the rest of humankind, the Christ becomes a transparent image of
God's own radical openness to what is other than God.326 Nevertheless, this transparency
makes him vulnerable in precisely the ways Kittay describes. As Jesus devotes the last
three years of his earthly life towards building and maintaining healing relationships with
the poor and the marginalized, he remains greatly dependent upon external support to
enable his efforts and, more importantly, meet his daily needs.327
The material details of his adult life disclose anything but the modern ideal of
autonomy and self-sufficiency. Despite his status as the son of a carpenter, the New
Testament makes no mention of Jesus keeping up a trade or earning a wage. Additionally,
the itinerant nature of his ministry meant he continually relies on the hospitality of
persons in numerous towns and villages for food and housing. He regularly leans on the
twelve disciples to manage the crowds that come to hear him preach, to mediate
communication for him and, in the case of Judas, to serve as treasurer for him and his
entourage (John 13:29). In their relationships of transparency toward Jesus, these men
expose themselves to greater vulnerability. Having left their own vocations, they are no
longer wage-earners and, because of the subversive nature of Jesus's preaching, political
threats are very real. In yet another reversal of man-made hierarchies, it falls to several of
325
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the women who travel with Jesus to provide for him and his male disciples out of their
own resources (Luke 8:1-3). As the center of this group, Jesus draws all around him into
a life of increased dependency and decreased security.
The biblical portrait of Jesus's earthly ministry bears out the limits model's
assertion that disability is normal to human experience. Even in the life of the incarnate
God, the encounter between embodied and embedded limitations and the conditions of
environment lead to the impediment of certain actions and the continual frustration of
purpose. In precisely this way, "Christ is normatively impaired."328 Jesus's solidarity with
the materially disadvantaged is personally born out in his own lived experiences of
struggle and pain, of physical ability falling short of what imagination can conceive. To
borrow another thought from Reynolds, Jesus lives out the image of God and authentic
humanity "neither by denying nor suppressing human limitations, but by opening them up
to God in a relational praxis of transformative love."329 Jesus is the icon of the vulnerable
God, imaging God by being the embodied expression of God's creative, relational, and
available presence.330 Concepts of human flourishing that exclude impairment,
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incapacity, frustration, and profound dependence thus stand at odds with Christology.
What reconstructions of theological anthropology ought to do is reflect more intently on
how these inherent and common, yet ambivalent, limits of human embodiment become
elevated and expressed within the grace-infused pattern of reality Christ images. No
event in the story of Jesus is more relevant to this reflection than his crucifixion.
Paul famously explains that the faithful proclamation of Christ crucified is "a
stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles" (1 Cor. 1:23).331 Nonetheless, the
scene of a condemned criminal's slow and public death captures and communicates "the
power of God and the wisdom of God" (v. 24). The sense in which the divine foolishness
and divine weakness evident here are superior to the best of human wisdom and human
strength (v. 25), although always mysterious, is especially confounding to substantialist
approaches to the imago Dei and to Christology. As Nietzsche noted, Western rationality
judges Christianity's "god on the cross" to be “as remote as possible from the image of
the most powerful.”332 Anthropologies devoted to upholding the triumphal agency of
Christ typically point to what his divine nature is accomplishing behind the scenes of his
material, concrete situation. Resisting both trends, a disability perspective interprets the
crucifixion in a way that fits more easily with Paul's explanation to the Corinthians. The
portrait of Jesus's ministry just articulated provides cogent insights into how the creature
331
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who is wounded and tortured under Pontius Pilate (John 19:1-3) and then nailed to a tree
is, precisely in that moment, the only fully human being.333
The event of the crucifixion is best understood as the likely outcome of Jesus's
life-praxis and public proclamations on behalf of his society's outcasts.334 The kenotic
Christ is obedient to what his orientation requires of him even when it means his death
(Phil. 2:8). As Samuel George remarks, "It is precisely Christ's willingness to go to the
cross that shows he meant what he taught."335 The pain, torment, and stigma that Jesus
experiences on the cross is the apotheosis of his solidarity with human suffering.
Through this event, the incarnational process elevates experiences of tremendous
disability into the divine life, including the foremost restriction of embodied existence—
the vulnerability of mortality. The body of this fully human Christ is far from whole,
undergoing disfigurement, scarring, and physiological malfunction.336 Nor is it a paragon
of purposive agency. Here the likeness of God is decidedly incapable of self-assertion to
the point of utter helplessness.337 Living in a bodily state that is undeniably closer to a
person with profound disabilities than a soldier or athlete, "Jesus could not act, he could
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only be."338 After the many subversive words and deeds of his ministry, his greatest
subversion of established systems occurs here, as the invisible God becomes most clearly
visible when he is at his least capable. The redemptive work of God on the cross,
therefore, proves to be just as inconspicuous as God's providential activity.339
The theologian who takes the scandal of the cross seriously also comes to see that,
not only is Christ's way of being human inclusive of embodiments where physical
capabilities are profoundly lacking, it likewise embraces disabling emotional and social
experiences. Suspended above the gathered crowd, he is both exposed in his nakedness
and as an object of ridicule. Jesus reveals the specifically psychological agony of his final
hours through utterances such as, "My soul is sorrowful to the point of death" (Matt.
26:38), and "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" (Mark 15:34) Fintan
Sheerin remarks that these statements resonate with persons who have felt the effects of
shame, humiliation, and degradation, feelings especially common among those
institutionalized on the grounds of cognitive difference.340 Because the crucifixion
represents such a social scandal, Jesus's incarnational solidarity extends even to even the
most despised person. As Mary Jo Iozzio writes, "In the face of oppression,
marginalization, isolation, erasure, and abuse, God remains in solidarity with humankind
even in its most socially despised expressions through the condescension of kenosis and
the injustice and sin that was the crucifixion."341 Divine participation in these forms of
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pain and destitution lovingly pulls all crosses into the redemptive process and so denies
them the possibility of being "the final word of human existence."342

Disability and the Risen Christ
Crucifixion is obviously not the final word of Christian theology either. No
Christology can be complete without some meaningful consideration of Jesus's
resurrection from the dead. By its very nature, the doctrine of the resurrection presents
problems for a retelling of Jesus's story that tries to stay focused on the earthly details of
his life. At this narrative juncture, the bodily imprint of the divine life itself transforms
into an entity that, like the invisible Creator, has no observable analogue in common
experience. Rather than become embroiled in speculation about how the materiality of a
resurrected body differs from typical human embodiment, I want to focus on New
Testament passages that emphasize that the form of the crucified Christ remains
prominent in his reconstituted flesh.
Whatever one's beliefs about the nature of a resurrection body, Paul asserts that it
will bear a basic continuity with the earthly body that has perished, even if it is as
empirically loose a resemblance as that of a wheat grain to a wheat plant (1 Cor. 15:3555). This continuity is especially evident in Luke 24:36-39. This passage describes a
scene in which the risen Christ appears to his disciples, not as a ghostly presence, but as a
tangible, embodied being who still bears the marks of his violent death (cf. John 20:2429). In an oft-cited passage of The Disabled God, Nancy Eiesland offers this commentary
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on the significance of Luke's report for body theologies and theologies of disability in
particular:
Here is the resurrected Christ making good on the incarnational proclamation that
God would be with us, embodied as we are, incorporating the fullness of human
contingency and ordinary life into God. In presenting his impaired hands and feet
to his startled friends, the resurrected Jesus is revealed as the disabled God. . . . In
doing so, the disabled God is also the revealer of the new humanity. The disabled
God is not only the One from heaven but the revealer of true personhood,
underscoring the reality that full personhood is fully compatible with the
experience of disability.343
In contradistinction to best-case anthropologies, as well as concepts of human
flourishing that assume a medical ideal of wholeness, the glorified body of Christ carries
concrete evidence of his mortal disfigurement and the moments when he was bereft of
both honor and purposive agency. Instead of purging these signs of brokenness and
vulnerability from his flesh, Jesus draws attention to his wounds as the verification of his
true identity.344 These marks are indelible to this embodied person, and his friends and
followers cannot know him in any other way.345 The Incarnation's assumption of
impairment into the divine life was not a stop-gap measure of redemption, a cluster of
lesser human qualities and experiences to be erased once Christ's glorification made it
possible.
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The body of the risen Christ exemplifies how disability is redeemed, even
redemptive, without being "healed."346 What Jesus presents to his disciples is a body that
remains normatively impaired but is no longer disabled.347 Whatever else the theologian
might conclude about the new life the resurrection makes available, the overcoming of
death is not tantamount to the overcoming of limitness any more than redemption is
deliverance from embodiment. As the image of a disabled God, the redemption found in
Christ is for the sake of bodily existence in all its capacities, and it opens up the richest of
possibilities for communion with God and humankind alike.348 Evident here is the utmost
sort of accommodation: The one who bears the stigmata cares for the stigmatized.349
In numerous remarkable ways, reflecting upon the material details of Jesus's life
has proven generative for constructing a theological anthropology centered around radical
interdependence. The particularity of his story truly is a valuable touchstone for
conceptualizing the imago Dei in relational terms. Nevertheless, this particularity may
once again become scandalous in a destructive sense if Christian theology overcorrects
and begins seeking the divine image strictly within the Jesus story. Because Jesus's
specific embodiment cannot possibly assume the multitude of possible human
morphologies, nor can his embeddedness allow him to belong to every social, cultural, or
political climate realized across history, restricting the content of the Incarnation, the
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imago Dei, or human being to his person could provide a new avenue for questioning the
full humanity of certain groups.350 I have in mind here groups far more common than
persons with profound cognitive disabilities. For example, appeals to Jesus's maleness
could reinstantiate patriarchy and sexism. His ethnicity could provide grounds for
constructing a hierarchy with Semitic identities (not whiteness) as its apex. The fact that
he was crucified at age thirty-three calls into question whether old age failed to be a part
of the incarnational process. Since the canonical scriptures never record Jesus having a
wife or children, the details of his life might suggest that marriage and procreation
diminish one's possibilities for manifesting full humanity.
McFarland warns against any "Jesusolatry" that would seek to honor Jesus's
centrality by making the contemplation of the imago Dei only about him.351 Such a
strategy forgets that the Incarnation occurs within the context of creation and considers
Jesus abstractly, "as though it were possible to cut the [Christ] free of the myriad earthly
attachments that accompany the act of taking on creaturely existence."352 That approach
also ignores the biblical statements that all of humankind is made in the image of God
(e.g. 1 Cor. 11:7; James 3:9). Other verses profess that the totality of even Christ's person
remains to be revealed. As the doctrine of the ascension communicates, the risen Christ
350
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remains alive and well but on some other plane of existence (Acts 1:9), making it
impossible for any embedded person to "see him as he is" (1 John 3:2).353 For the time
being, the fullness of human being remains hidden with Christ in God (Col. 3:3).354 The
pursuit of the question of human being remains ongoing because the revelation of the
person and work of Christ has yet to reach its culmination.
The good news of the ascension is the promise that Jesus's departure from the
earth does not amount to the impossibility of encountering him or imitating the pattern of
his being for others. According to the author of Acts, Jesus’s final words to his disciples
include the promise that the same Spirit of God that manifests itself decisively in his flesh
will enable the community of his witnesses to be living images of God themselves (Acts
1: 5, 9). This observation requires the present study to move on from Christology to the
reconstruction of ecclesiology within a limits perspective.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RADICAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN ECCLESIOLOGY

A theological anthropology that adopts a relational approach to the imago Dei
blurs the long-standing distinctions between the concepts of human nature and the nature
of the church. What the biblical portrayals of the resurrected Christ make clear is that the
redemptive activity of the Incarnation spills out from the individual existence of Jesus of
Nazareth to include the lives of all who are made in the divine image. What God's
embrace of the full range of the human condition ultimately establishes is the concrete
reality of a liberative and inclusive human community.355 While the life of Jesus Christ
reveals this community to be the end of the Creator's generative and providential activity,
it is the life of the faith community formed around the praxis and teachings of Christ that
reveals that this relational way of being in the world is the purpose for which God creates
human being. The church is the social space and material place where the being-together
that ought to characterize all humankind occurs most intentionally.356
The great anthropological truth of ecclesiology is that the imago Dei is not
something human creatures possess but "something God does to us by grafting us into the
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life of Christ."357 Realizing the fullness of human being in one's own life, therefore, never
begins with the initiative of an autonomous individual who changes to become God's
friend and ally.358 The Spirit of God empowers the community of faith as it did Jesus
himself. Rather than this entailing the regeneration of each believer into a carbon copy of
the Nazarene, there is an incorporation of each uniquely embodied and embedded person
into the transformative process the Incarnation inaugurates.359 Understood in this context,
the warrant for identifying Jesus as the sole individual who is the imago Dei is not that
his embodied person exhausts that image, but that he alone provides the source and unity
of a human community's gradual transformation into a state of divine likeness.360 Human
persons thus participate directly in the imago Dei instead of just mimicking it. As the
space and place of intentional community, they are more than the creaturely context of
divine disclosure; they are part of its content.361
Several biblical metaphors support these constructive moves. Jesus's status as the
one, true vine means that all branches depend upon their connection to him simply to be,
let alone thrive (John 15:5). To paraphrase Paul, Jesus is ever and always some mother's
child but, as the firstborn child of God, he also belongs to a very large family (Ro. 8:29).
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Yet the most relevant analogy for the present study is that church is itself a body that has
Christ as its head (Col. 1:18, cf. 1 Cor. 12). I want to concentrate primarily on this
metaphor and explore how the life of the church images God through living into the
realities of radical interdependence. It does this in two ways—first, by being a
community that simultaneously imitates and continues to encounter Christ within the
world through its continuation of his earthly ministry and, second, by being the actual,
ontological body of Christ by virtue of its authentic being-together. On this last point, the
unequivocal affirmation of the humanity of persons with profound cognitive disabilities
receives its firmest theological support.

The Service of God as the Task of the Church
The Christian theological imagination often employs spatial terms to represent the
various relationships that constitute human life before God. When discussing the imago
Dei in the contexts of creation and Christology, attention most often goes to the vertical
dimensions of creaturely existence: the Source's generative energies well up from
unknowable depths to bring form and motion to creation, while the incarnate Christ
condescends from unfathomable heights to heal a broken world. A relational approach
notes how these vertical movements unavoidably prompt reflection on the horizontal
vectors of a dynamic, earthly existence: each creature is entangled in the web of all finite
beings who are also absolutely dependent upon God, and Christ lives his life for others
rather than merely alongside them.
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To continue conceptualizing the imago Dei in the context of ecclesiology is to
pick up these threads and focus the imagination in a decidedly horizontal direction. What
are the material, concrete details one should expect to find in a community of persons
who earnestly seek to follow the example of Jesus Christ but none of whom are him?
Christology casts the image of God in terms of a specific creature living fully into both
the divinity and humanity of his flesh; that is, Jesus images God simply by remaining
faithful to who Jesus is. But ecclesiology must wrestle with the New Testament principle
that, for any other human being to integrate successfully into the life of Christ, he or she
must undergo a dramatic transformation. As Paul writes, anyone who is in Christ is a new
creation (2 Cor. 5:17). Whereas Jesus is born a model citizen of the Kingdom of God, the
rest of humankind is called to become one.
I contend that a limits perspective on the doctrine of the church will responsibly
elide the traditional notions of the regeneration and the vocation of the believer. As the
kenotic interpretation of the Incarnation emphasizes, Jesus brings redemption into the
world by means of the constitutive elements of concrete human existence, by elevating
them rather than replacing them. His superlative imaging of God and his role as the
Christ are accomplished through earthly and material means that are not all unique to his
personal embodiment. His story validates the hope that mortal instruments are able to
promote eternal life as long as grace imbues them. To be a new creation in Christ,
therefore, does not involve a supernatural reconstitution of one's creaturely substance.
Regeneration is instead a fundamental reorientation of the sum total of one's naturally
ambivalent capabilities and functionings.
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Being a new creation, therefore, parallels being a creature in the more basic sense
in that God in Christ moves to revivify every personal aspect that has become
"conformed to this world" in its dehumanizing patterns of being (Ro. 12:2). Within the
matrix of this divine activity, transformation is never limited to "the renewing of your
mind," if by that one means "merely giving an intellectual assent to a state of affairs,
creeds, or metaphysical propositions." That activity instead effects "a new state of being"
inclusive of whatever an individual's capabilities and functioning might be.362 This new
state is, of course, Jesus's own pattern of reality—one in which the orientation to God is
the service of God and the service of God centrally involves pursuing the well-being of
one's fellow creatures.363 To be a member of the body of Christ is indeed, then, a certain
sort of liberation, yet it is not a liberation whose core quality is a will free from the
heteronomy of external constraint. One's new state of being is that of a "living sacrifice"
(Ro. 12:1), of experiencing the fullness of personal deliverance from dehumanizing
practices by continually giving over the members of one's own body in righteous
servitude to the only One who deserves such devotion (Ro. 6:17-19).364
To be the church of the regenerated is, in short, to be a community genuinely
oriented towards others as Christ was. In this sense, the call of vocation is ecclesiology's
synonym for the call to be human. Whatever further theological considerations one might
address under the heading of personal vocation, enlisting in the ministry of Christ-like
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service to others is the responsibility that ought to inform and take priority over all
individual pursuits. The preceding reexamination of the Jesus story becomes immensely
valuable at this juncture. What he embraces about self and others is the criterion of the
church's signature activity in the world. As the body of Christ, the church realizes its true
identity by engaging in the bodily practices that Jesus performs and, in that way, meeting
the material needs he prioritized. For it is the bodily gestures a person commonly
performs that both distinguish him or her from others and indicate association with
particular cultural or linguistic groups. It is likewise gestures of care, concern, and
assistance that most set the body of Christ apart from the forms of social organization his
ministry opposes.365
This line of reflection thus arrives at a conclusion that would appear to be a truism
of the Christian religious tradition but, nevertheless, remains a confession of faith that
history shows is difficult to exposit exhaustively or to embrace thoroughly: God is love,
and the presence of love in one's own life is the surest possible evidence that one truly
knows God (1 John 4:7, 8). Western thought has typically eschewed the idea of love
when engaged in "serious" consideration of fundamental truths. The present-day
academy's ongoing discomfort with matters of care and dependency shows that this
practice persists, even on the other side of the turns to expressivism and relationality. But
it is fundamentally through love that the church images the praxis of the life of Jesus,
which is itself a disclosure of the compassion of the Creator. The love named here is not
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some "touchy-feely" and disembodied abstraction, but an idea that orients thought
towards the interconnections and interactions of embodied beings. It captures an affective
dimension of human experience that, although irreducible to the explanatory models of
the natural sciences, never occurs apart from the material reality those disciplines seek to
understand. A relational approach to the imago Dei, conceptualized through the lens of
the limits model, boldly asserts that a particular idea of love must be taken into account if
the concept of human being is to have any true meaning or relevance.
The abiding indeterminacy at the heart of even this idea of love has everything to
do with that fact that it is a creaturely mode of existence and so necessarily engaged in
the open-ended manifestation of what human being is capable of becoming. Accordingly,
the body of Christ distinguishes itself not only by means of its gestures but also by its
posture. A community that displays the Creator's compassion acknowledges that the
fundamental unity of the human family is realized from a position of openness.366 To take
on Christ's orientation of being for others channels openness into an improvisational
alertness and readiness to help when help is required.367 Once again, in resistance to
substantialist approaches, the relational imaging of divine life is irreducible to a single
channel of human interaction because true relationship involves the whole person.368
Doctrinal agreement or mutual respect for one another's agency is still too shallow a basis
of unity. The responsibility of Christian love extends to every aspect of the
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interdependence between self and other because God's claim on each human creature is
total.
Responding to people aright necessarily entails knowing them, rather than sticking
to methods of interaction patterned after some best-case anthropology.369 Continuing
Jesus's ministry also means that this love is not provided from afar, but by crossing
boundaries to provide comfort and to form attachments to meet specific needs for
tenderness and security.370 Themes of dependency work and transparency of self prove
relevant here as well because, as Jesus's network of discipleship exemplified, a
community that maintains this posture renders itself vulnerable in the context of a world
that operates according to contrary values. This church risks falling behind other
communities in the acquisition of public goods and becomes susceptible to violence from
those who continue to find the life-praxis of Jesus an actionable threat to the status quo.
For these reasons, Reynolds observes that the vocation of a Christian is to learn to
live according to a new economy—one in which the community rejects the dominant
narrative that advocates acquiring the greatest possible wealth under conditions of
scarcity in favor of a framework in which the collective need is "to respond to what we
have received out of the plenitude of God's goodness."371 The divine act of incorporating
humankind into the life of Christ is as equally gratuitous as the divine bestowal of mere
existence. Likewise, the concept of grace undermines ontological hierarchies in
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ecclesiology as thoroughly as absolute dependence does within the doctrine of creation.
Christian visions, stories, and doctrines of church must be careful to maintain this
underlying truth because where they position particular persons within community
relationships will determine what particular responses their presence ought to elicit.372
This "ought" brings considerations of dignity back into the conversation. Within an
economy of grace, dignity never depends upon the utility of an individual body's
capabilities because a recipient of God's grace boasts a worth that exceeds any finite
system of value.373 Here is a theological (and non-Kantian) understanding of human
being as an end in itself: A fellow member of Christ's body is dignified because that
person's presence is a gift and, insofar as another receives that gift in a loving posture of
availability, a genuine instance of being-together manifests itself.374
Above all, therefore, community is an experience available only in the midst of
brokenness.375 Learning to receive other people as a gracious and divine gift means
letting go of any pretense that the recipient of care must satisfy some sort of prerequisite,
such as being generally self-sufficient and only in need of temporary assistance or that,
once aided, that person will clearly be able to make useful contributions to the group.
Those may be "normal" expectations for dependents in the political discourses of the
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West, but the church's task is to be faithful to Jesus's strange and scandalous story. That
will require thinking and being in "abnormal" ways.376 God does not give as the world
generally gives (John 14:27), and neither should the human community that intends to be
the space where the divine image appears.
The economy of ecclesial life cannot ever simply reinscribe the larger society's
already established relationships of power and privilege, because the church's relationship
to the marginalized is an integral feature of its identity.377 Furthermore, the establishment
of horizontal connections of grace should never be unilateral. The precedent of the
Incarnation goes beyond the demonstration that divine life can join itself to humanity. It
also discloses that humanity can embrace divinity when the latter draws nigh. A
relationship truly operates according to a principle of grace when love is extended to the
person who fails to meet society's expectations for "one of us" and that person returns the
Christ-like embrace.378 The full integration of the marginalized into the body of Christ
requires that all other members allow them to exercise their capabilities and functionings
to the edification of all.379
In the immediacy of being-together, there is no creaturely height from which one
party may condescend to the other or, remaining at that height, reduce the other to an
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object of either charity or pity.380 With specific regard to disability, the active awareness
that every human person is incomplete mitigates against that common assumption that the
incompleteness of people with disabilities is greater and more significant than one's own,
simply because their impairments are more visible.381 That sort of high place is a site of
idolatry. The caring affirmation of another's presence does not amount to the declaration,
"You are fortunate that I arrived to help you." Nor does it involve expectations of the sort
of strict reciprocity of quid pro quo. As a word of reassurance, care is a gentle
affirmation: "It is good that you exist; it's good that you are in this world."382
To acknowledge one's own brokenness and limitation in the face of someone
else's is a gesture of community truly befitting the body of Christ. Concrete instances of
such gestures make possible a deeper current of reciprocity—one that obtains even when
the empirical details of exchange appear decidedly asymmetrical (e.g. the daily support of
a parent diagnosed with late-stage Alzheimer's). The divine economy of care requires that
those popularly regarded as "weaker" receive a greater portion of honor than what is
typical and, for those deemed less deserving of respect, a measure of respect exceeding
what is average (1 Cor. 12:21-22). As the parable of the unforgiving servant illustrates
(Matt. 18:21-35), the proper response to receiving God's grace in the midst of personal
380
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limitations and shortcomings is to extend the same unconditional acceptance toward
those whose also live before God, irrespective of whether one of the world's prevailing
economies would justify claiming superiority over someone else.
Another important reason for the church's care for the marginalized is that, in
addition to being a continuation of Jesus’s ministry, relationships of hospitality with the
oppressed and alienated are the means by which the church continues to encounter
Christ himself.383 In Matthew 25:31-46, Jesus famously allies himself with those society
at large would deem a stranger. Mirroring the words of God in the Pentateuch, his
teachings emphasize justice for the widow and the orphan and a concern that the stranger
be fed and clothed (Duet. 10:18). Yet, in this Gospel, Jesus goes beyond allying himself
with the marginalized to identifying with them in the strictest sense: "Truly I tell you, just
as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me"
(v. 40). When the body of Christ performs the gestures of feeding the hungry, providing a
drink for the thirsty, clothing the naked, visiting the sick, going to see the prisoner, or
otherwise welcoming those who appear strange, it is not simply imitating Christ but
experiencing Christ's very presence in them. In these earthly encounters, the servant
concretely assumes the posture and gestures of Jesus, and the one served is precisely the
other for whom Jesus was. This is the embodied and relational incarnation of the Spirit of
Christ. This is also arguably the strongest point yet in favor of conceptualizing both the
imago Dei and human being in terms of an ontology of radical interdependence.
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Even if the entirety of these assertions concerning ecclesiology goes uncontested,
the abiding influence of agency-centered anthropologies may continue to prevent full
acceptance of the radicality of interdependence. A person with a cognitive disability
continues to be the stranger par excellence because their presence calls into question
canons of reason and custom that justify the dignity and flourishing of most other identity
groups.384 An apparent truism of liberation theology that has also proven difficult to
embrace fully is that genuine liberation entails the liberation of all without exception.
When the ethos of theological anthropology is saturated with love and grace, rather than
ressentiment, the point of liberation is not to supplant the oppressor to enjoy his power
for oneself, but to dismantle oppressive systems without reinstantiating the values that
constituted them.385 An instrument nominally devoted to liberation is not de facto a
gesture of the body of Christ; it is an ambivalent tool like any other. A value system that
refuses to welcome the stranger with a cognitive disability, and so treats that person as
something less than a child of God, keeps an economy of scarcity in play.
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At a minimum, honoring persons with cognitive disabilities with greater honor
will mean the forthright rejection of the stigma and marginalization specific to their
experiences.386 Loving a person as Christ loves means valuing the well-being and
security of another as much as one's own.387 The alternative structure of relationality will
be to cease defining their place in the body of Christ in terms of deficits and aberrance
and begin seeing their personal embodiments as particular ways of being human that
require understanding, esteem, and support.388 When the community successfully regards
the life and vitality of human existence to be a gift, it will become increasingly apparent
that this gift arrives in countless ways throughout each person's lifetime and that the
medium of giving is "a nexus of reciprocity that is based in our vulnerable humanity."389
Congruent with the limits model, here there is no clear dichotomy between ability and
disability because the material details of community building run roughshod over that
construct. Within this nexus, persons with disabilities are constitutive members of the
body of Christ who incarnate his Spirit by extending their hospitality to others even as
they embrace the hospitality other persons extend to them.390 The concept of wholeness
too takes on a relational orientation, where genuinely inclusive companionship takes the
place of the medical model and substantialist approaches alike. As Reynolds succinctly

386

Yong, The Bible, Disability, and the Church, 95.

387

Post, "Drawing Closer," 31.

388

George, "God of Life, Justice, and Peace," 462.

389

Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 14, 41.

390

Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 224.

154

states, "This is what it means to be God's representative on earth, a counterpart to the
divine."391
The combination of these ecclesiological considerations with a relational
approach to the imago Dei yields an understanding of the church as simultaneously
natural and unnatural. It is a discrete earthly entity and yet also the expression of the
Spirit of God in Christ, which makes it more than what empirical observation of its
embodied members could possibly uncover.392 This community discloses that human
being becomes what it ought to be by being caught up in the dynamics of God's relating
as it both receives and responds to God's vocational call.393 The love and service at the
heart of this community reveal that the new creation of its community experience
involves neither the eradication nor the rejection of material existence in favor of an
otherworldly mode of being.
Jean Vanier writes, "Love doesn't mean doing extraordinary or heroic things. It
means knowing how to do ordinary things with tenderness."394 Authentic love is the
being-together that images the incarnational movement of bringing divine transformation
to the mundane, to the everyday details of deep dependence and limitness that theory
continually misconstrues as negligible. The church is most the imago Dei when it shares
a table, when it celebrates through laughter and fooling around, and when it gives thanks
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together for the gift of life.395 This list also includes the dependency work of a transparent
self, following the precedent Jesus consciously set when washing his disciples feet (John
13:1-17). Through all these activities, there is a shared posture of expectation and
welcome as the ongoing addition of new members fleshes out the contours of Christ's
body in ever-new and often unpredictable ways.396 That community's concept of itself
and of the God it images, accordingly, remain under construction.
Humility remains the necessary correlate to the church's love, first, because it
informs the nature of Christian service and, second, because its active demonstration
protects against the various temptations toward idolatry facing the church. While piety
and doctrine alike ought to avoid the false image of "Jesusolatry," Jesus Christ's perennial
status as the head and unifying principle of proper relationality should never be forgotten
either. The church is the space of Christ's objective presence in the world but Christ's
objectivity exceeds any earthly, historical community.397 This state of affairs prohibits
(what one might call) "ecclesiolatry"—the mistaken assumption that one's own faith
community boasts a one-to-one correspondence with God's own mode of being. In other
words, the church also resembles Jesus in being less than the full content of the imago
Dei. The humble awareness of this should lead to the recognition of a collective sense of
limitness. Human groups have their own distinctive impairments in addition to their
combined capabilities; this guarantees that shared experiences of disability are inevitable.
395
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Even when its liberative efforts are maximally effective, a particular manifestation of the
church can only accomplish so many of the historical possibilities the theological
imagination can perceive.
Another idolatrous temptation is to conflate being an image of God so thoroughly
with abstract concepts like "justice," "inclusion," or even "love," that the figure of Jesus
recedes into the background of the Christian story, making only the occasional cameo as
an exemplar of ethical principles rather than as their criterion.398 This makes Christ as
dispensable to discussions of his own body as God is to substantialist conceptualizations
of the divine image. A similar vigilance ought to govern the discernment of Christ's
presence in the neighbor. The Christological safeguard against categorically dismissing
one's neighbor from being made in the image of God is that the particularity of Jesus's
life shows the God enfleshed to be a man for others.399 Theological discourses that
exclude his particularity from the warrants they employ to establish the neighbor as a
child of God, and then characterize Jesus according to the qualities in the neighbor these
other warrants prioritize, run the risk of misrepresenting the figure of Jesus, as well as the
One he makes known. This caution applies just as fully to theologies of disability as to
best-case anthropologies.
The primary purpose for naming these idolatries is not to sharpen the
methodological parameters of theologizing human being (although those are valuable
clarifications), but to keep the present course of reflection focused as squarely as possible
in the most promising direction. I concluded above that the church most effectively
398
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imitates Christ and so, by extension, is most clearly a creaturely expression of the divine
image precisely when its members engage one another in a certain mode of reciprocity.
The best examples of these engagements come from mundane instances in which all
parties honor their radical interdependence. The vital question to raise at this juncture is
this: How can persons with profound cognitive disabilities actually participate in
reciprocal relations (even asymmetrical ones) as anything other than objects of charity for
purposive agents? If one of the markers of being-together is that the welcome neighbor
returns the offered embrace, how does someone like Jarrod do this in a way that is
anything other than deficient? Answering these questions satisfactorily requires further
explanation of how labeling the church as the body of Christ is not just a poetic flourish
or a regulative ideal of practical reason. The body of Christ is an ontological reality that
incorporates persons with profound cognitive disabilities just as fully as persons with the
highest powers of representational thought and intentional action.

The Body of Christ as the Model of Radical Interdependence
The commitment to understand the Pauline notion of the body of Christ as a
material reality in the physical world undermines a dichotomy that commonly appears in
the history of New Testament interpretation. As Richard Hays explains in his
commentary on 1 Corinthians, scholars have long debated whether Paul's description of
the body in chapter twelve is purely metaphorical or whether the apostle has some
mystical union in mind.400 Hays insists that Paul would not have understood the terms of
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this dichotomy. Consistent with the description above, he portrays the church as an
undeniably human community which owes its being to the activity of the Spirit of Christ
as it binds all members intimately together and with the risen Lord.401 That Paul uses the
idea of communal body to deliver an admonition for unity and reciprocity is itself an
instance of reconstructive thinking and a challenge to first century social structures.
Roman politicians would use this image to urge the lower classes to remember their
ordained roles and avoid disturbing the natural equilibrium of the body politic.402 His
revolutionary insight is that, at an ontological level, the very being of the church
presupposes interdependence and it needs diversity to be authentically itself.403 In my
ongoing efforts to sound out the depths of human interdependence as thoroughly as
possible, and thereby bring the theological imagination nearer to the concrete details of
human relationality, closer attention must be paid to the tight conceptual linkages
interdependence shares with diversity and difference.
It may be impossible to overemphasize that the hospitality one extends to the
stranger is always mediated through concrete practices of flesh and blood, for these
practices form the scaffolding that gives the church its structure.404 Beyond the verbal
assurance that one's existence in this world is an intrinsic good, affirmation of the person
on the margins consists of bringing him or her into the historical, physical space which an
401
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embedded instance of the church universal currently occupies. The most genuine
welcome is not satisfied with casting someone favorably in the community's shared
narrative. True welcome acknowledges the difference that oppressive systems find
unpalatable chiefly by finding it a concrete place within the church's space. This place is
one of regular embodied encounter as opposed to compartmentalized socialization and
brief, unsettled engagements. There is "direct sympathetic communication between all
members" such that, if one member suffers, all suffer together and, if one member
receives honor, all rejoice together (1 Cor. 12:26).405 In short, when the church welcomes
the stranger, it welcomes them to a place of belonging. Incorporated into the life of
Christ, the outcast finds a home.
If the principle of the Incarnation informs the initiative for forming community,
then the principle of belonging names what keeps community together. The desire for
welcome is "a desire for a meaningful and vitality-giving place with others in
creation."406 It is a human creature's recognition that the open-ended and relational
qualities of human existence require a companionship irreducible to a partnership geared
only toward survival. In this way, the recognition that one does belong is both the means
by which the dehumanized find edification and the mechanism for breaking any member
out of the shell of individualism and self-centeredness.407 To know one belongs or—more
to the point—to delight in the fact that one belongs is a tacit admission that one is not
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self-sufficient and instead reliant upon the diversity of abilities and contributions that
neighbors make to one's life.
Among the most troubling implications of the modern political notion of equality
is that its attribution of the same fundamental identity to all persons means that all
persons are basically interchangeable.408 By contrast, the Pauline insight is that "the unity
of the body under Christ does not preclude but rather presupposes a multiplicity of
genuinely different, non-interchangeable, and mutually dependent members."409 In this
way, ecclesiology deepens a truth encountered in the doctrine of creation ex nihilo:
diversity is not simply a consistent quality of creaturely relationships; diversity is the
necessary precondition of authentic human relationality.410 Considering oneself to be
basically independent and in no need of the rest of the body would thus appear to be one
of those instances of immature thinking Paul encourages believers put behind them (1
Cor. 13:11).411
Thinking diversity and interdependence together delineates precisely the sort of
path a limits perspective on the imago Dei sets out to travel; namely, to continue to think
outside the substantialist box without then falling into an exhaustively social model of the
self that overlooks the person amidst its focus on constitutive, environmental factors.412

408

McFarland, The Divine Image, 64. McFarland refers specifically here to John Rawls.

409

Ibid., 86.

410

Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 182.

411

Jeff McNair, "The Indispensable Nature of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities to the Church," Journal
of Religion, Disability and Health 12, no. 4 (December 2008): 322.
Recall Creamer’s critique of the social model of disability in Chapter 2. Also, see my discussion of
eschatological essentialism in Chapter 5.
412

161

Rigorous commitment to the position that "diversity" always signifies an embodied and
relational state of affairs ought to put to an end any vestige of the view that "differences"
are accidental qualities attached to some core self. Agency-centered anthropologies bring
diversity into theological reflection by noting the vast and unpredictable manifestations
that self-determination may assume, and they laudably draw attention to a multitude of
ways that the relative scope of any specific agency leaves human persons reliant upon
one another and their environment. Yet, despite all that, the value of diversity remains
anchored in sameness—the common font of expressive activity at the center of each
individual. As I have been arguing since Chapter 1, the ubiquity with which agencycentered anthropologies assert the evolutionary and historicist character of the human self
only soften their recapitulation of this tradition, and they function in much the same way
that hardcore essentialisms do. The limits model alternatively emphasizes how the idea of
diversity is an attempt to represent the embodied fact that the presence of each person
discloses a unique configuration of finite strengths and vulnerabilities alike. This
uniqueness provides the grounds on which to posit an intelligible understanding of
diversity that amplifies interdependence without reservation and reduces essentialism
without remainder.
Diversity is the necessary precondition of relationality because embedded
dependencies characterize every feature of the body of Christ, just as absolute
dependence colors every aspect of the web of creation. In addition to whatever ways each
person may experience brokenness, even one's most impactful abilities boast only so
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much potential. The bonds of relationality form at points of dependency.413 Far from
being antithetical to a meaningful notion of individuality, the material details of both
one's dependent attributes and the specific connections they enable and require are the
very parameters that make the identification of a distinctive individual possible at all.414
Only through the diversity of interdependent relations does one become knowable as an
individual self. This is why a biblical statement that, in Christ, there is neither Jew nor
Greek, male nor female, slave nor free (Gal. 3:28; cf. 1 Cor 12:13), cannot be read as the
obliteration of difference for the sake of some core sameness, but an injunction against
using difference as an occasion for exclusion from historical, Christian communities.415
To be at home amidst the innumerable, often imperceptible, bonds that
distinguish one's position vis-a-vis a multitude of neighbors is to enjoy one's self as a
place of regular edification and security. It is not uncommon for theologians to cite the
Southern African proverb, "I am because we are," and to do so quite casually.416 What
this ecclesiological treatment of diversity accomplishes is to bring the theological
imagination closer to the material details that support a Western appropriation of this
claim. In short, individuality is only possible because embodied specificities of human
interdependence flesh out each person as a living site where relational connections
converge, emerge and redirect.

413

Vanier, Becoming Human, 40.

414

Iozzio, "Norms Matter," 100-01.

415

McFarland, Difference and Identity, 23.

416

For a book-length, theological treatment of this theme, see Michael Battle, Ubuntu: I in You and You in
Me (New York: Seabury Books, 2009).

163

Following the precedent of 1 Corinthians 12, the concept Christian theologians
typically employ when making sense out of the church's unity within diversity is that of
spiritual gifts. In this concept, ecclesiology receives a valuable assist from pneumatology;
in other words, the doctrine of the Spirit whose coming Christ promised to his disciples.
The intersection of these two doctrines is especially prominent in the work of Amos
Yong, who theologizes disability within a Pentecostal framework.417 Yong develops a
powerful hermeneutic for understanding the body of Christ by reading Paul's remarks on
gifts alongside the account of the Spirit's bestowal of astonishing abilities in Acts 2. His
exegesis of the latter highlights that, beyond the famous "tongues of fire" that appear in
the story, this chapter presents a portrait of community where a variety of embodied
abilities are empowered to establish community where differences of language and
nationality might otherwise prevent it.418 What makes a spiritual gift "spiritual" is that not
that the gift itself is always some sort of otherworldly ability (e.g. prophecy, supernatural
healing, etc.) but its Source. A relational account of the imago Dei ought to explore the
full theoretical implications of the strict identity between the Spirit of Pentecost, the
Spirit of Christ in Paul's writings, and the Spirit that hovers over the primeval waters in
the first creation narrative.
In the second genesis of transformation in Christ, the one and only Spirit of God
continuously activates gifts among all members of the body of Christ for the benefit of
the entire community (1 Cor. 12:11), with purposes that are finally as mysterious as those
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of creation in the most fundamental sense. No human calculus of utility can provide
either a rationale or predictive model for the manifestation of spiritual gifts. God's
relational approach towards humankind is once again liberal and gracious, yet never
wasteful, equipping each member to be just as capable of edifying the faith community
and making each necessary.419 This is why, within the diverse and interdependent
network that is the church, the "eye" cannot say to the "hand" that it can get along just
fine without the other member's distinctive contributions (v. 21). It is also the vital reason
for a member to resist negative regard for itself, such as the "foot" lamenting it is not a
"hand," or the "ear" concluding it must not truly belong to the body because it not an
"eye" (v. 16). God's relational approach to all the members of the body is simultaneously
the wellspring of the community's diversity and its unity, and this dual assertion must
always be a confession of faith since nothing like a grand schematic of divine engrafting
finally unveils itself, even to the faithful.420
A theological anthropology that owns the full implications of this confession will
encourage reflection upon how the embedded manifestations of spiritual gifts defy
conventional wisdom surrounding the nature and origins of community contributions.
First and foremost, there is a need to recognize that each permutation of the human
condition and each age of life offers unique gifts.421 This will entail a collective effort to
look beyond the sociological and demographic certainties members of the body
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customarily attach to particular individuals.422 Within a limits perspective, gifts are not
what a present person does to provide for the well-being of the group; the material details
of their gifts comprise one's presence. This adds rich nuance to the preceding assertion
that, under an economy of grace, one should accept the other person as a gift.
Furthermore, the proper discernment of spiritual gifts is not chiefly a matter of
isolating which person's individual capacity correlates most directly with this or that
specific benefit to the community. Although there is pragmatic value to such practices,
they are not sufficient in themselves. The significance and special character of each gift is
not an automatic outgrowth of a particular person's empirical capacities because the Spirit
of God apportions them.423 The Spirit may direct a much-needed contribution to come
from an unlikely source. For example, a word of wisdom might come from a mouth
generally observed to be foolish, or a forgetful mind might rekindle a crucial memory.
The profoundly dependent person may provide the decisive acceptance that makes the
caregiver's flourishing a genuine reality. On Brian Brock's reading, Paul encourages a
posture of openness to these reversals by instructing faith communities to orient
themselves according to the question, "How do I embrace the giving of the Spirit?" rather
than getting stuck on the identity question, "Which gift is yours or mine?" Consideration
of what brings relational wholeness resoundingly trumps inclinations to secure credit for
the self in isolation.
This orientation also undermines yet another common avenue for introducing
hierarchy into the human family—the ranking of spiritual gifts. The fact that, through the
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initiative of the Spirit, a person's presence introduces a gift into the community's
experience automatically means in theological perspective that this gift cannot be done
without. Therefore, as Yong writes, "no gift—and no individual believer—is to be
suppressed, dismissed, or minimized, and there is no hierarchy of gifts."424 To do so
would be to close the door on fresh, revelational possibilities, namely in the form of
unanticipated experiences of being-together, as well as the recovery of underappreciated
blessings from the past.
Embracing the giving of the Spirit thus proves to be nothing less than the
welcoming of the stranger already present within the body of Christ, the one that ought to
have a place within the church yet does not quite belong. This involves giving concrete
expression to the principle of Incarnation through the lived affirmation of the entire
multiplicity of sensory modalities which may foster reciprocal modes of interdependency
and so image the divine life disclosed in Christ.425 With specific reference to persons with
disabilities, this will mean giving careful attention to ways in which their embodied lives
are already transformative presences in the body of Christ because the Spirit of God has
elevated their impairments rather than "fixing" them.426 These statements bring the
present study back around to its central concern: When the Christian communities of the
present day place the abilities of intentional communication (speech, writing, artistic
performance, etc.) atop a hierarchy of spiritual gifts, while also associating the fulfillment
of Christian vocation with purposive agency, how can the theologian credibly affirm that
424
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persons with profound cognitive disabilities are anything but junior members in the body
of Christ? How are their ways of being in the world genuine instances of "human being"?
It is to these poignant questions I now turn.

Theological Anthropologies that Include Profound Cognitive Disability
The two theologians who have given the most direct answers to these questions
are Hans Reinders and Molly Haslam. In this regard, they count among my most
important interlocutors. Both scholars provide generative insights about how best to bring
profound cognitive disability into a relational conceptualization of the imago Dei,
although I find problematic elements in their respective proposals as well. Through the
process of engaging the most relevant strengths and weaknesses of those proposals, I will
arrive at my culminating statement concerning the place persons with profound cognitive
disabilities occupy within the body of Christ, as well as articulate the most robust version
of my ontology of radical interdependence.
In his book Receiving the Gift of Friendship, Hans Reinders sets forth a
theological anthropology fully committed to the aforementioned notions that being
human is primarily a matter of belonging and that knowing what we are as human beings
is less important than knowing Who makes us what we are. He takes a further step
beyond the turn to relationality by asserting that the ground of personhood is extrinsic to
the human creature, residing entirely in God's movement toward humankind. He insists
that, unless Christian thought establishes God's friendship as the particular relationship
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that precedes all other facts about human existence, ableist accounts of subjectivity and
difference will continue to govern theological reflection.427
When constructing his own anthropology, he draws heavily (though not
uncritically) on the thought of Eastern Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas.428 Zizioulas
conceives of human being as both extrinsic and ecstatic in nature. Reinders explains that
"something has an extrinsic cause when it does not have its own cause in itself but in
another being outside itself."429 This amounts to a total rejection of substantialist and
capacity-based approaches to anthropology in that the possibility of personhood exists
only in the reality of God's gracious action and never in any biological or historical
potentiality one might actualize.430 Human being is also ecstatic in the sense personhood
is not “a condition that is received and henceforth our own,” but instead “a gift that
continues to be given because it stands in constant need of regeneration.”431 The human
creature's distinctive mode of being in the world can, therefore, never be the natural
manifestations flowing forth from some essential human substance. Alternatively,
ecstatic being has its ground in communion or, to be more precise, a movement towards
communion.432 God's own being is ecstatic in that God exists as the communion between
Trinitarian persons. Paralleling Kathryn Tanner's anthropology, Reinders and Zizioulas
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agree that the purpose of the dynamic movement of human existence is to become
progressively incorporated into the very life of the Triune God. There can be no sense in
which human being or the imago Dei is something human individuals accomplish. In
short, being the image of God is "a way of relationship with the world, with other people
and with God, an event of communion, and that is why it cannot be realized as the
achievement of an individual, but only as an ecclesial fact."433
Because divine agency, not human agency, is "the primary concept of Christian
anthropology," a person with profound cognitive disabilities cannot be demoted within
the human family, or excluded from it completely, because he or she lacks the capacities
of goal-oriented reason or purposive action.434 Nor is human flourishing any less a
possibility for these persons than "normal" persons because the final end of human
existence is identical with a unique relationship with the triune God rather than the
development of any intrinsic capacity.435 In Reinders's sense of relationality, human
being is fundamentally ecclesial in that it aims at communion and never merely at
enriched subjectivity; the latter does not constitute the former.436 An embodied life like
Jarrod's and the life of a temporarily able-minded person such as myself share the same
basic humanity because our respective statuses as images of God, and as members of the
body of Christ, have the same extrinsic foundation: God's loving kindness. In both

433

John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Yonkers, NY: St.
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), 15.
434

Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 275.

435

Ibid., 273.

436

Ibid., 252.

170

instances, personhood is a gift that can only be received, a primordial movement of
existence passively accepted.437
Nevertheless, Reinders does not reject the traditional confession that to live in
Christ is to be set free. Genuine freedom, in his view, it to be set free to be God's friend
and thereby be friends with others.438 Once again, the gift of being is not an abstraction,
but the gift of being who one is. Although the endorsement of freedom to over freedom
from introduces a verb tense into human being, this is a movement of being irreducible to
purposive action—freedom to is freedom to be.439 God's love and care for persons with
profound cognitive disabilities draws them into the experience of this freedom
"regardless of whether they have—or can have—any sense of it."440 As with any child of
God, reception of divine love is not contingent upon whether one meets certain thresholds
of merit.441 The security of each person's humanity, regardless of what capabilities they
possess or the uses to which one puts them, lies in the constancy of God's friendly
approach.442 Like every other human person, those with profound disabilities participate
in the freedom of being who and what they are without further need for justification.443
Like every other human person, they enjoy the benefits of the friendship others extend to
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them when the embrace of their presence brings transformation to the body of Christ. The
church is continuously recreated in the image of God in its resemblance of God's freedom
of being free for somebody.444
What I find most promising about Reinders's theological anthropology is the way
in which, more poignantly than any other source I have engaged thus far, he articulates an
ontology of belonging that defuses the tendency to regard profoundly disabled lives as
having a fundamentally different order of being than lives rich in rationality or purposive
agency. This is a tremendous contribution toward the goal of liberating persons with
profound cognitive disabilities from the pejorative judgments about them that standard
conventions engender. He accounts for why they are no less lovable in the eyes of God
and, on that basis, no less deserving of human attachment and care than the rest of
humankind. Reinders also provides an unapologetically theological case for basic
humanity and human flourishing alike that corroborates many of the intersections I have
already highlighted between creation ex nihilo, Christology, and ecclesiology.
That having been said, his ontology of belonging does raise a few pressing
concerns for an ontology of radical interdependence. On the one hand, Reinders's
anthropology may not sufficiently honor the diversity of the body of Christ. In an article
that postdates Receiving the Gift of Friendship (but does not explicitly name it), Reynolds
expresses suspicion concerning any theological anthropology that moves "quickly past
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disability to favor 'the person' God sees in love."445 His concern is that such a move
establishes a dualism of person/disability reminiscent of traditional dualisms of
soul/body. A person's true value hides behind the fleshly signs of his or her disabilities.
Reinders does indeed seem susceptible to this criticism when he declares, "Difference can
be celebrated only because it has no theological significance; in the eyes of God, human
beings are equally worthy of his loving kindness, no matter what differences the bodies
of these human beings may exhibit."446 In the final analysis, the material details of
embodied diversity are conceptually separable from the ground of personhood and
dignity. Reynolds worries that relegating disability to the background of personhood in
this way effectively perpetuates the denigration of disability that a theologian like
Reinders expressly sets out to oppose.447 It may also promote an ironic state of affairs
where it successfully promotes practices of care and genuine welcome but also dismisses
the embodied difference and vulnerabilities that constitute and distinguish each
individual. While inviting further theological reconstruction on these issues, Reynolds
writes, "Perhaps instead there is a way to see vulnerable bodily differences as graced
features of an embodied and relational creaturely life, such that minding differences
matters."448 My reflections on spiritual gifts above begin to map out such a way, but I
will need to say more on this in moment.
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Another concern is that Reinders may not devote sufficient attention to
theologizing the interdependence of the body of Christ. Molly Haslam argues
convincingly that his triune God is so outside the material world that he reinscribes a
cosmological dualism that most constructive theologians find simply untenable.449 To this
I would add that Reinders’s turn to an extrinsic ground of human being moves the
theological imagination further away from, not only the material details of particular
disabilities, but also the radical interdependencies that comprise both human communities
and human individuals. In this way, his version of an ecstatic anthropology runs counter
to my argument that an embodied nexus of reciprocity is precisely the medium through
which God most fully relates to human creatures and the image of God becomes manifest
in their being-together.
Relatedly, Haslam notes how Reinders’s insistence on humankind’s complete
passivity in receiving personhood from God creates a further dualism: While human
being is a fundamentally passive movement into the life of God, the divine nature is the
active initiation of friendship. God is, therefore, essentially a purposive agent. This begs
the question, “In what way does human passivity image this divine agency?”450 If
Reinders is describing God at God’s most divine, then it would seem irrefutable that
persons with purposive agency more fully manifest the imago Dei than those without it.
Despite his earnest advocacy on behalf of persons with profound cognitive disabilities,
Reinders's doctrine of God provides a backdoor for agency-centered hierarchies to
449
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maintain their dominance. In the final analysis, even though Reinders provides useful
strategies for thinking about the common ontological ground between individuals with
cognitive impairments and all other individuals, a theological anthropology committed to
a limits perspective cannot facilely adopt the theoretical underpinnings of those
strategies, particularly his assertions concerning the thoroughly extrinsic nature of
personhood.451
Haslam calls for theologians to do more than simply reverse the traditional
intrinsic/extrinsic binary in much the same way Creamer critiques the social model’s
reversal of the medical model’s framework. She is equally suspicious of moves to place
the dignity of persons with profound intellectual disabilities in the extrinsic attachment to
a human caregiver.452 She has specifically in mind Yong’s assertion that such a person is
dignified because “she is a being who has become who she is through the loving care of a
mothering person—a persons who herself embodies intrinsic worth.”453 What concerns
Haslam about this portrait of dignified humanity is that it neglects to address the
unfortunate fact that caregiving relationships can be abusive and neglectful.454 The
dignity of a profoundly dependent person would thus appear to be in question wherever a

451

Consequently, Haslam explicitly adopts the limits model in her reflections on human being. See Ibid.,
12-13.
452

Haslam makes regular reference to persons with profound intellectual disabilities rather than profound
cognitive disabilities. In my estimation, the two phrases function synonymously. Nevertheless, as I exposit
her anthropology, I will use her preferred terminology.
453

Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 184-85.

454

Haslam, A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability, 6.

175

caregiver fails to respond to the vulnerability of those individuals with the requisite care
and respect.455
Haslam alternatively constructs an anthropology that is not only relational but
also dialogical. She arrives at her concept of human being by bringing the philosophy of
Martin Buber to bear on the embodied lives of persons with profound intellectual
disabilities. The position she articulates is so germane to the conceptualizations of human
being and the imago Dei I am constructing here that it demands sustained attention.
Haslam draws on her years of experience as physical therapist to construct an
individual she names "Chan." She describes Chan as a twenty-year-old man with cerebral
palsy who is developmentally at the level of the infant. His behavior does not indicate the
ability either to comprehend or produce words or sentences or to use gestures or sounds
with the intent to communicate his wants or needs.456 His behavior does, however,
suggest an awareness of the world around himself and of the position of his body in
space. But he never evidences that awareness of awareness we associate with selfconsciousness.457
The objective here is not to fixate on these impairments, but to describe the
responsiveness Chan does demonstrate through his behavior. I find two of Haslam's
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examples especially illuminating for the present study, particularly because they depict
instances similar to interactions I have witnessed between Jarrod and his caregivers. Chan
lives in a group home where Philip is his primary caregiver. Philip and the other
caregivers observe that, when Philip enters Chan's room in the morning to bathe, dress,
and transfer him to his wheelchair, Chan exhibits more "awake behavior." There is
increased motor activity in his arms and legs, his eyes remain open, he smiles, and he
begins vocalizing at the sound of Philip's voice. To the contrary, when Philip is ill or has
the day off, Chan responds to other caregivers with more "asleep behavior;" he arouses
less easily, his eyes open only intermittently, and he may grind his teeth as he often does
during sleep. Chan is also quicker to relax and go to sleep when Philip is the one who
prepares him for bed. The caregivers of the group home interpret these differences in
behavior as indicative of Chan's desire to interact with Philip, and they respond by
ensuring that Philip tends to Chan as often as possible.
Haslam also describes an instance of Chan participating in a game of volleying a
balloon. Late in the day, Philip transports Chan to the common room at his day treatment
center, a place where persons with intellectual disabilities and their caregivers socialize.
In response to the noise of the balloon game happening near him, Chan begins to
vocalize, his head flexes back and forth, and the motor activity in his limbs increases.
Philip responds by wheeling him over to the group at play. Haslam observes that, even
though Chan is unable to help volley the balloon, he does participate in the game through
his presence as he responds with changes in his behavior. Philip, in turn, interprets these
changes as indicative of Chan's interest in the game.
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Haslam provides this and additional observations as evidence that Chan
communicates with others at a preintentional level, expressing wants and needs of which
he himself may be unaware.458 Chan responds to changes in his world and these
behaviors prompt a response from persons around him to engage him in particular ways.
This is mutual interaction in the absence of agency or symbolic communication. Haslam
argues that these relationships are more fundamental to human being than relationships
that require intention or agency and make the latter possible.
While the vast majority of Western anthropologies may be incapable of affirming
Chan's full humanity, Haslam finds that Martin Buber's anthropology is. His view of
human being is dialogical in that its dynamic manifestation occurs only in (what he calls)
the realm of "the between." Here the I meets the other in a relationship of mutual
responsiveness, totalization, and immediacy.459 Buber famously calls this the I-Thou
relationship. Although Buber's language often tends toward the abstract or poetic, the
encounter he describes is a face-to-face meeting, a relationship initiated by the other
"bodying over against me."460
Buber portrays the disclosure of the other's presence as a word spoken to the I that
demands an answer. I am responsible to respond to that word, and the word I speak back
will determine whether this is an I-Thou or I-It relationship.461 In the case of I-It, the
other exists for me as a value-neutral object for the projects of the self. I assert my
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individuality by imposing my subjective designs between us, thus rendering myself
incapable of listening or responding to a word that is not my own. Alternatively, in an IThou relation, I acknowledge how the other makes herself known to me by way of her
bodily expressions, and I engage the other in an open sharing that transcends my
individual designs.462 This dialogue is mutually responsive in that I and Thou reciprocally
constitute each other; only in being addressed is one truly an I and only by addressing the
other are they truly a Thou. It is only in their being present together that the
fundamentally relational character of human existence is realized and known. Only there
are any of us persons.
The element of totalization in I-Thou relationships has to do with the fact that the
I's attention is on the subjective whole of the Thou rather than on any isolatable trait. The
Thou is set free from the oppressive effects of scrutiny and categorization. Human being
is thus also marked by immediacy in that the address of whole to whole is unmediated by
reflexive activity. Buber explains that "the melancholy of our fate" is that I-Thou
relationships inevitably give way to I-It relationships, as we rely upon the latter to order
our world and find a sense of security within it.463
Haslam notes that, within Buber’s anthropology, a person with profound
intellectual disabilities is remarkably well-positioned to experience the sheer presence of
full humanity.464 Chan demonstrates how the manner in which these persons relate to
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others is non-objectifying in the most genuine sense. For example, Philip is never an
object of Chan's individual projects because Chan lacks the self-consciousness and
symbolic reasoning needed to regard Thou as It. Yet, through behavior like his awake
activity, Chan evidences his mutual relatedness to others and his experience of their
embodied presence. Haslam remarks that, to the degree that other persons engage Chan
without reducing him to an object in service of their needs, Chan would be seen as
unequivocally human.465 Regarding persons who do possess that non-essential and
ambivalent capacity to address others as Thou or It, one must discipline its exercise with
an ethics of care—one that prioritizes the inclusion and loving treatment of persons with
profound intellectual disabilities and opposes their social and conceptual marginalization.
To refuse to be present together with them dehumanizes them and oneself. Haslam
clarifies that possessing the capacity for mutual response is merely a necessary
precondition of human being. Being present together in dialogue is everything.
To summarize, Haslam argues that "human being" is realized only through the
reciprocal constitution of self and other that occurs in relationships of mutuality and
response. Buber's realm of the between is an embodied encounter in which I and Thou
are present with one another as subjective wholes, free from the calculative reflection that
reduces subjects to objects. Haslam's phenomenology of Chan demonstrates how a
person seemingly incapable of agential or symbolic activity still responds concretely to
changes in the world and evokes responses from others. Persons with profound cognitive
disabilities thus participate in human being just as fully as persons with rational
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capabilities. Haslam’s dialogical anthropology grounds an ethics of care in which
promoting the flourishing of persons like Chan is a nonnegotiable requirement.
At this juncture, it is necessary to integrate Haslam's insights more explicitly into
my preceding account of how the church images God by being the body of Christ. With
her constructive reflections upon Chan as a precedent, I want to bring other conversation
partners back into the discussion to articulate explicitly how this engagement of Haslam
either enriches or advances my treatment of both the church's continuation of Jesus's
earthly ministry and its ontological condition of diversity in interdependence. Making her
vision of human being my own will occasionally require embellishment or pointed
critique.

A Critical Appropriation of Molly Haslam's Anthropology
What I find most promising about Haslam's work on profound cognitive disability
is how effectively it directs thought toward the material details that differentiate an
ecclesial economy of grace from the dominant economy of scarcity. Her portrait of
human being as occurring strictly in the realm of the between provides a conceptual
means to further separate the concept of being-together from anthropologies that continue
to understand human relationality largely in terms of a union of wills and otherwise
autonomous agents electing to cooperate. The theological literature on cognitive
disability contains several felicitous instances of parallel thinking where, independent of
any direct engagement of Haslam, theoretical and experiential evidence appears that
corroborates her notion of the between. Returning to theme of spiritual gifts, Brock
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argues that a properly Pauline understanding will recognize these gifts as situated in
between their bearer and their recipient. "This in-between is the particular theatre of
operations of the Spirit who does not only donate the gifts, but needs actively to donate
them right into the middle of inter-personal relational space."466 Just as one is only an I
when engaged in dialogue with a Thou, a member of the body of Christ is only ever a
bearer of spiritual gifts when actively engaged with a recipient of what the Spirit has
donated in and through that member.
Recalling an assertion I made above, these gifts are not some discrete commodity
that may be held in reserve at the bearer's discretion. The embodied and dynamic life of
the bearer constitutes the content of the gift as well as the means of its sharing. The gift
that a Thou gives the I is its uniquely embodied self. Reynolds mirrors Buber's remarks
on the reception of that gift when he writes that, by virtue of encountering the sheer
givenness of the other, "I am lured into the between-space of relation, and thus available
to another, involved to the point where my own good is caught up with and connected to
his or her own good. Sympathetically attuned, I participate in the giftedness of the other
as someone akin to me."467 Conceptualized in these terms, the body of Christ's signature
posture of openness is an abiding receptivity to this lure into the between, a space that is
only real in the dialogical exchange of gifts and that occurs ever and always through the
Spirit of Christ moving through the embedded conditions of interpersonal encounter.
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Swinton offers a concrete example of what it looks like for a person with
profound cognitive disabilities to experience this lure in a congregational setting. He
profiles Mary, a member of a Quaker community whose diagnoses are similar to those of
Chan, Jarrod, and Sesha Kittay. During meetings, Mary often behaves noisily during
meetings until the community moves into its time of silence. "As the silence of the
community engulfs the room, so Mary shares in the silence. Precisely what that silence
means is unclear; but her response is regular... patterned... [and] engaged."468 Swinton
interprets Mary's behavior as evidence of her participation in the shared spirituality of the
congregation. Seeing the marks of relationship much like those apparent between Chan
and Philip, Swinton asserts that Mary exemplifies something fundamental to Christian
spirituality rather than some atypical or deficient version of it. In other words, "Mary's
experience seems to communicate that spirituality may be a corporate event in which a
person is greatly dependent on others."469 The difference of profound disability does not
disqualify a member of the community from being lured into the space of the between
and so being grafted into body of Christ as fully as anyone else.
The example of Mary also adds support to Haslam's speculative assertion that
Chan's cognitive impairments favorably predispose him to authentic human being since
he is unable to thematize the life another and thereby reduce a Thou to an It. Drawing on
decades of experience working in church settings alongside adults with intellectual
disabilities, Jeff McNair argues that these members of the community exemplify the
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child-like faith Jesus said one must have to enter God's kingdom (Matt. 18:2-4).470 If it is
indeed the case that human sinfulness finds one of its chief sources in the impious use of
reason, then the unreflective immediacy that consistently informs a profoundly disabled
person's experience might also place his or her life somehow more squarely within the
presence of God.471 Following much the same line of argument, Yong posits that persons
with severe to profound cognitive disabilities do not resist the Spirit making them the
persons within the church "who are most able to be iconic charisms of God's presence
and activity in the world."472 What sharing these remarks in conjunction with Haslam's
anthropology brings even more clearly to light is that persons like Mary participate no
less fundamentally in being-together than persons who are presently able-minded.
Theological anthropology should, therefore, depict those diagnosed with profound
cognitive disabilities as human, no more or no less.473
These further reflections on how the realm of the between defines life in Christ
also highlights the sense in which the lived experience of human embodiment is not even
just one of interrelatedness but also interpenetration. In dialogical encounter between
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subjective wholes, the other does not merely body over against me, like the surfaces of
two self-contained shapes pressing flush against one another. There is an undeniable, if
still difficult to articulate, sense in which the lure into the space of between exposes the
arbitrariness of borders between one body and the other. If a relationality of beingtogether captures the heart of human being, then there remains a mystery at the heart of
humanity as such—the mystery of authentic communion. To borrow the words of Vanier:
"[Communion] means accepting the presence of another inside oneself, as well as
accepting the reciprocal call to enter into another.”474 Finding a welcome place within the
intentional space of the church is to belong so fully that one can dwell in the other; that
is, one is at home dwelling in the other and with other dwelling in oneself.475 This is
where phenomenological language comports the theological imagination toward a
recurring experience that medical models of the body and autonomy-centered
understandings of subjectivity cannot faithfully capture. This language also leads to a
preferable alternative to Reinders's proposal that authentic communion depends entirely
on the transcendent God's movement toward humankind in friendship. Authentic
communion is an embodied interdependence of such radicality that it transcends the
physical boundaries of any individual body and, in their overlapping, the earthly lives of
the members of the body of Christ truly do combine into an ontological unity.
Admitting the mysterious character of this mutual indwelling is not the
reinstantiation of unbridgeable chasms between the realms of scientific and religious
truth (Reinders understanding of communion would seem to do that); it is instead an
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identification of where the commitment to honor the embodied and embedded conditions
of human existence leads organically into a consideration of the sort of ineffability upon
which theology is accustomed to reflecting and the natural sciences have traditionally
found unpalatable. The embrace of the mystery of communion as the heart of humanity is
not a retreat into untethered fancy and blatant irrationality. Methodologically speaking, it
is more akin to the commitment to map a discovered, yet largely unexplored, territory in
as much concrete detail as possible, knowing full well that some of its terrain will
continue to prove inaccessible to the cartographer's finite powers of observation and
representation.
Nor is the identification of the mystery of communion a compounding of
mysteries; that is, yet a further mystery on top of mysteries already named over the
course of my treatment of the imago Dei. The mystery of communion is the mystery of
encountering Christ in the neighbor, which is also the mystery of being grafted into the
body of Christ by the Spirit, which is the mystery of being made in the image of the
Creator. Like the concept of the imago Dei itself, the sense in which mystery remains
central to the concept of human being assumes various permutations contingent upon the
doctrinal context of theological reflection. Yet, also like the imago Dei, overt continuities
bind those permutations together in a fashion that aims at the utmost intelligibility
possible given the subject matter.
One final positive outcome of integrating the insights of Haslam's anthropology
into my ecclesiology is that her work highlights the concrete ways in which persons with
profound cognitive disabilities do indeed express and receive love. What is love if not
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genuine mutuality and response? What is love if not sympathetic attunement to the
presence of another? What is love if not a desire for communion with another that runs so
deep that it directs one's embodied activities in the world irrespective of one's express
awareness of this fact? These questions are, of course, rhetorical. These statements
express the quintessence of love. If everyone who loves is born of God, Haslam's
anthropology better equips Christian theology to assert under no uncertain terms that
persons with cognitive disabilities are members of the body of Christ and creatures made
in the image of God.476
As this chapter's final exercise, I want to make two important clarifications of the
relational understanding of the imago Dei my reflections on ecclesiology have
established, and I will make them by engaging two potential weaknesses that appear in
the closing pages of Haslam's book: her own articulation of the imago Dei and her
assessment of the human-animal distinction. The former needs only a brief assessment,
while the latter calls for a more sustained engagement.
Haslam is explicitly aware that any constructive proposal about the imago Dei
assumes a particular doctrine of God as well. She identifies the two primary resources
that inform her notion of God as the Hebrew Bible and the works of Pseudo-Dionysius,
especially the text The Divine Names.477 Given her conceptualization of human being as
mutuality and response, she appreciates the Hebrew portrait of God as a deity who
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desires and actively seeks covenantal relationships with human creatures. Nevertheless,
she is wary of anthropomorphic representations of the divinity human being resembles.
She approvingly cites three reasons Gordon Kaufman provides for eschewing this sort of
God-talk. First, there is the tacit assumption of cosmic dualism on account of which
Haslam critiques Reinders. Second, it represents God not only as the proper object of
human desire but also a distinct being who self-consciously desires relational partners in
the way that persons like Chan cannot. Finally, the Hebrew Bible's characterization of
God as "an all-powerful cosmic agent" slides too easily into notions of a God who may
be arbitrary or unjust in the dispensation of omnipotence.478 Human beings can then
justify their own penchants toward oppressive and warring actions by claiming they are
simply emulating God's own behavior.
To steer Christian theism away from these unsettling possibilities, Haslam uses
the thoughts of Pseudo-Dionysius to articulate a non-personal doctrine of God.
Summarizing the heart of this discussion clearly, Haslam writes, "If with Dionysius we
conceive of God in bodily terms as longing itself, rather than in intellectual terms as the
object of longing, then we have the conceptual space to include the ways in which Chan's
body testifies to this longing as expressive of God."479 She notes how Chan's behaviors
indicate a desire for Philip's presence or to participate in the balloon game in
nonsymbolic ways, desires concerning which he himself may be entirely unaware. 480 In
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short, his responsiveness to the world around him may be interpreted as nonconceptual
desire. Persons with profound cognitive disabilities thus image God "not because of some
intellectual capacity they possess, but because their participation as responders in
relationships is expressive of the longing that God is."481
While this casting of the doctrine of God is indeed congruent with Haslam's
dialogical anthropology I cannot help but find its content thin and, for that reason,
unsatisfactory. It represents for me a contrary extreme to the doctrine of God attached to
Reinders’s theological anthropology. While the ecclesiology articulated above certainly
emphasizes a relational sense of longing and yearning as necessary to the wholeness of
the body of Christ, being-together in the image of God goes beyond those manifestations
of bodily desire. A Christian doctrine of God is necessarily personal because the person
of Jesus Christ is the chief criterion for the discernment of genuinely divine attributes.
Haslam's theological anthropology is one clear example of where God is an optional
corollary to a concept of the human worked out in conversation with a philosophical
account of what it means to be human and references to Christology are few and far
between. Furthermore, I think that, rather than eschewing all descriptions of God as
person, Christian theology can assuage Haslam’s legitimate concerns about possible
abuses through an insistence that personal and non-personal metaphors for God function
alongside one another and that no one metaphor be allowed to monopolize the theological
imagination. It is only natural for human users of language to find spiritual power in
understandings of a God whose attributes resemble human qualities. The error appears
when one dogmatically makes an idol of one of these understandings.
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In her remarks about the possible distinction between human beings and
nonhuman animals, Haslam raises another valid concern about the dangers of allowing
anthropocentrism to operate unchecked within Christian theology. Yet, once again, I
disagree with her proposed solution. Haslam observes that the degradation of nonhuman
animals, like the marginalization of persons with profound intellectual disabilities, has
typically been justified by their perceived lack of rationality.482 Having just argued that
human beings are not necessarily rational, Haslam plays with the idea of greatly
broadening her anthropology to include these other embodied creatures. She cites Buber's
affirmation that objects in nature also body over against the I as a single whole, and they
too call for an affirming response from the I; albeit the effect of that response on the
nonhuman other remains shrouded in mystery.483 Buber asserts that "man [sic.] is
commissioned and summoned as a cosmic mediator to awaken a holy reality in things
through holy contact with them."484 In light of these statements, Haslam stops just short
of claiming that animals and other life should be included in "human being" in order that
they may receive the dignity and respect associated with that concept. She identifies the
desire to define humanity in contradistinction to the rest of creation as anthropocentric, in
service of the need to justify the denigration and exploitation of other creatures and
nature's resources.485 She claims such separation and exclusivity depend on the reification
of "the human," a reification she rejects.
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There are certainly things to admire about how Haslam forges a link between nonhuman animals and persons with intellectual disabilities. First and foremost, she exhibits
what Licia Carlson calls an inclusive approach to the matter, rather than an exclusionary
approach, in which these two groups operate conceptually in opposition to one another
and their respective flourishings are leveraged against one another as mutually
exclusive.486 One finds prominent examples of the exclusionary approach in the animal
rights scholarship of Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan.487 In brief, both scholars claim that
animals that demonstrate the psychological capacities typically associated with moral
personhood ought to be granted the same moral status, if not higher, as persons with
severe-to-profound intellectual disabilities. This twist on the bias toward the rational self
aims to trump a supposedly arbitrary species bias and allows for the minting of new
moral categories, such as nonhuman persons and the alarming human nonpersons.
Admirably, Haslam's proposal seeks to elevate the dignity of all parties. In the process,
this amicable association emphasizes the continuity of embodied limits shared between
traditionally defined realms. The same qualities of responsiveness, dependency, and
vulnerability we share with Chan, we share with other creatures as well.488 For these
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reasons, I sympathize with Haslam's aspirations of parlaying her anthropology into a
more global ethics of care.
Yet I remain skeptical that her massive expansion of the concept of human being
is required either to validate nonhuman life or to check the hubris of human
exceptionalism. More importantly, I think the accomplishment of Haslam's primary
objective—establishing the full humanity of persons with profound intellectual
disabilities—depends on keeping the boundaries of human being narrow. I say this for
two reasons; the first is methodological. Recall that moment Buber describes when the
immediacy of the I-Thou inevitably gives way to the I-It. For persons who are capable of
agency and symbolic expression, part of articulating an ethics of care is theorizing the
specific, concrete actions one must be prepared to take to respond appropriately to a
given Thou. To paraphrase Kant using Buber's terminology: efforts to treat the other as
Thou will necessarily involve treating the other as It, though never merely as It.
I second Creamer's insistence that the limits model ought to function in
conjunction with other models of disability. Recall that she says the ongoing viability of
the medical model lies largely in its ability to inform Christian theology about the
diversity of human embodiment.489 Care-fully attending to persons with profound
cognitive disabilities involves acknowledging that their embodied limits, including their
genetic make-up and physiology, share family resemblances with persons with agency or
language that they simply do not share with other mutual respondents encountered in the
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world.490 Sensitivity to the social model should protect against the naïve acceptance of
biological classifications as anything more than fallible constructs. But even in their
fallibility, these constructs continue to provide empirical insights into what Chan's
embodied limits might actually be and how a relationship with Chan has to differ from a
respectful treatment of, say, a potbellied-pig, a starfish, or a birch tree. This is where I
think keeping human being narrow and distinctive is a practical necessity.
As an alternative, I think the portrait of "creature" I articulate in Chapter 3
accomplishes what Haslam is after in broadening human being. To encounter a
nonhuman animal as "creature," rather than a mere It or thing, is to encounter a presence
created and sustained by the same mysterious Source as oneself. Such a presence calls for
a show of respect—the sort of respect that precludes humanity's colonial exploitation of
other forms of life.
At this juncture, my methodological reason for concern transitions into my ethical
reason. I think one ought to entertain the thought that, as an embodied being presents
itself to me as a subjective whole, the immediacy of sheer presence produces in me a
feeling that, although never fully captured by rational reflection, qualitatively
distinguishes the nature of the response I must offer one Thou from the response I owe
another.491 This is the affective, embodied dimension of a human-to-human encounter—
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the sort of feeling moves in and through the members of my body even as it convicts my
conscience. I suspect there is a place for this sense of feeling in Haslam's understanding
of dialogue. Put another way, not every word communicated in dialogue evokes my
responsibility in exactly the same way. It is my conviction that I experience this regularly
with Jarrod. To be present with Jarrod produces a feeling of solidarity and of obligation
that is stronger and richer than has any pet or plant for which I have cared. My certainty
of his humanity is the surplus of my being present with him. It is a haunting experience
insofar as I largely fail to speak it into a discernable form. Haslam's anthropology gets me
closer to articulating this difference for an academic audience, but I need to push for
more.
Eva Kittay expresses a similar dynamic between herself and Sesha. Paralleling
Haslam's phenomenology, Kittay reports that Sesha is enormously responsive to her
world and has formed deep personal relationships with her family, caregivers, and
friendly relations.492 In her essay, "The Personal is Philosophical is Political," Kittay
reflects on a conference panel she participated in with McMahan and Singer. In answer to
Singer's request for a capacity that grounds the humanity of the severely disabled, Kittay
insists, "[T]here is so much to being human. There's the touch, there's the feel, there's the
hug, there's the smile . . . there are so many ways of interacting. . . . It's a way that you
are, a way that you are in the world, a way you are with another."493 She admits to trying
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to satisfy Singer's request after the conference, observing Sesha disinterestedly in the
effort to identify what set her apart empirically from nonhuman animals. The experience
made Kittay feel nauseous and cut off from her daughter.494 To try to define the human
within these parameters is already to concede the outcome to ableist, capacity-based
approaches.
Meanwhile, I worry that even a well-intentioned collapse of the distinction
between nonhuman animals and persons with profound cognitive disabilities would have
a similar effect; that it might consolidate the lack of affinity the average person feels for
Chan, Sesha, or Jarrod, rather than spurring people toward loving and mutual engagement
with the profoundly disabled. I am convinced that the church's collective likeness of God
the Creator fails to materialize as long as the well-being of certain members of the human
family is an acceptable casualty in the struggle to promote the flourishing of nonhuman
animals. To borrow a thought from Sallie McFague: "Until we rectify gross injustices
among human beings, in other words, begin our ecological work at home, we will have
little chance of success abroad, that is in relation to other species and the planet as a
whole."495 As long as the theology and doctrine of a church community remains
incapable of affirming the full humanity of persons with profound cognitive disabilities,
at least one gross injustice persists.
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From Ecclesiology to Eschatology
The preceding discussion of the doctrine of the church reveals how an ontology of
radical interdependence is not merely compatible with a relational approach to the imago
Dei; the two concepts share an affinity that dates back to Christian antiquity. Just as the
Creator lays claim to the entirety of the human creature and not just one venerated
capacity, just as the process of the Incarnation embraces the entirety of Jesus's humanity,
the life of the church is one in which the Spirit of God weaves together a diversity of
persons into common mode of embodied existence such that their diversity is not
obliterated. Both in its continuation of Christ's earthly ministry of service to God and in
the material details of its practices of care and hospitality with one another, the church is
the earthly space where authentic human being becomes most intentionally manifest.
Each member of the body of Christ participates through spiritual gifts, distinctive
contributions that one's embodied presence within the community provides. Like
existence itself, these gifts are provisions of God's grace and compassion.
Persons with profound cognitive disabilities may not be categorically ruled out as
members of this network of exchange because there is neither a hierarchy of gifts nor an
idealized model of necessary abilities to account for the church's unity within diversity.
Once the valorization of either rationality or purposive agency is set aside, careful
attention to the lives of profoundly disabled persons uncovers the truth of their
participation in relationships of interdependence. More than objects of charity or pity,
they engage other embodied persons in mutual and responsive ways. The details of their
atypical embodiments thus prove to be material for fresh theological reflection about the
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distinctive character of human being rather than trivia unworthy of consideration. They
are no less a child of God than any other member of the body of Christ, and they are no
less human than any other man, woman, or child one might encounter. For all these
reasons, the theological consideration of how ecclesial being discloses what it means to
be human must account for how persons of all levels of physical and cognitive abilities
are a constitutive part of the ongoing revelation of Christ and, by extension, the imago
Dei.
It is the ongoing nature of this revelation and, more specifically, the futureoriented aspects of human being, that still require additional attention. One further
consequence of the Incarnation is that, in joining itself to human flesh, divinity has joined
its destiny to that of humankind with an intimacy not found in God's relationship with
any other creature.496 How should this confession impact the way that theological
anthropology describes the final end of human being? How should one comprehend the
place and participation of persons with profound cognitive disabilities within the body of
Christ when the culmination of its manifestation remains unrealized and largely
unforeseen? As I take up these questions in the final chapter, my treatment of the imago
Dei transitions from the doctrinal context of ecclesiology to eschatology.
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CHAPTER FIVE: LAST THINGS AND FINAL THOUGHTS

Any sustained examination of the concept of the imago Dei will inevitably
address matters of eschatology. Yet, for a theological anthropology that aims to affirm
the full humanity of persons with profound cognitive disabilities, this is doctrinal terrain
where one must tread carefully. Because both traditional and popular forays into
eschatology tend to perpetuate the sort of ableist assumptions I have named and
challenged in previous chapters, my own theological construction of human being would
be incomplete without providing an account of how to reconceptualize these matters in
terms of an ontology of radical interdependence. The purpose of this chapter is to
complete that task by bringing common features of eschatology into critical engagement
with the relational understanding of the imago Dei that has emerged over the course of
my discussions of creation ex nihilo, Christology, and ecclesiology. After discussing the
insights that this engagement produces, I offer some concluding thoughts on my extended
treatment of human being as the image of God and on the present study as a whole.
Christian theology has traditionally defined eschatology as the doctrine of "last
things." Its signature questions and assertions typically focus on events that still belong to
the future, such as death and resurrection, the end of the world, the last judgment, eternal
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damnation, and eternal life.497 When one considers the imago Dei within this context, the
most pressing question of theological anthropology becomes, "What is the final end of
human being?" There is an important sense in which this question has already been a
matter of concern in the present study, where I have addressed this "final end" in terms of
the "highest end" or "underlying purpose" of human existence. Most eschatological
discussions, however, interpret the final end of human being and the world in terms of a
temporal ultimacy. Often attending this interpretation is an expectation that biblical
passages stating the heavens and the earth will pass away (e.g. Rev. 21:5; Matt. 24:35)
will prove to be literally true. In other words, creation in its current form will cease, and
God will bring into being some new order of existence. The anticipated event that will
inaugurate this new order is the Parousia of the risen Christ, i.e. the Second Coming. His
return to the earth will also precipitate the resurrection of all Christians who have died
since his ascension (1 Thess. 4:16) and the ontological transformation of the believers
who are still alive that they may enjoy everlasting life in heaven.
Without dismissing common beliefs on these matters altogether, I want to
challenge the assumption that the proper content of Christian eschatology is strictly these
kinds of last things. I contend that the central theological significance of eschatology lies
in its ability to affirm and elaborate upon the themes of creaturely interdependence,
materiality, and being-together I have exposited thus far. When a limits perspective
orients the discussion of last things, the vital tether between Christian expectations for the
future and the shape of Christian existence in the present becomes clearer. This
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orientation also emphasizes the reasons to posit continuities (rather than disjuncture)
between the world humankind currently occupies and the fully redeemed world the
church faithfully anticipates. In what follows, I will highlight how this brand of
eschatology also embraces an ontology of radical interdependence instead of seeking to
overcome it.

Parousia Now – The Immediacy of Eschatology
In the latter half of the twentieth century, eschatology experienced a renaissance.
Led by theologians like Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, theological
approaches emphasizing the primary significance of Christian hope began to proliferate.
A common theme of these "theologies of hope" is that eschatology is not the perfunctory
conclusion to a systematic theology, as though its defining purpose is strictly that of
epilogue. To the contrary, the content of one's eschatology regularly influences and
determines one's thought and conduct in day-to-day life.498 A proper theology will thus
prioritize eschatological concerns throughout its constructive efforts, if not attend to them
at the beginning. As Moltmann explains, "Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward
looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the
present...[It] is the medium of Christian faith as such."499
Taking this statement seriously requires a willingness to suss out meaningful
ways in which God may currently be realizing the final ends of the world within the
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structures of temporality and history rather than holding that realization in abeyance until
a forthcoming punctiliar event when those structures will undergo violent disruption. This
course of reflection also demands consideration of how theological claims that concern
more mundane content nevertheless bear the connotations of ultimacy traditionally
reserved for apocalyptic subjects. To borrow the words of Carl Braaten: "Every
theological statement is at the same time an eschatological statement in the sense that
eschatology deals with what is ultimate;" namely, the reality of God.500 There is, then, an
inherently eschatological dimension to the notion of the imago Dei that needs further
explication.
My construction of creation ex nihilo provides a model of the God-world
relationship that is instructive for how to articulate the ultimate end of human being
within a limits perspective. In much the same way that Christian theologians fall into
error when they identify the primary significance of creation ex nihilo with cosmogony, it
would be a mistake to reduce the function of eschatology to prognostications about the
eschaton. First of all, scripture is clear that this event is so impossible to predict that not
even Jesus claims to know the day or hour of its occurrence (Matt. 24:36). Like the
doctrine of creation, the deepest significance of eschatology alternatively concerns the
abiding character of human life before God. The common theme here is the human
creature's absolute dependence upon divine providence. Above all else, this primordial
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dependency is the intimate link between the genesis of human being and it telos.501 Just
as the human creature has no option other than to live in the world God creates, he or she
must finally concede that God alone possesses the power to ensure that the world reaches
its rightful conclusion, not any individual or combined human agency.502 Whatever
material details may come to define humankind's collective future, this fact will never
cease to be true. For precisely this reason, Kathryn Tanner asserts that the fundamental
meaning of Christian hopes for the world has no definitive stake in how or even whether
the world ends.503
When considering the systematic connections between eschatology and this
understanding of creation, it also important to recall how the latter represents God's
generation of the world as ongoing rather than a finished act. This assertion undercuts the
presupposition of an ideal, prelapsarian world that, among its original perfections, hosted
an ideal human creature. This tenet of the doctrine of creation preemptively disallows
eschatology from depicting eternal life or heavenly existence as a return to an Edenic
state. Otherwise, last things are yet another point at which best-case anthropologies,
ontological hierarchies, and substantialist approaches to the imago Dei can easily reassert
themselves. It is only natural for the theological imagination to ponder what the
culmination of human being's process of dynamic unfolding might look like and attempt
to depict a pinnacle state. However, if the assumption persists that God engages
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humankind in order to repair it according to some presupposed original and ideal form,
then the picture of heaven one imagines is bound to be a community purified of impaired
bodies and minds.504 Rather than a God who delights in difference, this deity would
appear, at best, to tolerate the multiplicity of human embodiment until the Second
Coming homogenizes the human family.
This is precisely the point at which eschatology tends to fund ableist concepts of
human flourishing. Hope presupposes that something is currently lacking, and
eschatology promises the fulfillment of what human existence most desperately lacks. 505
The problematic element of traditional eschatology is not confidence in divine promises.
Far from it, this is a positive donation eschatology makes to the doctrine of creation.
(Because God's benevolent power governs all life, finite existence is neither aimless nor
meaningless.) Eschatologies go awry when the values systems and attitudes that define
lack operate without critical evaluation. For example, when many Christians reflect upon
the promise of Revelation 21:4—humankind will dwell with God and there will be no
more crying, mourning, or pain—they do not tend to have in mind the impairment
without disability Jesus exemplified in his own resurrected body. They instead define the
absence of pain and other suffering according to the dictates of the medical model of
disability and expect the literal fulfillment of prophetic passages that foretell the opening
of blind eyes, the unstopping of deaf ears, and the singing of once speechless mouths
(e.g. Isa. 35:3-6). If eternal life entails the correction of these lacks, then it is no surprise
that most theological discussions of human flourishing do not even consider the lives of
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persons with profound cognitive disabilities. One cannot wholeheartedly say to a
neighbor, "It is good that you are in this world," when there is no expectation of dwelling
with such persons in the world to come.
The great challenge of reconstructing eschatology from a limits perspective thus
proves to be the dilemma of how to honor the created goodness of earthly, finite
humanity alongside confident hopes that the life found in Christ leads to an ultimate wellbeing that earthly terms strain and fail to describe. Like the resurrection and ascension of
Jesus himself, Christian imagery of a general resurrection of the dead, or of eternal life as
afterlife, carries thought beyond the material details of human being-together that the
limits model strives to keep at the center of theological reflection. The concept of a
reconstituted, spiritual body (1 Cor. 15:35-54), much like the concept of an immortal
soul, by the very nature of its content refers to something that human understanding
seems incapable of perceiving, let alone conceptualizing.506 Nevertheless, certain biblical
promises require that a theological anthropology give some explanation for how to
incorporate that imagery into its larger account of human being. The Pauline epistles in
particular make claims that "we will certainly be united with [Christ] in a resurrection
like his" (Ro. 6:5), and, "Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we will also
bear the image of the man of heaven" (1 Cor. 15:49). Ian McFarland takes this language
to indicate that the way in which humankind bears the image of God is more a matter of
its destiny than its origin.507 The answer to the challenge at hand, therefore, would seem

506

Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, rev. ed., trans. and ed. by Gary Hatfield
(1783; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 87-88.
507

McFarland, The Divine Image, 53.

204

to be articulating the irreducibly eschatological dimension of the imago Dei while
simultaneously insisting that eschatological depictions of humanity's ultimate flourishing
remain congruous with a limits understanding of human embodiment and creaturely
dependence.
One strategy for producing such an articulation involves the notion of
eschatological essentialism. This approach to theological anthropology, much like the
limits model, strives to occupy a middle position between the substantialist assertions of
traditional essentialisms and the insistence that "human nature" is never anything more
than the product of social construction. While acknowledging both the open-endedness of
creation and expressivist values concerning the irreducible plurality of human being,
eschatological essentialism insists that the person and work of Christ make it possible for
theologians to assert that a peculiarly human form of existence is discernible in the here
and now.508 As the chief criterion for discerning how human being images divinity, the
incarnational process of Jesus's life is the concrete revelation that human existence not
only begins with God but is destined for God. The dual confession of Christ's resurrection
and ascension indicates what he has accomplished through elevating human being into
the life of God remains intact beyond the vicissitudes of history and the subjective
conditions of human language and understanding. The defining content of human life
remains hidden with Christ in God (Col. 3:3) in the sense that it is safely stored and that it
remains a mystery to earthly minds. Where these confessions bolster Christian hope, even
as they fail to satisfy epistemological demands, is that "even though we are not able to
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define what it means to be human, our destiny is secure in the one who made and
redeemed us."509
Yet there is epistemological value here as well. Even if the definitive unveiling of
God and Christ truly will not occur until the future event of the eschaton, what it means
to be created in the image of God has still been initially glimpsed in Jesus's unequivocally
human life.510 Therefore, while believers should expect that any complete revelation of
human being will include surprises, they should also expect to observe a specific
ontological relation between the content of this disclosure and the form of human life
under its present, created conditions.511 This continuity, combined with the security of
human destiny, provides theological warrant for maintaining that constructive proposals
about human being are not merely arbitrary and that certain proposals may more
faithfully capture the truth of human existence than others. The label of eschatological
essentialism names the theological anthropologies that overtly adopt these warrants.
These theological anthropologies owe much to the notion of "strategic
essentialism" that feminist theorists first developed in their efforts to define woman's
nature apart from the essentialist/constructivist dichotomy. Driven by the same pragmatic
orientation that drives Sheila Davaney's theological anthropology (see Chapter 1),
strategic essentialism makes normative claims about the common nature of women—or
of all human persons—with full acknowledgement that there is an inherently functionalist
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character to these claims and that a single, unchanging model of human nature is
impossible.512 Here the measure of a theory's strength is its practical effect. Congruent
with the orientation of constructive theology, the theorist who employs this highly
qualified brand of essentialism is a politically engaged analyst whose primary objective is
to provide a regulative ideal that is emancipatory and life-giving. This approach remains
ever strategic in that the theorist never disregards the contextual character of the
universals proposed and never presumes to occupy a "view from nowhere."513 As Serene
Jones explains, eschatological essentialism is likewise a "boldly pragmatic universalism,"
and its measure of truth is its ongoing transformative power.514 What makes it distinctly
theological is that it roots its claims in the "vision of an already/not-yet future—a vision
of God's will for a redeemed humanity where all persons live in a right relation to God
and one another."515
While I remain wary about retaining the term "essentialism," I nevertheless
appreciate the way in which eschatological essentialism equips theological anthropology
to make normative and liberative claims about human existence. I am also encouraged by
how this constructive strategy, by the very nature of its operation, identifies a basic
agreement between the human family's current state and its anticipated future. I do not
advocate completely abandoning the idea of eternal life as afterlife because it honors the

512

Serene Jones, Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of Grace (Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress Press, 2000), 44-46. Alternate names for this approach are normative constructivism, pragmatic
utopianism, pragmatic universalism, and utopic essentialism.
513

Ibid., 45.

514

Ibid., 54.

515

Ibid.

207

Christian confessions that death cannot separate the believer from God revealed in Christ
(Ro. 8:35) and that, whatever the true nature of that afterlife might be, its defining marker
is a state of perfect peace.516 A truly life-giving eschatology, however, will not be "so
heavenly minded it is of no earthly good." It will not bleed dry "the already" on the altar
of "the not-yet."
Owning up to the pragmatic character of eschatology will mean staying critically
aware of how Christian hope not only emboldens theological anthropology but stands in a
dialectical relationship with it. What I consider the overriding pragmatic objective in
reconstructing eschatology should now be obvious: To portray the shape of human being,
from its ultimate origins to its ultimate end, such that the full humanity of persons with
profound cognitive disabilities and the radical interdependence of being-together are the
preeminent values. By extension, the lacks that ought to define the core of Christian hope
are the material and social ways that humankind currently fall short of being-together
with one another and before God. In offering a proposal about how Christian theology
might best meet this objective, I will not address every aspect of last things one could
conceivably discuss, but instead make a case for how the eschatological dimension of the
imago Dei adds further credence to an ontology of radical interdependence.
In making this transition, I begin with another important systematic connection
between eschatology and the doctrine of creation ex nihilo: Both portray the human
creature as inextricably embedded in the larger cosmic order. The redemptive benefits of
God's compassionate engagement of creation are not limited to the freedom of human
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creatures to be authentically themselves. As Paul describes it, creation itself will be set
free from its present state of decay and "will obtain the freedom of the glory of the
children of God" (Ro. 8:21; cf. Rev. 21:5). Two key implications follow from this
expectation. First, anthropocentrism has no place in a biblical image of afterlife. The
entire order of absolutely dependent beings shall enjoy God's everlasting care. In this
way, eschatology only strengthens the sense in which humanity is responsible for the
flourishing of nonhuman creatures, rather than providing a justification for abdicating this
responsibility on the auspices that human dominion amounts to human caprice.
Second, since the theme of human embeddedness persists within this vision of
humanity in its glorified state, the theme of human embodiment must persist as well.
Once again, humankind's organic, animal bodies provide strong empirical proof of its
intrinsic solidarity with all other created life. The concept of the eschaton, therefore, is
not a loophole through which either body/soul or disability/person dualisms may
reestablish themselves. Accordingly, Christian thought should devote attention to
conceiving how any human body will still bear resemblance to its earthly impairments—
much like Christ's resurrected body retained the scars of his crucifixion—rather than
perpetuating notions of disembodied souls or of bodies perfected according to the ableist
norms.
Even when it is granted that solidarity with the larger cosmos defines origin and
destiny alike, there is still the question of how humanity's creation in the image of God
invests human with a unique role to play in the process of creation's renewal.517 In taking
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up that question, I want to embellish upon my Christological and ecclesiological
conclusions concerning the imago Dei with a few observations about how to
conceptualize eternal life within a limits perspective. The teachings and life-praxis of
Jesus of Nazareth remain the definitive touchstone for any claims about the divine image.
His earthly ministry begins with the declaration, "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom
of God has come near; repent, and believe in the good news” (Mark 1:15). As the rest of
Jesus's story bears out, the declaration of this good news is more of a call to certain kind
of existence than an affirming description of existing conditions; the reign of God
remains unrealized as long as the injustices of human society instigate and prolong the
brokenness of creation.518 Yet the declaration itself is evidence that the reign of God has
already begun to infiltrate the world's brokenness; namely, in the process of Incarnation
and transformation that are the heart of Jesus's existence as the man for others. The
coming of Christ brings judgment in that his way of being in the world challenges the
world as it is. Yet this coming also presents humanity with good news in that God's
judgment serves the salvific purpose of healing.519 One can thus understand "the already"
of the eschatological kingdom of God as an immediate and expanding reality, a material
and relational order of being in the world that gains in content as the Incarnation elevates
more and more of creaturely existence into the divine life. Jesus Christ is an
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eschatological image of God in that his life, death, and resurrection simultaneously
delineate and secure the shape of human destiny.
As discussed in the previous chapter, neither the process of the Incarnation nor the
revelation of Christ remain confined to Jesus of Nazareth. The church is the body of
Christ in its continuation of Jesus's earthly ministry and in the diversity within
interdependence that constitutes the relationships between its members. As the head of
this body, Christ's relationship to the church is not that of an otherworldly presence that
communicates with a human community from a distant metaphysical height. The church
regularly encounters Christ in its welcome and care for the neighbor. By being the
intentional space in which the Spirit of Christ becomes manifest in the interpenetrating
lives of human creatures, the church images God by being the body of Christ. In this
sense, the Parousia is not just a one-time event set to occur at a time yet to be announced.
The Parousia is now!
The Second Coming of Christ occurs repeatedly, whenever the church lives out
the relational mode of being that is its ultimate end. For this reason, it is possible to live
the resurrected life now, "even in the midst of death and dying that is characteristic of life
under the conditions of creaturely limitations and finitude."520 Similarly, the theologian
ought not conceptualize eternal life as "the endless extension of our present existence into
an endless future," but as the new quality of life found only in God that is even now
seeping into creation.521 Eternal life belongs to human creatures by virtue of their union
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with Christ, a union based in an absolute dependence that the church enjoys now just as
fundamentally as it will in the future. Regardless of what the temporal event of an
eschaton might change or reveal, the in-breaking of eternal life both empowers and
requires those who are in Christ to promote the pattern of reality he inaugurates and to
oppose competing patterns that imbue life with futility and hopelessness.522 Regardless
how fervently a believer awaits the full manifestation of divine glory, christomorphic life
is necessary to remain faithful in the meantime (Titus 2:12-13).523
As I lay out my own concept of the final end of the human being, I adopt this
detemporalized understanding of eternal life and emphasize the ways in which the reign
of God is an immediate reality. Following the biblical insight that, among the most
enduring values of the Christian religion, love is greater than even faith and hope (1 Cor.
13:13), I contend that what is hoped for should be defined according to the deficits in
Christ-like love that the church continues to experience in its finitude and fallibility. As
an image of the Creator, the ultimate end of human being is to be the fleshly expression
of a love with an expansive, rather than provincial, scope. To cite Moltmann once more:
"We love only as far as we can hope. Only if we include all things into our hope will we
be ready to love all things and meet them with respect."524 This statement, of course,
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applies to all persons as well, especially persons with profound cognitive disabilities. I
want to explore what portrait of the eschatological community comes into view when
Christian desires for destiny acquire their signature content from the earthly mission of
Jesus and the engrafting activity of the Spirit of God. By identifying the shape of human
life encapsulated in such images, theological anthropology names the concept of human
flourishing that ought to govern Christian life under the conditions of history and
limitness. To offer what might initially seem a counterintuitive claim, I hold that the
central tenet of this concept is that the final end of human being is to know God.

The Knowledge of God as the Final End of Human Being
As I ruminate over the question of what sort of future the church ought to hope
for, a passage from Marjorie Suchocki's book God, Christ, Church repeatedly comes to
mind. Suchocki states that, in the reign of God, "humans shall know and obey God,
rejoicing and living in this knowledge, with the result that all shall participate in the good
life of the community."525 To be part of this community is to be in covenant with God
and neither disability nor illness nor age may be grounds for exclusion; "the reign of God
is well-being toward all and for all."526 This description resonates with my relational
approach to the imago Dei, and yet it also prompts me to consider whether, by adopting it
as my own, I would hand the reigns of the theological imagination back over to the
themes of rationality and purposive agency. After all, even if one recognizes the validity
of Molly Haslam’s argument that persons with profound cognitive disabilities participate
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in relationships of mutuality and response, the nature of their impairments seems to rule
out the possibility that they could know God, let alone rejoice in that knowledge.
Similarly, how can these persons obey God when they lack the self-awareness and
intentionality that obedience requires? This line of discussion raises another immensely
important question: If there is reason to doubt whether persons with cognitive
impairments know God, then it is also possible that they are capable of having faith? A
theological anthropology would deny the necessity of faith for inclusion in the body of
Christ would be peculiar to say the least.
The most effective course for addressing these concerns is to problematize the
assumed connection between knowledge and rational abilities in a manner that parallels
my argument that human relationality runs far deeper than the cooperation of wills. There
is a sense in which Jarrod and I may each know God in the very same fashion, one that
logically precedes, and so ought to inform, any propositional knowledge I might profess
to have. In the Gospels, Jesus declares that it is only possible to know God by knowing
him (Matt. 11:27) and that, if one has seen him, one has seen God as well (John 14:9).
Yet recall that the believer does not see Jesus through the empirical observation of his
individual person. The church encounters Jesus through compassionate relationships of
being-together, especially caring and welcoming gestures toward the outcast and the
stranger.527 One thus never knows Jesus through individual and strictly mental
apprehension, but only through the participatory encounters that comprise the body of
Christ. By extension, knowledge of God does not come merely through theory; it is the
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embodied and embedded practices of the church that make the reality of God's presence
known.528 Corroborating this assertion, the same passage of scripture that identifies God's
being with love also states that love is the means for knowing God (1 John 4:7-8). The
systematic influence this has on the doctrine of God is significant: God is a living
encounter, not a concept.529
There is, then, an important distinction between knowledge of God and
knowledge about God.530 The intellectual content of any theological proposition
(including this one) stands at a remove from the immediacy of God's presence.531 To call
back to Buber's discussion of I-It relationships, God-talk is necessarily a form of
thematization, making even the most reverent conceptualization of God an activity during
which God is absent. The theologian is never justified in reducing knowledge of God to
the dictates of logic or the proper functioning of the human nervous system.532 Each
member of the body of Christ comes to grasp God in different ways, including nonconceptual and preintentional ways, because of the variety of forms embodied love
assumes.533
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Admittedly, there is a sense in which Christian piety is already receptive to this
characterization of the knowledge of God. Nevertheless, the inertia of both Western
history and Christian doctrine makes it exceptionally difficult to affirm without
qualification. First and foremost, this position undermines the widespread identification
of authentic faith with intellectual assent to particular doctrinal statements, as this type of
knowledge of God now takes on a secondary and derivative significance. For the
academic theologian, in particular, this relativizing of the value of the intellect can be
outright frightening.534 So much of a scholar's social capital, economic security, and
sense of self-worth depends upon the continued esteem of superior intellectual abilities. It
may even seem like "career suicide" to admit that a person incapable of theoretical
reflection or language use is just as capable of knowing God as the most skilled
systematician or rhetorician. When one is well-versed in technical vocabulary or
numerous languages, it might be painful to concede that the embodied “language” of love
is more important than all other forms of human communication.535 But such a
concession is a clear and public way in which Christian theology can honor the
vulnerability and diversity that comes along with humanity's radical interdependence.
Besides, the purpose of decentering rational capabilities is not to deny them any value for
human being.
Another reason to emphasize the participatory rather than conceptual nature of
knowing God is that the valorization of the intellect is arguably human pride's last line of
defense against accepting that mystery and gift occupy the heart of human existence, not
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certitude and personal merit. For example, according to hierarchical conceptualizations of
the imago Dei, the intelligent person might consider themselves superior to the person
with an intellectual disability because one's own knowledge better resembles the divine
attribute of omniscience. However, when reevaluated from the vantage point of creation
ex nihilo, "the smartest human being is far more like a person with an intellectual
disability than he or she is like God."536 The similarity between these two persons
becomes more evident when one considers that all knowledge about God is tentative and
partial, occupying that strange place between revelation and hiddenness.537
A helpful precedent for how to conceive of the proper role intellect should play in
the knowledge of God comes from the medieval theologians, especially the
contemplative tradition. In this tradition, there is a concerted effort to use the intellect to
move beyond the confines of an intellectual relation to God and open up the whole of
one's self for the purposes of learning to love God for God's sake alone.538 As part of a
critical reading of works by Bonaventure and Meister Eckhart, Erinn Staley notes how
these theologians regard the final success of one's contemplative efforts as entirely a
matter of grace and, given the sense in which the infinite God remains unknowable, an
achievement one cannot hope to quantify.539
Josef Pieper explains how even the medieval scholastics assumed a notion of
intellect in which the possession of knowledge is never thoroughly the product of human
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effort. This epistemology distinguishes between intellect as ratio and intellectus. As
ratio, intellect is the labor that the human mind must put in to acquire knowledge; that is,
"the power of discursive thought, of search and re-searching, abstracting, refining, and
concluding."540 As intellectus, it is the ability of simply beholding the way in which the
truth presents itself, "as a landscape presents itself to the eye."541 This aspect of intellect
pertains to what surpasses human limits and gives human thought, not actively acquiring
but receiving access to (what the scholars of this period regarded to be) to the order of
angels. All knowing involved both senses of intellect. But insofar as the vision of
intellectus accompanies and penetrates ratio, there is something essential in human
knowledge that is not work.542 Pieper notes the decisive way in which the modern turn to
the subject led Western thought to lose this instructive insight. If, as Kant in particular
argued, knowledge is exclusively work, then what the laboring subject knows is "only the
fruits of his own, subjective activity and nothing else."543 In short, when an element of
grace is eliminated from the knowledge process, human knowledge is indeed strictly
confined to propositions and the boundaries of natural reason alone. Insofar as Christian
theology crafts the definition of faith according to these parameters, there will remain (if
only implicitly) an understanding that one's own efforts have taken possession of the
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knowledge of God, and the perception of individual capability in this area may become
the basis for bringing reason-centered hierarchy back into theological anthropology.
The alternative view that the element of gift always pervades the knowledge of
God is more consistent with a relational conception of the imago Dei, where the
understanding of human being in all its aspects begins with the Creator who lays claim to
the entire creature. Under these terms, even persons with the use of intellect and reason
cannot know anything about God apart from what the divine discloses to them. Retaining
any merit-based notion of faith runs contrary to doctrines of justification and
sanctification rooted in the scandal of the cross. What is so foolish about the divine
wisdom disclosed in the crucifixion is that the means and rationale according to which
God redeems any person is always beyond human comprehension. Yet each member of
the body of Christ is saved in spite of persistent noetic and cognitive limitations.544
Affirming that a person with profound cognitive disabilities genuinely knows God,
therefore, is not without warrant nor should the belief that this is so produce feelings of
anxiety or discomfort in believers who currently possess able minds.545 It is a humble
affirmation that recognizes, in Christ, embodied love takes priority over the certainty of
knowledge. As Thomas Reynolds notes, the church's shared commitment to honor its
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diversity and mind differences will often require lingering in moments of theological
apotheosis, unsure of what to say when the disruption of normalcy leads to the
breakdown of conventional language and thought.546
One should also note how the preceding discussion leads to an important
ecclesiological insight: Because the church is the earthly community that images the
invisible God, and the embodied relationships of its members are the means by which
Christ brings eternal life into the world, the Spirit's activity of grafting them together is
also the means by which humanity comes to enjoy a deeper fellowship with God. If
someone can assent to the content of the concept of God, then a formal affirmation of
God's love, compassion, and goodness is possible. But one only comes to the true
knowledge of God's attributes by encountering them in their living expressions and in the
thick of earthly existence.547 As the members of the body of Christ find their dwelling in
one another, the process of the Incarnation culminates in God finding an earthly dwelling
place in human being. Philip Thomas goes as far as to say that the regeneration of
believers into the imago Dei is simultaneously the communication of God's attributes to
human creatures.548 Consistent with my comments about regeneration in the previous
chapter, I do not understand this communication to be a metaphysical deification of a
finite being. Even still, I think that a recovery of the notion of God's communicable
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attributes does bring increased intelligibility to the confession that one encounters God
through the material particularities of interdependent human relationships.
Brian Brock interprets Paul's description of the body of Christ in 1 Corinthians 12
in a way that I find to be congruent with the point I am making now. When providing an
analogy for how spiritual gifts are given and received within the earthly body of Christ,
Brock suggests that the members of this body behave like nerve cells:
A nerve cell is capable of receiving and passing on the electric pulse that
constitutes the firing of the nerve, but this electrical signal is different from the
substance of the nerve cell itself. Each cell does not originate a special signal that
is all its own (as if each cell sent out a pulse that could be identified at any time
further down the line, like we do from the light spectrum emitted by stars) but
receives and hands on an entity different in kind from itself (electricity, not
organic material).549
Like a nerve cell, the human person who belongs to the body of Christ contributes the
spiritual gifts associated with his or her embodied presence, yet, in the act of giving, is
also one of the material instruments through which God becomes present and knowable.
In Chapter 4, I noted that even an exhaustive empirical study of a member's capacities
will not account for the nature of those gifts. Something irreducible to, but operating in
conjunction with, the embodied form and functionings of human persons becomes
manifest in their being-together. Naming this "something" as the presence of God does
not dispel the mystery of how the exchange of spiritual gifts effects the engrafting of all
the body's members, What this naming does do, however, is show how the eschatological
dimension of a relational imago Dei matches up with the ecclesiological dimension and
amplifies its. In short, human being's final end of knowing God is only possible because
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the Spirit of Christ transforms a community of interdependent human creatures into the
space where God's dwells.
Knowing God in the most fundamental sense, therefore, is to be lured into the
between and thereby experience the love, compassion, and goodness which God is. The
relevance of this discussion of last things for a project on human flourishing amounts to
this: Authentic human being is knowing God. This insight allows for the reappropriation
of Hans Reinders's description of human being as ecstatic, while still maintaining that
embodied differences have positive theological significance. To grow in the knowledge
of God is to become more thoroughly engrafted into the body of Christ which, in turn, is
to be drawn deeper into God's own life. Informed by this vision of ecstatic existence, I
see a more nuanced vision of the church's economy of grace that is specific to the places
persons with profound cognitive disabilities occupy in the body of Christ, which is an
economy infused with eschatological hope for eternal life.

Profound Cognitive Disability in the Life of the Church
My extended discussion of a relational approach to the imago Dei has come full
circle, returning to the confession that the human reflection of divine life begins with
God’s generative movement toward the human creature through the confession that the
defining desire of human existence should be to know the God who unites human persons
together in order to dwell in them. The doctrine of creation meets the doctrine of last
things through the mediation of Christ and church. Over the course of this discussion,
numerous reasons arose for conceptualizing creation in the image of God in terms of an
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ontology of radical interdependence. Because God draws near to human persons and
human persons encounter God through the fleshly, finite parameters of their embodied
limits, bodies are of ultimate importance to theological reflection. Because careful
attention to the material details of living bodies brings intrinsic vulnerability,
dependence, and the need for care to the fore, disability is a topic of ultimate importance
as well. And because accepting these qualities as necessary contours of human existence
leads to an understanding of relationality that is more primordial than the
interconnectedness purposive agency can establish, profound cognitive disability is a
topic of ultimate significance for theological anthropology.
Perhaps more than any other person, the loving engagement of a person with
profound cognitive disabilities exposes the relative worth of all the particular capacities
standard convention extols. For in this engagement, one finds the mutuality,
responsiveness, and welcome sought in any human relationship. The highest good
possible in God’s creation is the gracious gift of another’s presence in conjunction with
that person’s reception of the gift of oneself. The theological insight regarding this rich
manifestation of being-together is that such a mutual encounter is possible only because
of God’s gracious activity in Christ. Both in its mystery and its gratuity, Christian
friendship is the very means by which God brings human creatures deeper into the divine
life. This theological truth ought to be the foremost principle guiding Christian valuations
of all human abilities and the structures of communal organization.
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To clarify the sort of valuation I have in mind, I draw on the description of the
God-world relationship Augustine articulates in Book I of On Christian Doctrine.550
There he asserts that reality, as the human mind understands it, is made up of things to be
enjoyed and things to be used. To enjoy something is to cling to it for its own sake, and
through this clinging one is made blessed. To use something is to employ it towards
obtaining that which one loves, provided the latter is worthy of love. It is the failure of
the creature that things which should only be used are enjoyed in themselves—a situation
which leaves the creature “shackled by an inferior love.”551
For Augustine, God as “the single Trinity” is the thing most deserving to be
enjoyed.552 God is that thing to be placed above all other things and to be regarded as that
“which there is nothing better or more sublime.”553 Augustine encourages the estimation
of God as life itself, and so the creature should only love things that “pertain to God” and,
by enjoying God, live in right relationship to the source of one’s being.554 In short, love
of God is placed first and all other loves must flow into it.555
This proper arrangement of relationships became distorted after the historical
event of the Fall, when the introduction of sin into the world led to the corruption of the
creature’s nature and the direction of its desires. Amidst this misdirection, creatures use
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the eternal and the spiritual as means to enjoy temporal and corporeal things and thus
wander away from God. If they loved created things properly, they would regard such
things strictly as vehicles for bringing them into proper relationship with God, which is
the enjoyment of God.
I think there is much promise in integrating Augustine's distinction between
enjoyment and use into my own model of the God-world relationship, provided one
recasts this distinction, not in terms of Augustine's own Neoplantonic cosmology, but in
terms of the material, interdependent creation I have described. If Christ becomes present
to the church in the encounter with the neighbor and the stranger, and knowledge of God
comes primarily through concrete expressions of love, then the main criterion for placing
a value on an earthly good is whether or not the use of that good leads to the enjoyment
of embodied relationships of mutuality, welcome, and respect. In this economy, the
human capabilities of purposive agency, rationality, and even relationality have a market
worth, as opposed to an unconditional value.556 A proper love of created things is to
appreciate them for the ways in which they facilitate the enjoyment of God through the
highest love found only in being-together. In other words, purposive agency and
rationality are markers of human being only to the extent that they help draw one's life
deeper into the matrix of radical interdependence.557
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This course of theological construction similarly requires a reconceptualization of
divine transcendence. God transcends the cosmos in the sense that God is never reducible
to the sum total of material entities that currently, previously, or will eventually make up
the content of creation. Even still, Christian theology need not maintain that there is a
chasm between God and the world.558 As Reynolds explains, "God's transcendence is
paradoxically not far off but near, immanent in the world and engaged dynamically with
all things."559 The glory of God, and what makes God supremely deserving of enjoyment
and worship, is that God's care for dependent creatures is universal and unflagging and,
through that care, creation consists of an abundance of intrinsically good embodiments
and resources for the promotion of flourishing. God's self-communication is thus most
primordially "an effulgent welcome that overflows."560 This insight makes it necessary to
assert once again that participation in God does not entail the elevation of human being
into some abstractly conceived sphere of divinity, as if human being could outstrip the
immanent conditions of creation's materiality.561 Enjoyment of creation leads human
being to be the imago Dei with increasing fullness and so also reveal God's glory with
increasing luminescence.562 In the final analysis, there is no enduring distinction between

558

Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 147.

559

Ibid., 156-57.

560

Ibid., 159.

561

McFarland, The Divine Image, 39.

562

Thomas, "The Relational-Revelational Image," 141-42.

226

when those in Christ minister to one another in love and when they worship or commune
with God. "Attending to God's creatures is in fact a mode of attending to God."563
Proper knowledge and enjoyment of God remains impossible as long as Christian
theology and Christian communities continue to shirk the vocational responsibility of
attending to all human creatures and befriending each member of the body of Christ. The
great mystery of being-together is the precise means by which all the diverse and
dynamic embodiments of human being actually come together in ecclesial and
eschatological solidarity. Where being-together with persons with profound cognitive
disabilities is concerned, the Christian imagination is currently short on strategies for how
church practices ought to change to benefit persons with any sort of cognitive disability
because it very rarely considers their lives.564 Stanley Hauerwas hits upon the root of the
church's failure of these persons when he writes, "What has gone wrong is not that we
lack good will, but that we simply do not know how to care because we need the
challenge of real people who to teach us how to care."565
For this reason, the most important resource for reconstructing theological
anthropology in light of profound cognitive disability (for theologians and laity alike) is
to experience what it is like to receive the presence of a person with such disabilities. As
Creamer notes, "Genuine interaction is our best chance of truly connecting with each
563
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other in a world of difference and partialities."566 If formal doctrine and academic
theologies amount to knowledge about God, then they can only be a proper reflection of
the true knowledge of God when those who draft them are informed by a deep connection
to profoundly disabled lives.567 This statement presents a challenge to myself as well.
Beyond my familial ties to Jarrod, I must concur with Reinders that, “I find it much easier
to write about people with intellectual disabilities than to spend time with them.”568
Nevertheless, as proves to be the case with any stigma or discomfort concerning a
marginalized group, it is through sharing at least part of one's life with a supposed
stranger that truths once easily ignored become impossible to deny and that possibilities
for edifying change become real.569 The significance of a profoundly disabled life
discloses itself only through that sharing, and what that significance is will often come as
a surprise.570
Whatever surprises may come, one testimony that the friends and family of these
persons consistently provide is that life with them invariably requires individuals who
lack cognitive impairments to reorient their patterns of thought and action just to hold
space together successfully. In its privileging of cognitive function, Western society also
indoctrinates people to esteem efficient use of time and energy, the ability to control
566
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distracting impulses, thrift, economic success, self-reliance, and mastery of language.571
Yet persons with profound cognitive disabilities, precisely because these modes of selfpromotion and self-discipline are unavailable to them, appear to enjoy more regularly and
more naturally the peace that comes from being free to be oneself. The peace that attends
the immediacy of this simply being present is the peace that passes all understanding
(Phil. 4:7). Reinders comments that the embodied way of life persons with profound
cognitive disabilities demonstrate is foremost a lesson about what it is to live in God's
time, rather than scarce and partitioned time, and what it means to exhibit trust when
personal dependency places control over one's own life in the hands of another.572 A
community with the patience to dwell with these persons comes to accept that "time is
not a zero-sum game," and time is not lost like a wasted commodity if a meal or a church
service runs long.573 This continuation of Jesus's own story of being for others functions
as a counter-narrative for humankind in general.574
Persons with purposive agency demonstrate the humanizing use of that capacity
whenever they do their part to bring attention to how the life of God reveals itself through
disability.575 This includes promoting the flourishing of the profoundly disabled in the
performance of dependency work. Through caring gestures and attitudes, purposive
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agents assist these neighbors in the fashion of a midwife, facilitating their personal
manifestations of human being and experiencing with them the ecstasy that comes with
companionship.576 Christian thought also needs to rebuke the tendency to portray these
engagements as a unilateral movement of self-sacrifice by the able-minded party. While
the caregiver certainly does have a special responsibility to employ thought and practice
toward a dependent's well-being, the enhancement of human life is always necessarily
mutual.
The performance of dependency work is, of course, easier said than done. Jean
Vanier admits that, even after forty-plus years living in intentional community with
persons with cognitive disabilities, he does not understand all there is to know about
these persons or how to communicate with each of them.577 There is a both precarious
and extemporaneous character to these relationships that requires patience to work in
conjunction with vigilance and flexibility. There is no regular formula for being-together
here. Vanier further remarks:
Some people with disabilities call for the tenderness in me; others call forth
anguish, fear, and anger. In a world of constant, and often quite intense,
relationships, you quickly sense your inner limits, fears, and blockages...In times
of difficulty, it was hard to be open, welcoming, and patient. I have often come
head-to-head with my own handicaps, limits, and inner poverty. I did not always
find it easy, especially when my failure was evident to others...I am gradually
learning to accept my own shadow areas and to work with them in order to
diminish their power over me.578
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With his talk of shadow areas, Vanier brings attention back to the kinds of anxiety
that the encounter with profound cognitive disability can evoke. When face-to-face with a
child of God whose mere presence exposes the cracks and fissures in the "normal" order
of things, the precariousness of one's own material existence within that idolatrous
economy is also implicated. The temptation in response to that perceived threat is to
reduce the problematic Thou to an It, to exploit the harmful potential of relationality by
placing this atypically vulnerable other on the receiving end of my self-serving objective
functionings.579 Hiding personal vulnerability behind protective walls may preserve my
sense of autonomy and security for a time, but it does so by disengaging all parties from
"the very processes that have the power to bring wholeness."580 When this abuse defines
the society in which a person with profound cognitive disabilities lives (as it did during
the prevalence of institutionalization in the United States), he or she may truly never have
the opportunity for mutually enriching relationships.581 This amounts to nothing less than
dehumanization.
The acceptance of one's own vulnerabilities alongside the profound dependency
of another, however, leads to a further epiphany. As the engrafting work of the Spirit
draws both of them deeper and deeper into their common interdependence, persons with
purposive agency do not merely care for persons with profound cognitive disabilities,
579
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they care with them.582 When the church hears the vocational call to assist the persons
with disabilities solely as a commission to do good to them, they reduce the neighbor to
an object, albeit an object of charity.583 A similar danger is (what David Pailin) calls the
contributory view of disability. On this view, the life of a profoundly impaired individual
has worth because their dependency provides "an opportunity for the personal
development of those who care for them."584 In other words, they have instrumental value
because their presence challenges a "normal" person to become more ethical. To the
contrary, as responsive participants in the church's communal embodiment of the imago
Dei, the community must recognize and receive the gifts that persons with profound
cognitive disabilities actively provide for the edification of the body of Christ.585 For the
church, this will mean coming to see the presence of the Spirit of Christ in bodies and
behaviors that standard convention would label as disruptive, inconvenient, or
insignificant.
Having spent considerable time in sanctuaries with Jarrod when we were children,
I am intimately familiar with the sorts of distracting behaviors that may come from the
body of a person with his impairments. When active, Jarrod is liable to unleash any
number of unconventional noises, including grunts, hums, chirps of laughter, and those
unvoiced linguolabial trills more commonly known as "blowing raspberries." In
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conjunction with his cerebral palsy, his excitement also takes the form of grinding teeth,
spastic movements in his arms and hands, and the unpredictable extension of his knees or
hips. He is also prone to chew on his shirt, a bib, or (most often) his own fingers. Adding
to the potential stigma of how these behaviors may be received, the trills and the chewing
always involve drool or expectoration. These sounds and gestures still define him today
but, now a man in his mid-thirties, they are rarely as exuberant as they were when he was
a boy.
It is not difficult to imagine how the average congregant would find Jarrod's
presence in a worship service less than ideal, if not entirely unacceptable. But this is not
the only interpretation available even though it is likely the most common one. A concept
of human being that embraces the entire creature requires a corresponding understanding
of spirituality. What is to prevent the church from perceiving the unconventional
performances of Jarrod's body as acts of worship or praise, evidence that the Spirit of
Christ is active in the midst of God's people? David Coulter argues that spirituality is
present even where consciousness is limited or absent.586 It is a property of the whole
person, and not a property of the brain as consciousness is.587 While reflecting on the case
of Mary, a member of a Quaker community mentioned in Chapter 4, Swinton challenges
Christians to consider her physical interactions with others "as holy places where God is
revealed."588 Not only does being-together with Mary allow her to know God, but
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"accepting Mary's smiles, her touch, her sensitivity, her love is a way of receiving God's
love."589 Truly getting to the heart of the matter, Staley asks:
What if, instead of hearing the speech of a person with an intellectual disability in
church as disrupting a time of silent prayer or competing with the sermon, we
could take seriously the possibility that these are moments of grace bestowed on
the congregation? Could hearing sounds when we expect silence, two voices
when we expect one, or syllables when we expect sentences tell us something
about God, about human beings, about the life of the church?590
As I contemplate these questions myself, a bittersweet memory comes to mind. If
one were to watch the video recording of our father's funeral, the excited vocalizations of
an eleven-year-old Jarrod are audible throughout the service. Hauerwas posits that, as a
regular source of such unexpected occurrences, persons with cognitive disabilities are a
reminder that the God the church worships is not easily domesticated.591 In this light, I
think there is sufficient cause to view Jarrod's presence at that funeral as material
evidence that, even amidst the solemnity and mourning that come in the wake of death,
the joy and energy of eternal life remain active and available. The foolishness of God
may even take the form of blowing raspberries during a eulogy. This lesson can certainly
travel well beyond the walls of the sanctuary to serve as a hermeneutical key for catching
unexpected glimpses of God in any number of earthly contexts.
For these reasons, the content of Christian hope ought to include the expectation
that persons with profound cognitive disabilities will be present in whatever heaven
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providence might have in store for those who know God. Like the risen Christ himself,
they will experience impairment without disability, and no transformation according to
ableist ideals of health and beauty will be required. What such a person's precise place
should currently be among the many members of Christ's body still needs to be worked
out, but this is true of any person, irrespective of mental or physical ability.592 By
adopting a concept of human being that is dynamic, relational, and open-ended, Christian
theology ensures that mystery and uncertainty will continue to permeate even the most
intelligible and determinate conception of the imago Dei. In practice, therefore, this
doctrine may prove to be "as much a source of consternation as of celebration."593
Bringing profound cognitive disability to the center of theological reflection does not
exacerbate this consternation; it amplifies the cause for celebration. A relational
conceptualization of the imago Dei informed by a limits perspective discloses that the
final end of human being may be realized in the absence of an exhaustive and
unassailable account of what it means to be human before God.
The measure of a theological anthropology is how well it employs the conditional
goods of reason and imagination to capture the embodied and embedded realities of
being-together in Christ. Borrowing again from Vanier, I suggest that "maybe what our
world needs more than anything is communities where we celebrate life together and
become a sign of hope for our world."594 With regard to persons with profound cognitive
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disabilities, Christian theology's greatest service to humankind is to draw attention to
these signs and provide the theoretical justification for placing them at the center of both
thought and practice. In doing this, it declares a truth of love that the world rarely, if ever,
receives. Accordingly, I conclude with concise definitions of human being and human
flourishing that I intend to serve precisely that purpose.

Conclusion
Human being is a mode of relational existence in which the interdependent members
of a community recognize the dignity of others and themselves through embodied
practices of care and welcome. Human flourishing, then, is a state of well-being in which
one belongs to a radically interdependent community that is increasingly adept at
honoring the vulnerabilities and varying personal abilities of all of its members. These
concepts constitute an inherently theological anthropology insofar as any affirmation of
the underlying unity of the human family and, even more importantly, the basic goodness
of life's dynamic advance are confessions of faith in the face of the empirical world's
ambivalence toward humankind.595 Consistent with its biblical definition (Hebrews 11:1),
Christian faith involves a commitment to the eschatological vision that living a life for
others according to the example of the incarnate Christ will indeed lead to flourishing
instead of the destructive exploitation of a community's collective vulnerability.
The church is ever and always an inbreaking of an eternal life faith longs to see
fully realized because, to the degree it is authentically the body of Christ, it images God
Reynolds states, "“God is not another term for false optimism and a sense of controlled security, but
rather a way of naming the element of trustworthiness in the fragility of things, a way of persistently living
out the affirmation that ‘it is good.’” See Vulnerable Communion, 170.
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and makes the encounter with God more widely available. As the community that
becomes itself through practicing an economy of grace, its being-together is the material
sign of what human being in all its manifestations ought to be. Christ's church is the
concrete proof that human flourishing is a genuine, earthly possibility and not merely a
regulative ideal. A community that lives according to these anthropological assumptions
is the one whose members can turn to Jarrod, Mary, Chan, and Sesha—or to any person
with profound cognitive disabilities—and say:
"It is good that you exist. It is good that you are in this world. Not only are you
'one of us.' It is only together we are."
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Coda
As an epilogue to this study, I wish to revisit the anecdote I shared in Chapter 2
about my mother Debra. Her refrain ("Are we all just stupid and worthless?") deserves a
direct response. If I could draw upon the conclusion made above and place words in the
mouth of the younger self that sat before her in her moments of agitation, I would have
him say this:

No, mother, we are not stupid; not if the knowledge that matters most is the
knowledge of God that comes through being present with one another in our
uncertainty and vulnerability.

No, mother, we are not worthless; not when our dignity comes from the God
whose love is boundless and unceasing.

We might sometimes appear stupid, and we might sometimes seem worthless
because of the fragility and misunderstanding that colors our lives in the world.
But, as long we love one another within the limits of our flourishing, we will be
all we need to be.

Whether her mind grasped the intellectual content of these words would have been far
less important than whether she experienced the love that moved her child to speak them.
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